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ABSTRACT 
The alleged privacy paradox states that individuals report high values for personal 
privacy, while at the same time they report behavior that contradicts a high privacy value. 
This is a misconception. Reported privacy behaviors are explained by asymmetric 
subjective beliefs. Beliefs may or may not be uncertain, and non-neutral attitudes towards 
uncertainty are not necessary to explain behavior. This research was conducted in three 
related parts. 
Part one presents an experiment in individual decision making under uncertainty. 
Ellsberg’s canonical two-color choice problem was used to estimate attitudes towards 
uncertainty. Subjects believed bets on the color ball drawn from Ellsberg’s ambiguous 
urn were equally likely to pay. Estimated attitudes towards uncertainty were insignificant. 
Subjective expected utility explained subjects’ choices better than uncertainty aversion 
and the uncertain priors model. A second treatment tested Vernon Smith’s conjecture that 
preferences in Ellsberg’s problem would be unchanged when the ambiguous lottery is 
replaced by a compound objective lottery. The use of an objective compound lottery to 
induce uncertainty did not affect subjects’ choices. 
The second part of this dissertation extended the concept of uncertainty to 
commodities where quality and accuracy of a quality report were potentially ambiguous. 
The uncertain priors model is naturally extended to allow for potentially different 
attitudes towards these two sources of uncertainty, quality and accuracy. As they relate to 
privacy, quality and accuracy of a quality report are seen as metaphors for online security 
and consumer trust in e-commerce, respectively. The results of parametric structural tests 
were mixed. Subjects made choices consistent with neutral attitudes towards uncertainty 
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in both the quality and accuracy domains. However, allowing for uncertainty aversion in 
the quality domain and not the accuracy domain outperformed the alternative which only 
allowed for uncertainty aversion in the accuracy domain. 
Finally, part three integrated a public-goods game and punishment opportunities 
with the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism to elicit privacy values, replicating 
previously reported privacy behaviors. The procedures developed elicited punishment 
(consequence) beliefs and information confidentiality beliefs in the context of individual 
privacy decisions. Three contributions are made to the literature. First, by using cash 
rewards as a mechanism to map actions to consequences, the study eliminated 
hypothetical bias as a confounding behavioral factor which is pervasive in the privacy 
literature. Econometric results support the ―privacy paradox‖ at levels greater than 10 
percent. Second, the roles of asymmetric beliefs and attitudes towards uncertainty were 
identified using parametric structural likelihood methods. Subjects were, in general, 
uncertainty neutral and believed ―bad‖ events were more likely to occur when their 
private information was not confidential. A third contribution is a partial test to determine 
which uncertain process, loss of privacy or the resolution of consequences, is of primary 
importance to individual decision-makers. Choices were consistent with uncertainty 
neutral preferences in both the privacy and consequences domains. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
As a field, experimental and behavioral economics is familiar with the value of 
individual anonymity in laboratory interactions. Non-anonymous, face-to-face, 
interactions motivate altruistic, reciprocal, and other interpersonal comparisons which 
have been shown to change behavior in significant ways. This idea was first recognized 
in Siegel and Fouraker (1960). In a small experiment, Alvin E. Roth (1995, p. 297-98) 
demonstrates a significant decline in disagreement outcomes when bargaining is face-to-
face, as opposed to anonymous. The evidence further shows support for Siegel and 
Fouraker’s (196) anonymity (uncontrolled social utility) hypothesis. Disagreement rates 
are significantly higher in anonymous bargaining (Roth 1995, p. 298). However, face-to-
face disagreement rates are not significantly different when communication is 
constrained. A related literature, beginning with Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat, and Smith 
(1994), demonstrates a significantly higher incidence of self-regarding behavior under 
experimenter-subjects anonymity conditions. 
What is less understood, however, is how individuals value their own personal 
privacy, anonymity, and the consequences of privacy loss. What factors influence 
individual decisions to voluntarily give-up or protect personal privacy? Using the 
laboratory to simulate real-world exchanges of personal privacy, this thesis seeks to 
obtain a deeper understanding of how individuals value privacy (confidentiality) in 
bilateral bargaining situations, and how these valuations may be conditioned on existing 
states of privacy.  
If values of privacy have been understood for centuries (Westin 1967, 2003), why 
then do individual privacy decisions appear to exhibit what some have called paradoxical 
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behaviors? Acquisti and Grossklags (2005a) reports survey responses for 119 subjects, 
between 19 and 55 years of age. A majority of responses (89.2%) indicate that subjects 
are highly concerned about privacy.
1,2
 However, 87.5% of those same respondents have 
signed up for loyalty shopping cards, potentially placing themselves in privacy-sensitive 
situations. For example, the marketing firm HMI Communications, hired by Microsoft to 
handle a promotional ―give-away‖ of Visual Studio.net, inadvertently allowed personal 
information such as address, email, and telephone number for thousands of applicants to 
be made public (Orlowski 2002). Did these individuals consider the likelihood of their 
identifiable information becoming public, did they consider the likelihood of fraud, 
conditional on such a release, and how do the benefits of receiving a free copy of Visual 
Studio.net compare to the potential loss due to an increased risk of fraud? Similar 
questions can be asked of subscriber to AOL internet service (Barbaro and Zellner 2006). 
When AOL released 20 million web searches made from the AOL search engine, 
numerous individuals self-identified themselves through their web searches. 
The claim of paradoxical behavior rests on a misconception. Privacy behavior is 
easily explained as a tradeoff between expected benefits and expected costs. Conditional 
subjective beliefs account for the behavior reported in Acquisti and Grossklags (2005a). 
This thesis studies the roles of risk and uncertainty in privacy decision making. To 
accomplish this goal, laboratory experiments were conducted in three parts. Part one 
tested the canonical choice problem described by Ellsberg (1961, p. 650) and the role of 
uncertainty aversion in violations of Savage’s (1954) subjective expected utility theory. 
Part two extended the concept of uncertainty aversion to commodities with more than one 
                                                 
1
 The term ―high concern‖ is a self-reported qualitative ranking of how concerned survey respondents are 
about their privacy. 
2
 Norberg, Horne, and Horne (2007) observe similar self-reported behaviors. 
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source of uncertainty. The experimental design of Heath and Tversky (1991) was adapted 
to partially identify if subjects differentiate between uncertainties from different sources. 
And, finally, part three expands on the methods developed in parts one and two to study 
privacy decision-making and the role of uncertainty aversion. 
1.1 Experiments in Personal Privacy 
Individuals report high values for personal privacy, while at the same time 
reporting behaviors that would seem to contradict having high privacy values. These 
reports are self-reports from hypothetical surveys in which there are no real consequences 
from dishonest reporting. This statement of the alleged privacy paradox describes the 
canonical ―loyalty card‖ example discussed in Acquisti and Grossklags (2005a) and 
others. Syverson (2003) and Rifon, LaRose, and Lewis (2007) argue these reports are not 
indicative of paradoxical behavior. The dichotomy in self reports is attributable to either 
subject heterogeneity (Spiekermann, Grossklags, and Berendt 2002), or recognition that 
the alleged paradox assumes that stated attitudes map directly into consistent behavior 
(Syverson 2003; Rifon, LaRose, and Lewis 2007). 
More cachet explanations have included: bounded rationality, incomplete 
information, psychological distortions, attitudes towards risk/uncertainty
3
, and strategic 
interactions such as trust (Acquisti and Grossklags 2004 and 2005a). Evidence put 
forward in support of these claims is arguably tainted by confounding factors. These 
factors are: hypothetical biases, experimenter trust, framing effects, and deceit. 
Hypothetical bias in privacy studies is supported by Acquisti and Grossklags 
(2007), and is also a potential confound in Acquisti and Grossklags (2005b) and 
                                                 
3
 It should be noted that neither risk nor uncertainty aversion are necessary conditions to explain allegedly 
paradoxical privacy behavior. 
 4 
Huberman, Adar, and Fine (2005). Huberman et al (2005) elicit real and hypothetical 
values for pieces of private information. For their real treatment, average willingness-to-
accept for loss in weight privacy was $74.06, and 57.56 for age privacy loss.
4
 Reported 
values rose dramatically for hypothetical salary and other unverifiable characteristics. In 
Acquisti and Grossklags (2005b)
5
 values for 13 data categories such as name, SSN, 
favorite online alias, home address, phone number, email address, sexual fantasies, etc. 
were elicited using an open-ended hypothetical instrument. Wathieu and Friedman (2007, 
sec. 1) would use these results as providing ―useful dollar values‖ for privacy valuations. 
However, Harrison and Rutström (1999) tell us there are probably significant upward 
biases on these reports. Even if one corrected for hypothetical bias, as illustrated in List 
and Shogren (2002), instruments used in privacy experiments do not provide mechanisms 
mapping actions into controlled consequences.
6
 
The Duhem-Quine problem
7
 can be found in Norberg, Horne, and Horne (2007), 
where deceitful practices and experimenter trust effects are confounding factors. In 
Norberg et al. (2007) an attempt was made to control for both uncertainty and trust 
through framing of a hypothetical survey instrument designed to simulate a marketer’s 
request for personal information. Their results offer little, if any, support for paradoxical 
                                                 
4
 Huberman, Adar, and Fine (2005) conducted both a theoretically incentive compatible sealed bid real 
reverse Vickrey auction, and a hypothetical reverse Vickrey auction. Real auctions consisted of selling 
verifiable personal information, such as weight and age for 127 individuals. Rutström (1998) and Harstad 
(2000) provide evidence that behavior in Vickrey auctions does not reliably induce truthful responses, 
despite the theoretical incentive compatibility of the procedure. These bids need to be interpreted with 
caution. Hypothetical auctions were carried out for ―unverifiable‖ information, such as credit rating, 
income, and savings. The average demand prices for age and weight were $57.56 and $74.06, respectively. 
5
 Acquisti and Grossklags (2005a) and (2005b) use the same subject pool. 
6
 Furthermore, results presented in Acquists and Grossklags (2005b) does not test effects of uncertain 
(ambiguous) consequences on individual privacy decisions. The experimental design varied the framing of 
benefits as either a payment or discount on a purchase, not with uncertainty. 
7
 The Duhem-Quine thesis states that without proving the background assumptions it is impossible to prove 
or disprove a theory. Absence of order effects is an untested background assumption in Acquists and 
Grossklags (2005b). 
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privacy behavior. Violation of the ceteris paribus condition, as well as deceitful 
experimental practices, explained below, confounds their experiment. 
The initial experimental treatment in Norberg et al. (2007) was conducted under a 
hypothetical scenario, asking subjects to behave as if they were responding to an 
information request by a bank. Subjects were instructed that they were taking part in a 
focus group to aid in the design of a bank’s survey instrument. The second treatment 
removed the as if condition but a level of trust (i.e., a bank representative
8
) was added. 
Treatment two of the ―experiment‖ used dishonest practices. There was in fact no bank, 
and the bank representative was a fraud designed to cajole subjects into freely revealing 
personal information. 
Deceitful practices question the validity of subject responses, even under the most 
pristine experimental conditions. Do the subjects in Norberg et al. (2007) have previous 
experiences with deceitful practices? If so, are they responding truthfully, or are they 
trying to exhibit behavior that they think the researchers want to see? Or, are they languid 
with respect to the experimental task, simply reporting systematic responses in an attempt 
to extract resources (e.g., money or grades) from the experimenter? Hertwig and Ortmann 
(2001, p. 396-399) offer a detailed survey of potential detriments to deceiving and using 
subjects whom have previously been deceived by such experimental designs. 
Trust affects were also likely confounds in the online shopping experiment 
reported in Spiekerman, Grossklags, and Berendt (2002), Berendt, Günther, and 
Spiekerman (2005). In this particular experiment, subjects were given the opportunity to 
purchase real commodities (a camera or jacket) with their own money during an online 
                                                 
8
 Phase two of the ―experiment‖ presented in Norberg, Horne, and Horne (2007) used dishonest practices. 
There was no bank representative (ibid., 111, 115). 
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shopping experience. However, at the outset of the experiment, subjects were instructed 
―the experiment’s goal was to test interaction with a new product search engine.‖ 
(Spiekerman, Grossklags, and Berendt 2002 p. 40). These instructions, cue subjects to 
interact with the search engine as an expected behavior during the experiment. 
Furthermore, provision of rights according to EU privacy directive 95/46/EC and 
(unspoken) institutional review board policies likely diminish subject apprehensions to 
providing the experimenter with personal information. 
The literature recognizes that stated intentions often contradict (stated) behavior, 
even for privacy decisions. Subjective beliefs, consistent with Savage’s (1954) subjective 
expected utility, are capable of explaining reported privacy behaviors. As a result, the 
concept of uncertainty and attitudes towards uncertainty are unnecessary explanations. 
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents a series of numerical 
examples to demonstrate the role beliefs play in explaining privacy behaviors. The 
concept of uncertainty is introduced with Ellsberg’s (1961) paradox, and rationalized 
with the uncertain-priors model of Neilson (1993, 2009) and Klibanoff, Marinacci, and 
Mukerji (2005). Three experiments are proposed to test six hypotheses developed 
throughout the chapter. Each experiment and findings are presented in chapters 3, 4, and 
5 respectively.  
Chapter 3 experimentally identifies attitudes towards uncertainty in the classic 
Ellsberg (1961) framework. A structural econometric model is developed to calibrate 
estimated attitudes for risk aversion and subjective beliefs. In Chapter 4, the experimental 
design of heath and Tversky (1991) and linear scoring rule is used to elicit individual 
preferences for objective, uncertain, and compound uncertain lottery pairs. Structural 
 7 
econometric modeling suggests that subjects may cognitively differentiate multiple 
uncertain processes. Chapter 5 implements an experimental design replicating privacy 
behaviors previously documented in the literature. The experimental instruments are 
designed to mitigate previously identified experimental confounds and biases from 
hypothetical choice situations, experimenter trust effects, time inconsistent preferences, 
uncontrolled preferences, and deceitful practices. In addition to replicating privacy 
behaviors in a controlled environment, the data suggest that subjects respond differently 
to uncertain of confidentiality loss and uncertain consequences. The results of chapters 4 
and 5 also support a hypothesis that trust confounded subject choices in Spiekerman et al. 
(2007), Berendt et al. (2002), and affected consumer decisions in AOL and HMI. Finally, 
Chapter 6 concludes this dissertation. 
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CHAPTER 2: THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
The alleged privacy paradox says decision-makers report high values for personal 
privacy, while at the same time these same decision-makers report behaviors that would 
seem to contradict having high privacy values. Three behavioral explanations 
hypothesized to rationalize reported behavior are: Savage’s subjective expected utility 
(Syverson 2003), aversion to uncertainty (Acquisti and Grossklags 2004), and time 
inconsistent preferences (Acquisti 2004). In the sequel, I test Syverson’s (2003) 
hypothesis that the pattern of observed privacy behaviors is consistent with Savage’s 
(1954) subjective expected utility (SEU) model. Uncertainty aversion is a more general 
model, where the decision-maker holds multiple uncertain prior beliefs for the risks 
associated with privacy behavior. Because of its close relation to subjective beliefs, the 
time inconsistencies explanation is not studied here. 
2.1 Subjective Expected Utility 
Savage (1954) shows that if the decision-maker behaves according to a set of 
axioms he will behave as if maximizing a preference functional give by 
    j j
j J
V p v z

 z , (1) 
where jz  are consequences of act Z , dependent on which state j J  occurs, jp  is a 
probability measure (subjectively) known to the decision-maker, and  v   is the state 
independent utility function. To show how SEU preferences explain privacy behavior, 
consider the canonical ―loyalty card‖ example discussed by Acquisti and Grossklags 
(2005a). A majority of survey respondents (89.2%) reported having a high concern for 
privacy. However, those same respondents admit to routinely placing themselves in 
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privacy-sensitive situations. For example, 87.5% of respondents with a high concern for 
privacy have signed up for loyalty cards using real identifying information. 
A high privacy concern is taken to be synonymous with a high dollar value of 
private information. Thus, the paradoxical privacy behavior is represented by the decision 
to not make a direct-sale of information to someone who would potentially do harm, 
while at the same time make an indirect-sale of the same personal information to 
someone who will not do direct harm but may reveal the information to the same person 
who would potentially do harm. Acquisti and Grossklags (2005a), among others, would 
claim this behavior represents a dichotomy between stated privacy concerns and stated 
behavior. 
Consider this numerical example of the ―loyalty card‖ problem. Assume the 
decision-maker has an initial wealth level given by w  (e.g., $100w  ) and, in exchange 
for identifying information, he is offered some positive amount of money y  (e.g., 
$20y  ). If the decision-maker is successfully defrauded, he will lose some portion of 
his wealth. For simplicity, assume he loses 1   percent, retaining either w  or 
 w y   following a successful fraud attempt. Specifically, let 0.5  , $50w   and 
  $60w y   . Finally, let  cg,cb,ng,nbJ   be the events (good (g) conditional of 
confidential (c), bad (d) conditional on confidentiality, etc.) considered by the decision-
maker. 
For the direct sale the decision-maker compares the lottery between good and bad 
events conditional on confidentiality, against the alternative lottery for good and bad 
events conditional on non-confidentiality and payment for his identifying information. 
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Assume these beliefs are given by    g|c b|c g|n b|n, , , 0.65,0.35,0.35,0.65p p p p   with 
   c n, 0.50,0.50p p  . When his identifying information is confidential, the decision-
maker believes there is a lower risk of being defrauded. 
Defining  v x x , SEU preferences imply that if the decision-maker makes the 
direct sale he expects utility 
 |direct sale 0.35 120 0.65 60 8.869V     z , 
and if he does not make the direct sale he expects utility 
 |no direct sale 0.65 100 0.35 50 8.975V     z . 
The decision-maker decides not to make the direct sale. However, when confronted with 
the same offer of $20 for an indirect sale, the decision-maker agrees to the transaction 
because he believes there is a 50 percent chance his personal information remains 
confidential. For the indirect sale, the decision-maker expects utilities 
 |indirect sale 0.5 0.35 120 0.65 60V       z  
0.5 0.65 120 0.35 60 9.350      
 
, and 
   |no indirect sale 0.65 100 0.35 50 8.975 |no direct saleV V     z z . 
As this example demonstrates, exotic non-SEU preference functions are 
unnecessary to explain privacy behaviors. However, for ambiguous events, decision-
makers appear to exhibit aversion to uncertain mean preserving spreads (Camerer and 
Weber 1992). Halevy (2007) reports on an experiment where approximately 30% are 
characterized by ambiguity aversion. The uncertain priors (UP) model (Neilson 1993, 
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2009; and Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji 2005) is used to behaviorally allow for 
attitudes towards uncertain privacy events. 
The canonical concept of uncertainty aversion is introduced with Ellsberg’s 
(1961, p. 650) two-color problem. The same UP model also explains Ellsberg’s three-
color problem (see Appendix B). 
2.2 Uncertainty Aversion: Ellsberg’s Paradox 
Consider the following Ellsberg (1961, p. 650) example. There are two urns, and 
each is filled with red and black balls. Urn 1 contains 100 balls, split evenly between red 
and black. Balls drawn from urn 1 are labeled ―R‖ for red and ―B‖ for black. Urn 2 also 
contains 100 balls. However, the mix of balls is unknown. Balls drawn from urn 2 are 
labeled ―r‖ for red and ―b‖ for black. 
Table 1. Ellsberg’s Two Urn Problem 
Outcomes 1L  2L  3L  4L  
Rr $100 $0 $100 $0 
Rb $100 $100 $0 $0 
Br $0 $0 $100 $100 
Bb $0 $100 $0 $100 
 
Table 1 shows four lotteries ( 1L , 2L , 3L , and 4L ), with prizes $0 or $100 defined 
over the unique outcomes from drawing one ball from urn 1, and then a second ball from 
urn 2. Ellsberg (1961) hypothesized that subjects would exhibit preference relations given 
by 1 4~L L , 2 3~L L , 1 2L L , and 4 3L L . These hypotheses are the result of a thought 
experiment by Ellsberg, in the sense defined by Harrison and List (2004). He did pose 
these choices hypothetically to several prominent economists, including Savage. But the 
key ―empirical hypothesis‖ here derives from intuition, not observed choices in the sense 
that modern experimental economics would suggest. 
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Remember, L2 and L3 are each filled with 100 balls in unknown proportions of red 
and black balls. Had our Ellsberg decision-maker believed either event red or black was 
more likely to occur, he would have preferred to a bet paying on that color to 
indifference. By stating indifference, he is revealing to us his prior uniform belief. By this 
same logic, preferences for L1 over L2 and for L4 over L3 implies (Savage’s (1954) SEU) 
that subjects believe the likelihood of drawing red and black balls from urn 2 are less than 
1
2
, hence the paradox. The UP model (Neilson 1993, 2009; and Klibanoff, Marinacci, and 
Mukerji 2005) rationalizes these preferences by applying Savage’s (1954) axioms to 
second-order beliefs. 
2.2.1 The Uncertain Priors Model 
Using the terminology of Anscombe and Aumann (1963), let there be 1,...,j J  
(uncertain) horse lotteries and 1,...,k K  (certain) roulette lotteries. The decision-maker 
holds 1,...,i I  prior distributions over each horse’s ability to win the race – the outcome 
of the uncertain process U . Denote the probability over these priors as  1,..., I ρ . 
The set  1,...,i iJU U  is the set of uncertain processes with unknown probabilities for each 
of the J  horses winning the race. Define a set  1,..., KC C  as the set of certain processes 
with known probabilities over each of the K  roulette lotteries. 
Let  1,...,ij ijK   define the subjective conditional probabilities assigned to thj  
horse winning and the thk  roulette lottery outcome under each prior i . The decision-
maker’s overall evaluation of his preference for the race is 
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    
1 1 1
I J K
i ijk jk
i j k
W u v z 
  
 
  
 
 z , (2) 
where  W z  is the evaluation of all I  priors that the decision-maker holds, and 
U C
ijk ij k    with 
U
ij  defined as the probabilistic belief of each horse j  winning and 
C
k  
the known probability of the thk  certain event. The function  v   measures utility over 
final payoffs 
jkz , and  u   is the evaluation of the decision-maker’s subjective expected 
utility over final payoffs from the certain roulette lotteries. The curvature of  u   
measures uncertainty associated with the priors 1,...,i I . To illustrate how the UP model 
is able to account for the preferences depicted in Ellsberg’s example, I recreate the 
numerical example found in Andersen, Harrison, Fountain, and Rutström (2009). 
For some argument x , define  v x x  and   0.9u x x . Define balls drawn 
from urns 1 and 2 as belonging to the sets  R,Bk   and  r,bj  , respectively.  
Further assume the decision-maker holds three priors over the distribution of balls in urn 
2. That is,    1 2 3, , 0.6,0.2,0.2    , with    1r 1b, 0.5,0.5U U   ,    2r 2b, 0.4,0.6U U   , 
and    3r 3b, 0.6,0.4U U   . For each of these priors, the decision-maker evaluates 
U C
ijk ij k    as    1r R 1b R 1r B 1b B, , , 0.25,0.25,0.25,0.25U C U C U C U C          for his first prior set 
of probabilistic beliefs,    2r R 2b R 2r B 2b B, , , 0.2,0.3,0.2,0.3U C U C U C U C          for his second 
set of prior beliefs, and finally for his third set of priors the decision-maker believes 
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   3r R 3b R 3r B 3b B, , , 0.3,0.2,0.3,0.2U C U C U C U C         . For each of these priors, the evaluation 
of  
1 1
J K
ijk jk
j k
v z
 
  for lottery 1L  (see Table 1) is then given by 
1L : 0.25 10 0.25 10 0.25 0 0.25 0 5        , 
under prior 1, 
1L : 0.20 10 0.30 10 0.20 0 0.30 0 5        , 
under prior 2, and 
1L : 0.30 10 0.20 10 0.30 0 0.20 0 5        , 
under prior 3. Similar calculations are made for lotteries 2L , 3L , and 4L . Evaluating 
preferences for each lottery, 
  0.9 0.9 0.91 0.6 5 0.2 5 0.2 5 4.257W L        , 
  0.9 0.9 0.92 0.6 5 0.2 6 0.2 4 4.254W L        , 
  0.9 0.9 0.93 0.6 5 0.2 4 0.2 6 4.254W L        , 
  0.9 0.9 0.94 0.6 5 0.2 5 0.2 5 4.257W L        . 
For this numerical example,    1 4W L W L ,    2 3W L W L ,    1 2W L W L , 
and    4 3W L W L , which explains the hypothesized pattern of preferences in 
Ellsberg’s example. It is easy to see that, if there is no aversion to uncertainty, such that 
 u x x  apart from arbitrary normalizations, then        1 2 3 4W L W L W L W L   . 
This is the prediction of conventional subjective expected utility theory. 
Although the hypothesis that individuals exhibit uncertainty aversion has been 
studied extensively (Camerer and Webber 1992), prior investigations of the uncertainty 
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aversion hypothesis failed to verify the background assumption: the decision-maker 
believes that the realization of events is equally likely for both the known and unknown 
urns. Given this gap in the existing literature, the first hypothesis to be tested is: 
HYPOTHESIS 1: In Ellsberg’s (1961) 2-color problem (p. 650), subjects behave as if 
the realization of each uncertain event is equally likely as each 
certain event and bets on certain events are preferred to bets on 
uncertain events. 
Smith (1969, p. 329) conjectured that Ellsberg’s (1961) pattern of preferences 
would also be observable for bets where the distribution of balls in the ambiguous urn 
was determined by a uniform random integer 0-100. Since then, experimentalists (Sarin 
and Weber 1993; Harrison 2009) have considered compound lotteries as attractive tools 
for inducing uncertainty in laboratory settings. Because Smith’s (1969) conjecture 
remains untested, the following two hypotheses emerge as important methodological 
inquiries: 
HYPOTHESIS 2: The proportion UP/SEU consistent choices are equal for both the 
Ellsberg (1961) and Smith (1969) treatments. 
HYPOTHESIS 3: Attitudes towards uncertainty are equivalent for both the Ellsberg 
(1961) and Smith (1969) lotteries. 
The remainder of this chapter presents the UP model in the context of privacy. 
Finally, the analysis is extended to include two uncertain processes. 
2.3 Explaining Privacy Behavior with the Uncertain Priors Model 
The Ellsberg (1961) example(s) and the UP model (Neilson 1993, 2009; and 
Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji 2005) demonstrate how the uncertainty averse 
 16 
individual, will discount more heavily those processes which are described as ―more 
uncertain.‖ The utility spread for 2L  and 3L  are greater than that of 1L  and 4L . 
The ―loyalty card‖ problem is used as to illustrate the role of uncertain priors in 
privacy decisions. This behavior can occur in any privacy decision. The acts of 
confession or being an ―anonymous source‖ are other examples of the privacy paradox. 
Redefine  g,bk   for the good and bad outcomes. Let the J  uncertain events be 
given by  c,nj   for when the vendor has upheld the confidentiality of the decision-
maker and when confidentiality was violated. The following example shows that the UP 
model with only one uncertain process explains the alleged privacy paradox when the 
objective probabilities of experiencing either a good or bad events are conditional on the 
decision-maker’s state of confidentiality.  
Assume the decision-maker has an initial wealth level given by w  (e.g., 
$100w  ) and, in exchange for identifying information, he is offered some positive 
amount of money y  (e.g., $20y  ). Unconditional on the decision to sell information, if 
the decision-maker is successfully defrauded, he will lose some portion of his wealth. For 
simplicity, assume he loses 1   percent, retaining either w  or  w y  . Specifically, 
let 0.5  , $50w   and   $60w y   . Assume the decision-maker holds 2 priors 
 0.5,0.5ρ  for the uncertainty that the decision-maker’s confidentiality is violated. For 
each of these priors, let the distribution of events  c,nj   be    1c 1n, 0.7,0.3U U    and 
   2c 2n, 0.3,0.7U U   . These beliefs assume the decision-maker has joined the loyalty 
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card program. If the decision-maker does not make an indirect sale, then he forms a set of 
degenerate beliefs      1c 1n 2c 2n, , 0,1U U U U     .  
Let the objectively-known probabilities of a bad event conditional on a privacy 
breach be    g|c b|c, 0.65,0.35C C    and    g|n b|n, 0.35,0.65C C   . For prior one the 
decision-maker holds subjective probabilistic belief given by 
   1cb 1nb 1cg 1ng, , , 0.245,0.195,0.455,0.105     , and for prior two his beliefs are given 
by     2cb 2nb 2cg 2ng, , , 0.105,0.455,0.195,0.245     . Defining  v x x  and 
  0.7u x x , equation (2) implies that if the decision-maker makes an indirect sale, he 
expects utility 
 
0.7
|indirect sale 0.5 0.245 60 0.195 60 0.455 120 0.105 120W          
 
z  
0.7
0.5 0.105 60 0.455 60 0.195 120 0.245 120 4.781          
 
. 
If he does not make an indirect sale, the decision-maker’s information remains 
confidential and he forms beliefs      1 1 2 2, , 1,0U U U Uc n c n     , which imply that 
     2cb 2nb 2cg 2ng 1cb 1nb 1cg 1ng, , , , , , 0.35,0,0.65,0         , and  
 
0.7
( |noindirect sale) 0.35 50 0.65 100 4.646 |indirect saleW W      
 
z z , 
and the decision-maker decides to make the indirect sale because he expects a higher 
utility.  
Calculating utilities for the direct sale part of the alleged paradox is similar to the 
first part of the example. The direct sale decision removes the uncertainty from the 
decision-maker’s problem. He forms one of two degenerate beliefs, 100% or 0% 
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confidentiality. By not directly selling his information, the decision-maker forms the 
degenerate belief      1c 1n 2c 2n, , 1,0U U U U     . Thus, 
0.7
( |nodirect sale) 0.35 50 0.65 100 ( |noindirect sale)W W     
 
z z . 
By directly selling his personal information, the decision-maker holds beliefs 
     1c 1n 2c 2n, , 0,1U U U U     , such that his beliefs are objectively given by 
     2cb 2nb 2cg 2ng 1cb 1nb 1cg 1ng, , , , , , 0,0.65,0,0.35         , and so 
0.7
( |direct sale) 0.65 60 0.35 120 4.608 ( |no direct sale)W W      
 
z z . 
With the objective probabilities of either a bad or good event occurring 
conditioned on confidentiality of the decision-maker’s information, we see how decision-
makers evaluate uncertainty in privacy decisions. Extending the UP model to include two 
uncertain processes is a straightforward exercise.  
2.4 Explaining the Privacy Paradox with Two Uncertain Processes 
Extending the UP model to account for subjective belies for both a privacy breach 
and the consequences of such a breach is a conceptually straightforward exercise, 
although it does impose some notational burden. Consider the preference function 
    
  
1 2
1 2 1 1 1 2 2 2
1 1 2 2 1 2
1 2
1 1 c,n g,b
I I
i i i j j i j j
i i j j
W u v z   
   
 
  
 
 
  z . (3) 
In addition to his first 1I  priors for his identifying information remaining 
confidential, the decision-maker has now formed the additional 2I  prior probabilistic 
beliefs of a bad event, conditioned on the  1 c,nj   events. This formulation of the UP 
model assumes ROCL applies between the two uncertain processes. Beliefs represented 
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by 1 2 2
2
j i j
 , and 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 2
1 2
i i j j i j j i j
    are the decision-maker’s beliefs of realizing the events 
 1 c,nj   and  2 g,bj  . Finally, 2i  are the probabilities over the 
2I  priors. 
In equation (3), curvature of  u x  at the point x  measures the decision-maker’s 
aversion to his 1 2I I  uncertain beliefs of the 1 2J J  events. To show how equation (3) 
explains privacy behavior, use the same payoffs and functions before. Denote the 
subjective beliefs of good or bad events by    2 2 2 22 2 2 21 g|c 1 b|c 1 g|n 1 b|n, , , 0.7,0.3,0.3,0.7      
and    2 2 2 22 2 2 22 g|c 2 b|c 2 g|n 2 b|n, , , 0.6,0.4,0.4,0.6      which are his beliefs of bad and good 
events under each prior, conditional on his state of confidentiality.  
Define    1 2 1 1 1 2 2 21 2
1 2
c,n g,bi i i j j i j jj j
SEU v z 
 
   as the decision-maker’s prior 
subjective expected utilities over the final outcomes g or b, conditioned on c or n. Beliefs 
of having his identifying information remain confidential after engaging in an indirect 
sale are given by    1 1 1 11 1 1 11 c 1 n 2 c 2 n, , , 0.7,0.3,0.3,0.7       
If the decision-maker indirectly sells his information 
1 21 1
0.58 120 0.42 60 9.607SEU    , 
1 21 2
0.42 120 0.58 60 9.094SEU    , 
1 22 1
0.54 120 0.46 60 9.479SEU    , and 
1 21 2
0.46 120 0.54 60 9.222SEU    . 
The decision-maker expects final utility 
     
0.7 0.7
| indirect sale 0.25 9.607 0.25 9.094W    z  
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   
0.7 0.7
0.25 9.479 0.25 9.222 4.781     . 
If the decision-maker decides not to make the indirect sale, then he recognizes 
that he will be in a confidential state with certainty, and he forms the degenerate prior 
conditional probability distributions    1 1 1 11 1 1 1 11 c 1 n 2 c 2 n, , , 1,0,1,0    π , which implies 
1 2 1 21 1 1 2
0.70 100 0.30 50 9.992SEU SEU    , and 
1 2 1 22 1 1 2
0.60 100 0.40 50 9.671SEU SEU    . 
By deciding not to make the indirect sale, the decision-maker expects final utility 
       
0.7 0.7
| no indirect sale 0.5 9.992 0.5 9.671 4.646 | indirect saleW W     z z . 
The decision-maker will make the indirect sale because he expects to be better-off. 
Not making a direct sale is equivalent to not making an indirect sale of identifying 
information. Thus,    | no direct sale | no indirect sale 4.646W W z z . Making the 
direct sale, the decision-maker forms the degenerate beliefs 
   1 1 1 11 1 1 1 11 c 1 n 2 c 2 n, , , 0,1,0,1    π  by recognizing that he will be in a non-confidential 
state. Hence,  
1 2 1 21 1 1 2
0.30 100 0.70 50 8.709SEU SEU    , and 
1 2 1 22 1 1 2
0.40 100 0.60 50 9.029SEU SEU    . 
By deciding not to make the direct sale, the decision-maker expects final utility 
       
0.7 0.7
| direct sale 0.5 8.709 0.5 9.029 4.607 | no direct saleW W     z z , 
and the decision-maker decides not to sell his information. 
These numerical examples have shown how uncertainty aversion is incorporated 
into reported privacy behavior. The two-process UP model specified by equation (3) has 
 21 
two alternative interpretations. First, the decision-maker cognitively differentiates 
between the probabilities he assigns to his 1I  and 2I  priors (Kramer and Budescu 2002), 
and his preferences are given by 
    
  
1 2
1 2 1 1 1 2 2 2
1 1 2 2 1 2
1 2 1 2
1 1 c,n g,b
I I
i i i j j i j j
i i j j
W u u v z   
   
  
   
  
  
   z , (4) 
which is consistent with the interpretation that the decision-maker believes the uncertain 
confidentiality process determines the fraud process, which finally determines his payoff 
(Nielson’s 1993, 2009). The second (re)interpretation says the resolution of the fraud 
event determines the uncertain confidentiality process which determines confidentiality, 
and preference are given by 
    
  
2 1
2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2
2 2 1 1 1 2
2 1 1 2
1 1 c,n g,b
I I
i i i j j i j j
i i j j
W u u v z   
   
  
   
  
  
   z . (5) 
Each of these last two models reduces to equation (3) when the decision-maker’s 
attitudes are neutral towards the uncertainty of his priors over confidentiality or fraud, 
respectively. Chapter 4 introduces the experimental instrument used to vary each 
uncertainty, confidentiality breach and consequences, to identify the model (equation (3), 
(4),or (5)) which best describes individual privacy behaviors. 
Chapter 4 also accomplishes two objectives. First, the analysis is extended to 
identify attitudes towards commodity identification. The experimental design of Heath 
and Tversky (1991), which elicits preferences for probabilistically equivalent certain and 
uncertain lottery pairs, is adapted to Harrsion, List, and Towe (2007) which elicits 
preferences for lotteries paying with a field commodity rather than cash. The experiment 
is used to demonstrate that separate attitudes towards different uncertain processes are 
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identifiable. And, these estimates are behaviorally meaningful. The primary hypothesis 
tested is: 
HYPOTHESIS 4: Subjects cognitively differentiate between different uncertain 
processes. 
Chapter 5 collects all of these concepts together and offers the first true test for 
uncertainty aversion in the context of privacy decisions. The main hypotheses to be tested 
are: 
HYPOTHESIS 5: Subjects’ willingness-to-accept confidentiality loss is lower when 
making indirect sales of information to a party that does not have a 
direct mechanism to harm the subject. 
HYPOTHESIS 6: Subjects cognitively differentiates between uncertain 
confidentiality breach and consequences. 
Full information maximum likelihood (FIML) techniques were used to estimates the 
structural parameters of the SEU and UP models presented in the preceding discussion. 
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CHAPTER 3: TESTING ELLSBERG’S PARADOX & SMITH’S HYPOTHESIS 
This chapter presents a study of uncertainty aversion in individual decision-
making. This study is a methodological inquiry to replicate Ellsberg’s (1961) two-color 
thought experiment using real monetary rewards in a controlled laboratory environment. 
Although experimental evidence has been offered suggesting uncertainty aversion is a 
good description of individual decision-making (Becker and Brownson 1964; Yates and 
Zukowski 1976; Chow and Sarin 2002; Halevy 2007), verification of symmetric beliefs 
for both the known and unknown urns, necessary for uncertainty aversion, have not been 
verified. Ellsberg’s (1961, p. 653) three-color problem has been replicated by Ford and 
Ghose (1998) and Schmidt and Neugebauer (2003). 
The three-color problems, as well as supporting arguments for the two-color 
problem (Ellsberg’s 1961, p. 651 fn. 1), offer inappropriate support for uncertainty 
aversion. This argument has been previously recognized by Wakker (2001, p. 1040) and 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992, §1.3). Like the Allais paradox, multi-color and single-urn 
problems are also explained without reference to uncertainty attitudes. As a result, single-
urn problems do not isolate uncertainty aversion, a violation of simple ordering
9
, from 
violations of independence or the sure-thing principle, or even a systematic resolution of 
indifference (see Appendix B).
10
 Neilson (1993, 2009) and Klibanoff, Marinacci, and 
Mukerji (2005), as well as other multiple-prior models (e.g., maxmin EU of Gilboa and 
                                                 
9
 Cox and Epstein (1989) found that preference reversals were the result of violations of the completeness 
axiom, rather than violations the sure-thing principle. 
10
 It must also be recognized that direct replication of the three-color problem, as in the case of Ford and 
Ghose (1998), omits the possibility of indifference which allows for an explanation of the preference 
reversal as (possibly) the result of a systematic resolution of indifference (see Appendix B). Those 
decision-maker’s choices should not be considered significant (Savage 1954, p. 17). 
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Schmeidler (1989) and anticipated utility of Segal (1987)), capture the essence of UA, as 
describing attitudes towards expectations of expectations. 
The closest replication of Ellsberg’s (1961) two-color problem was offered by 
Chow and Sarin (2002).
11
 In their experiments, an unopened bag of M&Ms was used to 
simulate Ellsberg’s unknown urn. Chow and Sarin (1976, p. 135) report that ―…there was 
virtually no difference in the mean prices…‖ for bets on red, blue, or orange and bets on 
green, brown, or yellow. The M&Ms test reveals the most compelling evidence in favor 
of uncertainty aversion. Lacking statistical verification of symmetric probabilistic beliefs, 
certainty equivalents reported in Chow and Sarin (2002) are consistent with both aversion 
to acts with uncertain or ambiguous probabilities, and the formation of asymmetric 
beliefs. Consider the following example. 
Chow and Sarin (2002) asked subjects to report their willingness-to-pay for a bet 
that the color of a candy drawn from an M&M’s bag. The first bets paid if the color 
candy was red, blue, or orange. The second paid if the color was green, brown, or yellow. 
On average subjects were willing to pay $11.95 when the true distribution of color groups 
was known to be 50-50. Assuming EUT applied, the mean report is consistent with 
moderate risk aversion crra≈0.326, assuming also the utility function crrau x . For an 
unknown distribution of candies, average willingness-to-pay decreased $5.57 to $6.38. 
This value is consistent with either the belief that a favorable outcome is ≈41% and there 
is no uncertainty, or the subject has many uncertain priors and attitudes towards their 
uncertainty. 
                                                 
11
 Halevy (2007, p. 516, footnote 14) notes that the background assumption that subjective beliefs for the 
composition of the unknown urn needs to be 50-50 for either color. However, he offers no test of the 
assumption. 
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Halevy (2007) used four urns, with varying degrees of ambiguity, to extend Yates 
and Zukowski (1976). Each urn contained ten balls with distributions either known with 
certainty or determined using Smith’s (1969) compound objective lottery. Values of each 
lottery were elicited using the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (1964) (BDM) mechanism. 
There was considerable heterogeneity between elicited values which were shown to be 
consistent with three popular decision theories: SEU, rank dependent utility, and the less 
popular uncertain priors model. Use of the BDM mechanism to elicit incentive 
compatible values has come into question, however; especially when preferences violate 
reduction of compound lotteries (Segal 1987; Holt 1986; and Karni and Safra 1987).  
Approximately 35% of subjects revealed values consistent with the UP model, 
another 35% were consistent with a recursive rank dependent utility specification (Segal 
1987), and the last 30% exhibited preferences consistent with SEU. In principle, had the 
mechanism worked properly and subjects were known to assign 50-50 probabilities to the 
uncertain events, this discussion would be mute. Criticisms raised by Segal (1987) (as 
well as Holt (1986) and Karni and Safra (1987)) would validate Halevy’s (2007) 
conclusions. However, unknown subjective beliefs raise behavioral doubts and question 
the validity of Halevy’s design. 
These criticisms point to the need to control for subjective beliefs in order to 
properly identify attitudes towards uncertainty. Heath and Tversky (1991) addressed 
control of beliefs by eliciting probabilistic reports for the occurrence of a series of 
uncertain events. Reports were subsequently used to present subjects with paired lottery 
choices between the status quo uncertain prospect and an equivalent objective lottery 
with probabilities equal to subjects’ reports. The crux of the problem with the Heath and 
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Tversky (1991) design is that unless reports are honest in the sense of Myerson (1981), 
arguments in favor or against the presence of uncertainty aversion are confounded. It is 
well known that reports elicited without properly aligned incentives are biased by 
attitudes towards risk and/or uncertainty. Or, maybe, because it was costless to do so, 
subjects simply felt like misrepresenting their true belief (Harrison 1994), which is why 
the experimental design presented in the sequel used a large stakes belief elicitation task. 
Beliefs were elicited and symmetry tested by using a mechanism such as a scoring rule 
(Andersen et al. 2009a). 
To identify uncertainty attitudes, a design using paired lotteries is capable of 
alleviating the criticisms of previous experimental designs. Structural estimation of the 
UP model’s parameters and the identification of attitudes towards uncertainty do not 
suffer from the criticisms of the BDM procedure. By eliciting beliefs and using a binary 
choice mechanism to control risk attitudes, testing the uncertainty aversion hypothesis in 
Ellsberg’s (1961) thought experiment becomes practical from both theoretical and 
empirical perspectives. 
Replicating Ellsberg’s two-color problem with simple binary choice tasks allows 
for the identification of attitudes towards uncertainty as explanations of choice behavior 
when probabilities may not be well formed. The two-color problem using compound 
objective lotteries was also replicated to test Smith’s (1969) hypothesis that behavior 
similar to the predictions of Ellsberg (1961) would be observed using compound 
objective lotteries to induce second-order distributions.  
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3.1 Experimental Design 
Subjects were recruited from the student population at the University of Central 
Florida in the spring 2010 semester. In total 167 subjects participated in 10 different 
sessions during the spring 2010 semester. The experimental instruments were designed to 
test for uncertainty aversion and the validity of Smith’s (1969) hypothesis12 on a between 
subject basis. Ellsberg’s (1961) two-color problem is tested on a between subject basis.13 
The exact instructions used for these experiments are reproduced in Appendix D. 
Subjects were confronted with two bingo cages which were used in place of 
Ellsberg’s urns. One of these cages remained covered until a ball was drawn from it at the 
end of the session. The covered cage represented Ellsberg’s (1961) unknown urn. Half of 
the designs were used for the Ellsberg treatment and the other half for the Smith 
treatment. To save space the remainder of this section will focus on the Ellsberg’s two-
color problem. Smith’s choice problem is comprised of the same three variations, the 
difference was the randomization devices. 
To control for the range hypothesis, the number of balls in the visible cage were 
set to 30 or 50. Half (51%) of subjects participated in each treatment. To control for 
potential center effects, the distributions of orange balls were set to 50% or 20%. 
                                                 
12
 Smith’s (1969) hypothesis sates that similar choice patterns from Ellsberg’s two-color problem are 
observed when the unknown urn is replaced with an objective compound lottery. 
13
To the best of my knowledge, there are no presentations of individual decisions that support the 
hypothesis that subjects believe the draw of red or black from the Ellsberg’s unknown urn is 50-50. Becker 
and Brownson (1964, p. 66) claim ―…subjects given a choice of colors … are typically indifferent…‖, 
however, no statistical evidence to support the 50-50 background assumption is presented. Chow and Sarin 
(1988 p. 134) acknowledge subjects having 50-50 beliefs for the colors of M&M candies in a bag (their 
unknown urn), yet they offer no test statistics. The background assumption of 50-50 beliefs for the 
distribution of balls in Ellsberg’s uncertain urn is a necessary condition for any Ellsberg test. Ellsberg 
(1961) was aware of this fundamental issue. However, Kadane (1992) shows that Ellsberg’s pattern of 
preferences is possible without 50-50 beliefs provided the subjects distrust the experimenter. Kadane’s 
model is nearly untestable hypothesis tantamount to a faith based argument. 
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Following the preference elicitation task subjects participated in a belief 
elicitation task that paid according to a linear scoring rule (LSR). To identify and control 
for anchoring biases in reporting, approximately half of the subjects in each session were 
exposed to each skew frame of the LSR. Section 3.1.2 explains the LSR and skew frames 
in detail. Table 2 summarizes the full experimental design which was used. 
Table 2. Ellsberg/Smith Experimental Design 
Session 
Number 
Ellsberg / Smith 
Urns 
Probability 
Range 
(Balls) 
Probability 
Center 
(Orange) 
LSR 
Anchoring 
(Skew) Subjects 
1 Ellsberg 50 50% 
High 13 
Low 12 
2 Smith 50 50% 
High 9 
Low 8 
3 Ellsberg 30 20% 
High 8 
Low 8 
4 Smith 30 20% 
High 12 
Low 11 
5 Ellsberg 30 50% 
High 12 
Low 10 
6 Smith 30 50% 
High 13 
Low 12 
7 Ellsberg 50 20% 
High 11 
Low 10 
8 Smith 50 20% 
High 11 
Low 7 
 
3.1.1 Preference Elicitation Tasks 
3.1.1.1 Ellsberg’s Treatment 
The two bingo cages used to represent Ellsberg’s urns were labeled ―cage I‖ and 
―cage II.‖ Cage I represented the known urn with a verified number and distribution of 
orange and white balls. The number of balls in cage I were counted and verified prior to 
the end of the session, when one of its balls was randomly drawn. Cage II also remained 
covered until one of its balls was randomly drawn at the end of the session. 
Reproductions of the decision sheets presented to subjects can be found in Appendix D. 
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To avoid potential contamination from portfolio effects, one row was selected at random 
from each subject’s decision sheet to be played for real rewards. Each bet paid either $10 
or $0. 
3.1.1.2 Smith’s Treatment 
For the Smith treatment the distribution of balls in cage II was determined by the 
number 0 to 30 of a ball drawn from a third bingo cage, cage III. To operationalize cage 
III, each ball was labeled with a number 0, 1, 2, …, 30 to indicate the distribution of 
orange balls that would be used to play each bet. For the 50-ball frame, cage III was filled 
with balls numbered 0, 1, 2, …, 50. 
At the end of the session, when all bets had been finalized, one subject selected at 
random drew a ball from cage III. Cage II was then filled with orange balls in the amount 
of the number written on the ball drawn from the cage III. The remaining balls were 
white.
14
 A research assistant then drew one ball from both cage I and cage II, and all bets 
were paid accordingly. 
3.1.1.3 Controlling for Risk Attitudes 
Risk attitudes were controlled using subject responses to a series of 45 random 
lottery pairs, consistent with the classic Hey and Orme (1994) experiments. All bets were 
in the gain domain with payments of $0, $15, $35, and $50. An example screen shot of 
the computer interface used to elicit preferences is in Appendix D. 
3.1.2 Elicitation of Beliefs 
Beliefs regarding the distribution of balls in cage II, the covered bingo cage were 
elicited using a LSR. The design of Holt and Laury (2002) was adopted to avoid portfolio 
                                                 
14
 For example, if the ball drawn from cage III was labeled ―13,‖ then cage II would be filled with 13 
orange balls and 17 white balls, for the 30-ball frame. In the 50-ball frame, the remaining 37 balls in cage II 
would be white. 
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effects. Once subjects completed the individual choice task and knew which option of 
which row they would be paid from, the LSR betting task was introduced. Subjects were 
informed about the belief task with the following statement: 
[E]ach of you have [sic] the chance to make another choice, with much 
higher potential payoffs. Our research assistants are passing around the 
decision sheets for this task. If you choose to participate in this task, we 
will not pay you for the decision that you just made. You have the choice 
which decision we will pay you for: the one you just completed, or the 
new one we are offering you now. 
 
When deciding whether or not to participate in the LSR bet, subjects evaluated 
their original Ellsberg/Smith choice, which pays at most $10, with giving up that choice 
to participate in the LSR betting task. The range of LSR bets were from $0 to $50, with a 
―safe‖ bet paying $25 for sure. With the $25 safe bet, there was at least one LSR bet 
which strictly dominated all Ellsberg/Smith bets. As expected, all subjects gave up their 
previous choice to participate in the belief elicitation task. Table 3 shows an example of 
the LSR betting sheet used in the experiment.  
Table 3. Example Betting Sheet for Linear Scoring Rule 
Choice 
Payment if Ball Drawn 
from Cage #2 is Orange 
Payment if Ball Drawn 
from Cage #2 is White 
1 $0.00   $50.00   
2 $2.00   $48.00   
3 $4.00   $46.00   
⁞ ⁞ 
 
⁞ 
 12 $23.00   $27.00   
13 $25.00   $25.00   
14 $25.50   $24.50   
⁞ ⁞ 
 
⁞ 
 49 $48.50   $1.50   
50 $49.50   $0.50   
51 $50.00   $0.00   
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For report  , that an orange ball occurs, the LSR was defined as payment 
 |Orange occurs 50 50 1S         and  |White occurs 50 50S  
      . As the 
subject becomes more confident that cage II is filled entirely with orange (white) balls, he 
should choose a lower (higher) numbered choice. Row ―1‖ is consistent with the belief 
that cage II is entirely filled with white balls. Row ―51‖ is consistent with a belief that 
cage II is entirely filled with orange balls. These two reports, respectively, pay $0 and 
$50 if orange occurs. Row ―13‖ is the ―safe‖ bet with a guaranteed payoff of $25. The 
risk neutral subject should choose 1 (51) for any belief greater than 50% that white 
(orange) will occur and 13 if his beliefs are exactly 50%. As this representative subject 
becomes more risk averse, his optimal bet will move closer towards row 13, the safe bet. 
The LSR was administered using paper and pencil. To control and identify 
anchoring biases, an anchoring treatment varied the skewness of the payoffs (and their 
implicit probabilities). For the skew low treatment, the safe bet occurred at row 13 of the 
betting sheet. The safe bet occurred at row 39 in the skew high frame. As a result, 
anchoring would have a positive reporting bias in the skew low treatment and a negative 
bias in the skew high treatment. Appendix D contains copies of the actual scoring rules 
that were included with the subject instructions. 
3.2 Econometric Model 
3.2.1 Controlling Risk Attitudes 
Risk attitudes were controlled assuming the utility over risky choices is given by 
an expo-power utility function
15
 of the form 
                                                 
15
 The two parameter expo-power form is chosen due to its empirical consistency over a wide range of real 
payoffs (Holt and Laury 2001). 
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    11 exp rv x x      , (6) 
where 0   and 1r   are parameters to be estimated, and x  is income from observed 
lottery choices. The Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion is given by 
  11 rr r x   , which is increasing (decreasing) as 0   ( 0  ). Moreover, constant 
absolute risk aversion and constant relative risk aversion are nested special cases as 
0r   and 0  , respectively. 
With observed lottery choices, equation (6) is estimated using structural 
maximum likelihood techniques, assuming some latent structural model of choice such as 
EUT. For   outcomes in each of the two paired Hey-Orme lotteries, 
 1 1EU p v x  and  2 2EU p v x , 
where 1p  and 2p  are the known, certain, chances of winning prize x  from each 
lottery, 1 and 2. 
Assuming the link function between choices and the maximum likelihood 
procedure is represented by logistic distribution, the probability that the subject chooses 
the lottery 1 is given by the index function 
 
  
     
1 0
1 0 2 0
exp eu ,
exp eu , exp eu ,
r
EU
r r
 
   
 

. (7) 
Equation (7) adopts Wilcox’s (2009) contextual error specification16 where 
    0eu , ,i ir EU r   , with 0 v v    defined as the difference between the highest 
and lowest possible utility obtainable in the lottery pair. 1EU  and 2EU  are the vNM 
                                                 
16
 Contextual utility theory applies an adjustment to the Fechner error term, defined by the difference in 
value between maximum and minimum prizes in each choice context. Wilcox (2009) shows that without 
such normalization risk aversion does not imply probabilistically more risk averse. 
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utilities of lotteries 1 and 2, and 0  is a noise parameter which is proportional to the 
standard deviation of the decision-maker’s perceptual (or computational) error, 
conditional on the assumed logistic distribution. As 0 0   subject responses become 
more precise and the probability of choosing the utility maximizing choice converges to 
one. For noisier responses, as 0 0   choice probabilities are random and not explained 
by utility differences. 
Dropping indifference, the log-likelihood to be maximized is written as 
       0
1
ln , , ; , ln + 1 ln 1
T
t t
t
L r y y EU y EU 

   X , 0   1r  , (8) 
where 1(0)ty   indicates the t
th
 choice of lottery 1(2), and X  is data pertaining to the 
choice tasks and/or subject characteristics. 
3.2.2 Identifying Subjective Beliefs and Uncertainty Attitudes 
Subjective beliefs and attitudes towards uncertainty were identified from 
responses to the LSR bets and choices in the individual choice task.  
For the LSR betting task, the contents of the bingo cage with the known 
distribution a priori does not enter the subjects’ UP preference functions. Subjects are 
asserted to maximize 
    
 0 o,w
| report
I
U
i ij j
i j
W u v z  
 
 
   
 
 z , (9) 
where I = 30 and 50 for each range treatment, and utility over final prizes are identified 
by  v   from equation (6). The subjective priors  o w,U Ui i   for the distribution of orange 
and white balls in the covered (unknown) bingo cage are given by  ,1i I i I . Second-
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order utilities are assumed to be characterized by constant relative uncertainty aversion 
where 
 
   1 1u x x    . (10) 
For a given report  , the multinomial logistic link functions is written as 
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
ρ π
ρ π
, (11) 
where     1w , , ; , , , ; ,r W r     ρ π ρ π  with      1 50 0u v u v    is the 
contextual error specification for the UP values, analogous to equation (7). The log-
likelihood function is 
       1
1
ln , , , ; , , , ln + 1 ln 1
T
t t
t
L y r y W y W  

   ρ π X , 0  , 1r  , (12) 
where 1ty   for the report 
  and 0ty   for all other  . 
For the Ellsberg/Smith choice tasks subjects’ UP preferences are given by 
equation (2) in chapter 2. 
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1 1 1
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i j k
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 
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where 
U C
ijk ij k    and j i iji I    are the subject’s weighted average beliefs for 
each of the J events – draw an orange ball and draw a white ball from cage II. The C
k  
terms are known to be 0.5 for both orange and white balls drawn from cage I. 
For the logistic link function, the probability of each subject choosing option A is 
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where     2w , , ; , , , ; ,r W r     ρ π ρ π  with      2 10 0u v u v    is the 
contextual error specification. The log likelihood function is 
       2 2 2
1
ln , , , ; , , , ln + 1 ln 1
T
t t
t
L y r y W y W  

   ρ π X , 0  , 1r  , (14) 
where 1ty   for a choice of option A and 0ty   for a choice of option B. 
3.3 Data and Results 
Chapter 2 identified three behavioral hypotheses for Ellsberg’s (1961) two-color 
problem. 
HYPOTHESIS 1: In Ellsberg’s (1961) two-color problem (p. 650), subjects behave 
as if the realization of each uncertain event is equally likely as each 
certain event and bets on certain events are preferred to bets on 
uncertain events. 
HYPOTHESIS 2: The proportions of UP and SEU consistent choices are equal for 
both the Ellsberg (1961) and Smith (1969) lotteries. 
HYPOTHESIS 3: Attitudes towards uncertainty are equivalent for both the Ellsberg 
(1691) and Smith (1969) treatments. 
Before reporting the tests of Hypotheses 1 and 3, analysis of the raw choices in 
the Ellsberg/Smith task supports hypothesis 2. Smith’s conjecture ―choice behavior‖ is 
unchanged if the contents of the ambiguous urn is determined by the draw of a random 
integer. Table 4 reports the raw classifications of choices in the Ellsberg and Smith tasks 
when each bet on orange or white from cage I had a known 50% chance of paying. The 
p-value for the Fisher exact probability test is 0.398 and the null that there is no 
difference in the distributions is not rejected. 
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Table 4. Raw Classification of Choices in Ellsberg & Smith Tasks 
Treatment Neither SEU 
Uncertainty 
Averse 
Uncertainty 
Seeking 
Ellsberg 43 4 0 0 
Smith  37 3 2 0 
Total 80 7 2 0 
Note:  Subject choices are pooled across range treatments (see Table 2).  
With a p-value of 0.85, the Fisher exact test rejected the null of  
range effects. 
 
In Table 4, subjects were classified as SEU if their choice pattern was: 1) bets on 
orange I ~ white I, orange II ~ white II, orange I ~ orange II, and white I ~ white II; 2) 
bets on orange I ~ white I, orange II  white II, orange I  orange II, and white I  
white II; or 3) bets on orange I ~ white I, orange II  white II, orange I  orange II, and 
white I  white II. Uncertainty averse behavior was classified according to Ellsberg’s 
predicted pattern of preferences. No subjects exhibited uncertainty seeking behavior, in 
their raw choices. 
The distribution of responses in Table 4 presents evidence against Ellsberg’s 
(1961) hypothesis while supporting Smith’s (1969) conjecture. Eighty out of 89 subjects’ 
choices were not consistent with either SEU or Ellsberg’s uncertainty aversion. A subject 
was classified as ―Neither‖ when his preferences for bets on orange from cage I or cage II 
and white from cage I or cage II contradicted his preference (and implied belief) from his 
bet of orange or white cage II. For example, a subjects reporting preferences orange I ~ 
white I, orange II  white II, orange I  orange II, and white I  white II would be 
classified as ―Neither.‖ His preference orange II  white II implies a belief that orange is 
more than 50% likely in cage II and contradicts the preference orange I  orange II. 
Uncertainty aversion cannot be claimed here because his preference white I  white II 
and orange I ~ white I are consistent with SEU. 
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The parametric structural FIML model simultaneously controls for risk attitudes 
and (possibly) asymmetric beliefs when estimating the degree of relative uncertainty 
aversion and, as such, is superior to the nonparametric test from Table 4 for identifying 
non-neutral attitudes towards uncertainty. The remainder of this chapter will report the 
results of parametric structural UP, SDRA, and SEU likelihood models derived from 
equations (8), (12), and (14). 
3.3.1 Risk Attitudes Alone 
The lottery choice data identified risk attitudes. Assuming subjects made 
decisions under risk according to the mandates of EUT, the average relative risk aversion 
of the subject pool over prizes x = ($0, $15, $35, and $50) was estimated from the CRRA 
utility function      1 1rv x x r  . Table 5 shows the estimate of average relative risk 
aversion. Over the domain of prizes, the subject pool exhibited an average relative risk 
aversion ˆ 0.4422r  , with a p-value less than 0.0001. 
Table 5. Estimated Parameters from CRRA Utility Function 
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error p-value 
Lower 
95% CI 
Upper 
95% CI 
r CRRA coefficient 0.4422 0.0602 <0.0001 0.3242 0.5601 
µ0 RLP Fechner error 0.0926 0.0078 <0.0001 0.0773 0.1079 
       
Pseudo log-likelihood = -4921.5341      
Observations = 7261      
 
Coefficient estimates from the expo-power specification (equation (6)) are shown 
in Table 6. Estimates rˆ  and ˆ  are highly significant. The estimated degree of relative 
risk aversion 
   ˆ1ˆˆ ˆRRA 1 rr r x    , ˆ 1r   (15) 
 38 
is increasing when ˆ 0  , decreasing for ˆ 0  , and remains constant if ˆ 0  . Choices 
exhibit risk aversion for low stakes gambles ( ˆ 0.7265r  ), which decreases as lottery 
prizes increase to $50 ( ˆ 0.7082   ).  
Table 6. Estimated Parameters from Expo-Power Utility Function 
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error p-value 
Lower 
95% CI 
Upper 
95% CI 
r RRA at zero income 0.7265 0.0236 <0.0001 0.6802 0.7727 
α Positive income RRA normalization  -0.7082 0.0567 <0.0001 -0.8194 -0.597 
µ0 RLP Fechner error 0.0742 0.0053 <0.0001 0.0638 0.0845 
       
Pseudo log-likelihood = -4872.891      
Observations = 7261      
 
3.3.1 The Uncertain Priors Model 
The maximum likelihood estimator shows evidence of decreasing relative risk 
aversion, with relatively high risk aversion at low stakes. In the absence of uncertainty, 
estimated risk attitudes imply raw bets in the belief elicitation task are substantially closer 
to the safe 50-50 bet that true beliefs. A large number of subjects placed bets at the 50-50 
mark, ensuring a payoff of $25. Note, however with evidence of significant treatment 
effects. Subjects in the low skew treatment tended to place larger bets than in the high 
skew treatment. The largest difference in bets between low and high treatments is 30 
percentage points, which is significant that the 0.001 level. However, there does not 
appear to be evidence of lower bets for subjects in the high skew treatment. 
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Figure 1. Raw LSR Bets for Color Ball Drawn From Cage II 
For each possible set of beliefs    0 30 29 30 01o w 30 30 30 30 30 30, , ; , ;...; ,U U π π  when there are 
30 balls in each cage and    0 50 49 50 01o w 50 50 50 50 50 50, , ; , ;...; ,U U π π  when there are 50 balls in 
each cage, prior weights, ρ, were modeled using a Beta function with probability mass 
function 
  
 
 
11
o o
o 1 11
o o0
1
; ,
1
ba
i i
i ba
i ii
f a b
 

 






, for  o 0,1i  . (16) 
To obtain mass at the beliefs    0o 1o, 0,1   ,  1o; ,f a b  and  0o; ,f a b  were 
calculated using the approximation    0o 1o, 0.0001,0.9999   . Figure 2, illustrates the 
prior weights given estimated shape parameters, ˆ 0.0065a   and ˆ 0.0052b  . 
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Figure 2. Estimated Beta Mass Function for Prior Weights 
Coefficent estimates from the UP model (equation (2)) are shown in Table 7. The 
risk coefficients have the expected signs and magnitudes, ˆ 0.7233r   and ˆ 0.6895   . 
Estimated shape parameters imply subjects behaved as if the experiment were almost 
surely ―rigged‖ and believed there was a 49.5% chance the unknown cage was filled 
entirely with white balls and a 50.3% chance it was filled entirely with orange balls. 
While the shape parameters imply a SDRA consistent belief structure, the estimated 
coefficient of relative uncertainty aversion, ˆ 0.1007  , is significant at the 10.9% level, 
suggesting that SEU may be a better predictor of behavior than the UP model.
17
 
                                                 
17
 Contrary to previous estimates of uncertainty aversion presented in Anderson et al. (2009b) who found 
evidence of moderate uncertainty seeking, here small insignificant amounts of uncertainty aversion with a 
p-value of 0.109 were estimated. These differences warrant further analysis and replication to test a new 
hypothesis: in unfamiliar ambiguous choice situations subjects revert to SEU preferences assigning equal 
weight to the degenerate outcomes and willing to trade bets for a certain 50% chance at the high payoff. 
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Table 7. Coefficient Estimates for Uncertain Priors Model 
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error p-value 
Lower 
95% CI 
Upper 
95% CI 
r RRA at zero income 0.7233 0.0237 <0.0001 0.6768 0.7698 
α Positive income RRA normalization  -0.6895 0.0572 <0.0001 -0.8015 -0.5774 
µ0 RLP Fechner error 0.0742 0.0053 <0.0001 0.0639 0.0846 
a Shape parameter for prior weights ρ 0.0065 0.0145 0.6540 -0.0220 0.0350 
b Shape parameter for prior weights ρ 0.0052 0.0107 0.6310 -0.0159 0.0262 
ϕ CRUA coefficient 0.1007 0.0628 0.1090 -0.0224 0.2238 
µ1 LSR Fechner error 0.1631 0.1167 0.1620 -0.0656 0.3918 
µ2 Ellsberg Fechner error 0.1938 0.0230 <0.0001 0.1487 0.2390 
       
Pseudo log-likelihood = -5853.4699      
Observations = 8026      
 
Table 8 shows the coefficient estimates from the SDRA model. As expected, prior 
weights, ρ, are approximately evenly distributed, with cage II containing all orange balls 
with probability ˆ 0.5039  . With a standard error of 0.0158, ˆ  is equal to 50.3 at the 
5% level. The estimated coefficient of relative uncertainty aversion ˆ 0.1006   is 
significant at the 10.9% level. 
Table 8. Coefficient Estimates for Source-Dependant Risk Attitudes Model 
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error p-value 
Lower 
95% CI 
Upper 
95% CI 
r RRA at zero income 0.7233 0.0237 <0.0001 0.6768 0.7698 
α Positive income RRA normalization  -0.6895 0.0572 <0.0001 -0.8015 -0.5774 
µ0 RLP Fechner error 0.0742 0.0053 <0.0001 0.0639 0.0846 
ρ Prior weight for cage II all orange 0.5039 0.0158 <0.0001 0.4730 0.5349 
ϕ CRUA coefficient 0.1006 0.0627 0.1090 -0.0223 0.2236 
µ1 LSR Fechner error 0.1631 0.1167 0.1620 -0.0656 0.3918 
µ2 Ellsberg Fechner error 0.1938 0.0230 <0.0001 0.1487 0.2390 
       
Pseudo log-likelihood = -5853.4695      
Observations = 8026      
 
I used the Clarke (2003, 2006) paired sign test of the log-likelihood ratios to test 
the auxiliary hypotheses: SDRA explains behavior better than UP. The other well-known 
test for non-nested models was developed by Vuong’s (1989) and is only appropriate 
when likelihood ratios are normally distributed (Clarke 2006). The Shaprio-Wilk test fails 
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to reject normality at the 5% level, W = 0.898 n = 765.
18
 Figure 3 graphically depicts the 
distribution of likelihood ratios. 
 
Figure 3. Likelihood Ratio Distribution 
The SDRA model yields higher likelihood values for 437 out of 762 non-zero 
differences. The sign test rejects equality of the models in favor of SDRA with a p-value 
< 0.0001.
19
 Coupled with a coefficient of relative risk aversion ˆ 0   significant at the 
10.9% level and ˆ 0.50   with 21 815.26  , the SDRA model without accounting for 
treatment effects presents evidence in favor of hypothesis 1. 
In Table 9, treatment variables are added to the SDRA model. Each treatment 
variable is a binary indicator. The treatment variable Smith takes on a value of 1 if 
uncertainty was facilitated by cage III, which determined the distribution of orange and 
white balls in cage II. The Smith variable equals 0 for sessions where subjects were 
confronted with Ellsberg’s original problem. Hypothesis 3, that uncertainty is not 
                                                 
18
 The 7261 observations from the random lottery pair task were dropped from the model selection test. The 
Clarke statistics are calculated using only the 765 decisions from the Ellsberg/Smith and LSR tasks, those 
decisions the latent choice models are dependent on purely subjective beliefs. 
19
 The Vuong statistic is 0.5384 which is less than 1.96, the critical value from the standard normal 
distribution. 
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affected by the generating mechanism and predicts the coefficient of smith is 
insignificantly different from zero. 
Center equals to 1 when the distribution of balls in the known cage was 50% 
orange and 0 when the distribution was 20% orange. Range indicates the number of 
bingo balls used in cages I and II. Range equals 1 when 50 bingo balls were used and 0 
when 30 bingo balls were used. If the range hypothesis of Becker and Brownson (1964) 
is correct, subjects’ attitudes towards uncertainty covary with the ranges of second-order 
probabilities. The null is that range has no effect on estimated uncertain aversion. 
Finally, Skew controls for anchoring biases in the LSR betting task, and varies 
within each session. Skew is set to 1 for subjects in the ―high‖ treatment, where the safe 
bet was lower on the betting sheet. Skew is 0 for subjects in the ―low‖ treatment, when 
the safe bet was higher on the betting sheet. 
Estimates of the SDRA model controlling for treatment effects are presented in 
Table 9. Estimates for Range and Smith, treatments on the coefficient of RUA, are both 
insignificant. The coefficient for the range treatment ˆ 0.0037Range   is highly 
insignificant, with a p-value = 0.975. There are no differences in uncertainty attitudes 
between subjects in the 50 ball and 30 ball treatments. The point estimate for the smith 
treatment variable is ˆ 0.0198Smith    with p-value = 0.907. 
Conditional on SDRA preferences, the coefficient ˆ
Range  does not support the 
range hypothesis (Becker and Brownson 1964). Subjects’ attitudes towards uncertainty 
do not covary with the ranges of second-order probabilities. There is evidence in support 
of Smith’s (1969) conjecture, hypothesis 3. With ˆ 0Smith  , attitudes towards uncertainty 
are not affected by the uncertainty generating mechanism. 
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Table 9. SDRA Model Estimates with Treatment Variables Added 
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error p-value 
Lower 
95% CI 
Upper 
95% CI 
r RRA at zero income 0.7233 0.0240 <0.0001 0.6764 0.7703 
α Positive income RRA normalization  -0.6895 0.0580 <0.0001 -0.8033 -0.5758 
µ0 RLP Fechner error 0.0742 0.0053 <0.0001 0.0639 0.0846 
ρ Prior weight for cage II all orange      
Constant  0.4615 0.0210 <0.0001 0.4204 0.5026 
Center Known probability center effect 0.0495 0.0269 0.0660 -0.0033 0.1023 
Skew Anchoring effect 0.1513 0.0942 0.1080 -0.0333 0.3359 
ϕ CRUA coefficient      
Constant  0.0753 0.0777 0.3330 -0.0771 0.2277 
Smith Compound objective lottery effect 0.0249 0.1133 0.8260 -0.1972 0.2471 
Range Probability range effect 0.0092 0.1022 0.9280 -0.1910 0.2095 
µ1 LSR Fechner error 0.1465 0.0953 0.1240 -0.0403 0.3333 
µ2 Ellsberg Fechner error 0.1774 0.0206 <0.0001 0.1371 0.2177 
       
Pseudo log-likelihood = -5845.1253      
Observations = 8026      
 
3.3.3 The Subjective Expected Utility Model 
The final model estimated was Savage’s (1954) SEU theory. The coefficient for 
subjective beliefs that an orange ball is drawn from cage II, ˆ 0.5052  , is highly 
significant (Table 10). Subjects believed the contents of the covered cage II were 
approximately evenly distributed between orange and white ping-pong balls.  
Table 10. Coefficient Estimates for Subjective Expected Utility Model 
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error p-value 
Lower 
95% CI 
Upper 
95% CI 
r RRA at zero income 0.7232 0.0236 <0.0001 0.6770 0.7694 
α Positive income RRA normalization  -0.6871 -0.0570 <0.0001 -0.7988 -0.5753 
µ0 RLP Fechner error 0.0742 0.0053 <0.0001 0.0639 0.0845 
π Subjective belief of orange cage II 0.5052 0.0154 <0.0001 0.4751 0.5353 
µ1 LSR Fechner error 0.1299 0.0791 0.1000 -0.0251 0.2848 
µ2 Ellsberg Fechner error 0.2020 0.0239 <0.0001 0.1550 0.2489 
       
Pseudo log-likelihood = -5854.3914      
Observations = 8026      
 
Adding treatment variables to control for center and anchoring affects, coefficient 
estimates reported in Table 11 demonstrate that beliefs regarding the unknown urn are 
conditioned on the known probabilities. Subjects in the low center treatment, where the 
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known urn had a 20% of yielding an orange ball, held beliefs only 4.88% lower than 
subjects in Ellsberg’s original 50/50 treatment. 
Table 11. SEU Model Estimates with Treatment Variables Added 
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error p-value 
Lower 
95% CI 
Upper 
95% CI 
r RRA at zero income 0.7231 0.0238 <0.0001 0.6764 0.7698 
α Positive income RRA normalization  -0.6871 0.0577 <0.0001 -0.8003 -0.5739 
µ0 RLP Fechner error 0.0742 0.0053 <0.0001 0.0639 0.0845 
π Subjective belief of orange cage II      
Constant  0.4599 0.0203 <0.0001 0.4200 0.4998 
Center Known probability center effect 0.0489 0.0265 0.0650 -0.0031 0.1008 
Skew Anchoring effect 0.1222 0.0599 0.0410 0.0049 0.2396 
µ1 LSR Fechner error 0.1188 0.0621 0.0560 -0.0030 0.2406 
µ2 Ellsberg Fechner error 0.1841 0.0216 <0.0001 0.1418 0.2264 
       
Pseudo log-likelihood = -5846.0054      
Observations = 8026      
 
The chi-square test clearly rejects the null that all treatment effects are jointly zero 
( 2
2 7.72  ). Testing the distinction between SDRA (Table 8) and SEU (Table 11) is 
accomplished by testing the hypothesis that ˆ ˆ ˆ 0Constant Smith Range      from Table 9. The 
SEU model with covariates is a nested special case of the SDRA model with covariates. 
The likelihood ratio statistic 2
3 2.77   with p-value = 0.429 fails to reject the null that 
subjects behave as if maximizing SEU as estimated in Table 11. As such, this experiment 
reports evidence that contradicts Ellsberg’s thought experiment. 
3.4 Experiment Summary 
In Ellsberg’s two-color urn experiment, subjects behave as if the realization of 
each uncertain event is equally likely. However, bets on certain events are not preferred 
to bets on uncertain events. The data does not support hypothesis 1, Ellsberg’s predicted 
preferences. 
Hypothesis 2 and 3 are supported. The nonparametric test of the distributions of 
preferences between subjects failed to reject the null of hypothesis 2. Choices were 
 46 
unaffected by the mechanism used to generate uncertainty. Econometric estimates fail to 
reject both hypothesis 3 and neutral attitudes towards uncertainty. Smith was right. Using 
a compound objective lottery instead of Ellsberg’s urn would elicit the same preferences, 
although in entirely different way than intended. 
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CHAPTER 4: QUALITY, IDENTIFICATION, AND UNCERTAINTY 
The previous chapter tested the Ellsberg’s (1961) two-color problem using the 
uncertain priors model (Neilson 1993, 2009; KMM 2005) and tested the model’s key 
assumption, uncertainty aversion. Attitudes towards risk and uncertainty, along with 
beliefs were jointly estimated using a structural econometric model. Estimates in chapter 
3 demonstrated that (for subjects participating in experiment) behavior is best 
characterized by Savage’s (1954) subjective expected utility. 
Here, I build upon the chapter 3 and develop an experimental instrument to 
identify attitudes towards uncertainty under less abstract conditions and test for separate 
attitudes towards two separate uncertain processes. To facilitate the identification of 
separate attitudes, subjects completed a series of binary choices using a multiple price list 
(MPL) format (Holt and Laury 2002) paying in a branded commodity where information 
possessed by the decision-maker was noisy. 
To understand how uncertain processes are at work when evaluating graded 
commodities such as online security (Spiekerman, Grossklags, and Berendt (2002), 
Berendt, Günther, and Spiekerman (2005)), food products (Heyes, Shogren, Shin, and 
Kliebenstein 1995), or even gem stones, a two-uncertain process UP model is developed 
sequentially from the expected utility model. Consider the comparison of two bets, I and 
II. Bet I is a bet on receiving one of two commodities B or C, with known certified (i.e., 
branded) quality (e.g., security) g ,g G   where g g   and objective chances of 
winning given by  Pr B  and  Pr C . The second bet, bet II, is a bet on receiving one of 
two otherwise identical certified commodities A and D, with objective probabilities 
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 Pr A  and  Pr D . When deciding between which bet to choose, the EU decision-maker 
evaluates each according to the expected utilities 
 
         g gB,C Pr B B Pr C CEU v v   , (17) 
for bet I and 
          g gA,D Pr A A Pr D DEU v v   . (18) 
for bet II.  
If the commodity qualities are unknown (i.e., generic or not branded), the Savage 
(1954) consistent decision-maker evaluates the likelihood each commodity, A, B, C, and 
D, belong to the class of commodities with qualities g and g .20 Given beliefs regarding 
each commodity’s quality, preferences would be evaluated by 
       Bg g Bg gB,C Pr B B BSEU v v         
 
     Cg g Cg gPr C C Cv v        , and (19) 
       Ag g Ag gA,D Pr A A ASEU v v         
      Dg g Dg gPr D D Dv v        , (20) 
where the π  are the subjective beliefs that A, B, C, and D are either g  or g . 
When the decision-maker is unsure of his beliefs, he may form a sets of IA 
subjective distributions that A is g  or g . Denote the ith prior belief  A A g A g,i i i  π  
and the probabilities over all the IA priors  
AA A1 A
,..., I ρ . Similarly, for B, C, and D, 
the decision-maker has prior beliefs Biπ  Ciπ , and Ciπ with respective weights Bρ , Cρ , 
                                                 
20
 The experiment designed below uses Coke and Pepsi, ―familiar‖ products, as the experimental metaphor 
for more general economic concepts of differentiation. 
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and Dρ . Extending equations (19) and (20) to account for these prior beliefs, preference 
for the Neilson consistent decision-maker are given by 
          
  B CB Cg ,gB,C Pr B B Pr C Ci i k k i k ki I kUP u v v       , and (21) 
          
  A DA Dg ,gA,D Pr A A Pr D Di i k k i k ki I kUP u v v       , (22) 
with A B C DI I I I I     and  A B C D A B B DA1 B1 C1 D1 A B C D A B C D,... ,...,i i i i I I I I           ρ . 
In many instances however, commodities are accompanied by noisy quality 
signals. To better understand how noisy reports ―change‖ the UP model in equations (21) 
and (22), consider once again the Savage consumer. With such a noisy signal, preferences 
can be separated into two component parts: EU if signal is accurate and the SEU given an 
inaccurate signal. Assuming the signal that B is g and C is g , equation (19) is rewritten 
           w g gB,C 1 Pr B B Pr C CSEU v v        
            W Bg |w g Bg |w g Cg |w g Cg |w gPr B B B Pr C C Cv v v v                       , (23) 
where w  is the belief that the signal is wrong (inaccurate) and thus g |w  and g |w   are 
beliefs that B and C are g or g  give inaccuracy. For the personal belief that the signal 
was wrong, the Savage consumer’s beliefs are Bg |w Bg1     and Cg |w Cg1    , the 
consumer’s unconditional beliefs that each brand is not those of the signal, g for B and 
g  for C. Equation (20) then becomes 
           w g gA,C 1 Pr A A Pr D DSEU v v        
     w Ag |w g Ag |w gPr A A Av v           
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     Dg |w g Dg |w gPr D D Dv v         , (24) 
with conditional beliefs Ag |w Ag1     and Dg |w Dg1    for the quality of A and D, 
given an inaccurate signal. Equations (23) and (24) can also be extended to account for 
uncertain beliefs for signal accuracy. Define a set of priors J for the belief that the 
prediction is wrong, 
Wj , with probabilistic weights  1,..., J θ . 
Allowing for J signal accuracy beliefs and I quality beliefs, the two processes at 
work in the Nielson subject’s preference function can be modeled as 
             
  W B Cg ,gB,C 1 Pr B B 1 Pr C Ci I i j j ik k ik kkj JUP u v v              
 
        W g g1 Pr B B Pr C Cj v v          , (25) 
             
  w A Dg ,gA,D 1 Pr A A 1 Pr D Di I i j j ik k ik kkj JUP u v v              
         w g g1 Pr A A Pr D Dj v v          , (26) 
where A and B are predicted to be quality g , and C and D are predicted to be quality g  
(Model 1). The UP preferences assumed in equations (25) and (26) are analogous to the 
preferences given by equation (3) in chapter 2. Alternative specifications given by 
equations (27) and (28), Model 2: 
       
  W Bg ,gB,C 1 Pr B BI Ji j j ik ki I j J kUP u u v           
               C W g g1 Pr C C 1 Pr B B Pr C Cik k jv v v              , (27) 
       
  w Ag ,gA,D 1 Pr A AI Ji j j ik ki I j J kUP u u v           
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               D w1 Pr D D 1 Pr A A Pr D Dik k j g gv v v              , (28) 
and equations (29) and (30), Model 3:  
       
  W Bg ,gB,C 1 Pr B BJ Ij i j ik kj J i I kUP u u v           
               C W g g1 Pr C C 1 Pr B B Pr C Cik k jv v v              , (29) 
       
  w Ag ,gA,D 1 Pr A AJ Ij i j ik kj J i I kUP u u v           
               D w1 Pr D D 1 Pr A A Pr D Dik k j g gv v v              , (30) 
where the concavity of  Iu   and  Ju   capture aversion to uncertainty over the I and J 
subsets of prior beliefs. 
The experimental design integrates the equivalent lottery pair procedure of Heath 
and Tversky (1991) with a linear scoring rule used to identify subjective beliefs to test 
hypothesis 4 and identify which UP preference specification describes behavior, Model 1, 
2, or 3. The remainder of Chapter 4 is devoted to the experimental design used to test 
hypothesis 4 and the results of said test. 
4.1 Experimental Design 
Appendix E contains detailed instructions for the experimental sessions used to 
identify uncertainty aversion and test the hypothesis that subjects form separate sets of 
uncertain beliefs and attitudes towards distinctly uncertainty processes, hypothesis 4.  
HYPOTHESIS 4: Subjects cognitively differentiate between different uncertain 
processes. 
In summary, four individual choice tasks were employed to identify preferences 
for uncertain lotteries, control for risk attitudes, elicitation of beliefs, and control for 
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uncertainty. Each of these tasks is discussed in turn. In total, 82 subjects took part in four 
sessions over a one month period at the University of Central Florida. Table 12 
summarizes the experimental design used to test hypotheses 4. 
Table 12. Experiment Design 
Session 
Commodity 
Information 
LSR Bets on 
Commodities 
LSR 
Anchoring 
(Skew) 
MPL 
Anchoring 
(Skew) Subjects 
1 Branded N/A N/A 
High 13 
Low 12 
2 Ungraded 
Brand of 
Commodity won 
in MPL 
High 
High 6 
Low 7 
Low 
High 6 
Low 6 
3 Graded 
Brand of 
Commodity won 
in MPL 
High 
High 2 
Low 0 
Low 
High 0 
Low 3 
―Grade‖ prediction 
Accuracy 
High 
High 0 
Low 3 
High 
High 3 
Low 0 
4 Graded 
―Grade‖ prediction 
Accuracy 
High 
High 5 
Low 6 
Low 
High 5 
Low 5 
 
4.1.1 Eliciting Preferences 
Elicitation of preferences for the experimental graded commodity was conducted 
using a multiple price list instrument with twenty paired choices. Soft drinks were chosen 
as the experimental commodity, with their brand representing quality due to constraints 
of using student research subjects. Students can be reasonably expected to be familiar 
with taste differences between Coke and Pepsi. To control the ranking of utilities over 
these brands, subjects were instructed: 
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Each of these letters A, B, C, and D labels one of the sodas on the table in the 
front of the room. If the soda you win is a Coke, we will pay you $10. If the 
soda you win is Pepsi we will pay you $0… 
 
At the conclusion of this session you can have either a Coke or a Pepsi, which 
ever you prefer. You should not let the fact that you like to drink one soda 
brand over the other influence the 20 choices you make. You can have 
whichever soda you prefer at the end of the session. 
 
An example of the MPL is shown here. 
Table 13. Example Decision Sheet 
Option I Option II Decision 
5/100 of C, 95/100 of B 5/100 of D, 95/100 of A I II 
10/100 of C, 90/100 of B 10/100 of D, 90/100 of A I II 
15/100 of C, 85/100 of B 15/100 of D, 85/100 of A I II 
    
 
Commodities used in the experiment were labeled A, B, C, and D to match the 
price list. Ambiguity was controlled in three treatment frames: branded (certified), graded 
(uncertified), and ungraded. Each of these is discussed below in more detail. To detect 
anchoring of subject responses towards the middle their decision sheets, the decision 
sheet used two treatment frames, skew low and skew high. 
4.1.1.1 Ungraded Commodity 
For the ungraded treatment, subjects a priori did not know which soda brand, 
Coke and Pepsi, was associated with each label A, B, C, and D . Sodas were entirely 
covered with two to three layers of colored masking tape to completely conceal 
identifying brand characteristics. 
Prior to placing their bets, subjects were allowed to taste approximately 1 ounce 
from each soda. By taste testing, subjects were able to form a set of beliefs for each of the 
four commodities brands. 
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4.1.1.2 Graded Commodity 
In the graded treatment, a signal in the form of a brand prediction was added prior 
to subjects making their decisions. One volunteer subject was selected to taste each soda 
and report, to other subjects in the room, a binary prediction for each sodas correct brand. 
To incentivize the volunteer to report truthfully, a $10 reward was added for correctly 
predicting the brand of each soda A, B, C, and D. 
Finally, before making their choices subjects were once again invited to taste each 
soda to form their own sets of beliefs. 
4.1.1.3 Certified Commodity 
In the certified treatment, subjects knew in advance of betting that labels A and B 
were applied to cans of Coke, and C and D were applied to cans of Pepsi. To keep things 
equal subjects were invited to taste each soda prior to making their decisions – all 
subjects declined. 
4.1.1.4 Controlling for Risk Attitudes 
Risk attitudes were controlled by using reciprocal probabilities in options I and II. 
This means for the certified commodity treatment, excluding errors, subjects should have 
choosen option I up to the row there each option has 50-50 probabilities and then choose 
option II for the remaining rows of the MPL. Deviations in the switch point are assumed 
to be explained by asymmetric subjective beliefs for the brand of each commodity, or 
calculation errors. 
4.1.2 Elicitation of Beliefs 
Subjects’ beliefs for the correct brand of the soda they won and the accuracy of 
the volunteer’s report for both sodas in their chosen option were elicited using a LSR. 
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Subjects were assigned to only one of these two treatment frames. The LSR frame was 
varied within-session for the graded commodity treatment. Only the grade frame of the 
LSR was used in the ungraded commodity treatments. 
To operationalize the LSR, each subject placed their bets on the uncertain events by 
circling the appropriate row number on their decision sheets. Copies of the decision 
sheets and instructions can be found in Appendix E. The first six rows of a decision sheet 
used for the brand frame are shown in Table 14. To detect anchoring biases, two versions 
of the scoring rule varied the payoffs to determine if subjects anchor their choices in the 
center of the decision sheet. 
Table 14. Example Betting Sheet for Linear Scoring rule 
Row 
Payment if the correct 
brand for the soda you 
won is Coke 
Payment if the correct 
brand for the soda you 
won is Pepsi 
0% $0.00 
 
$50.00   
4% $2.00 
 
$48.00   
8% $4.00 
 
$46.00   
12% $6.00 
 
$44.00   
15% $7.50 
 
$42.50   
19% $9.50 
 
$40.50   
 
Subjects placed their bets by circling the row number corresponding to the bet 
they preferred. For the decision sheet here selecting row 19% would pay $9.50 if the 
brand for the soda possessed by the subject was a Coke and $40.50 if the brand was 
Pepsi. These prize amounts correspond directly to a report of  % report in the LSR 
given by    |Coke 50 50 1S      if Coke and    |Pepsi 50 50S     if Pepsi.21 
                                                 
21
 At least one subjects recognized the relationship between their implied beliefs and the row numbering. 
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4.1.2.1 Equivalent Lottery Pairs: Controlling Uncertainty 
The equivalent lottery pair (ELP) choice was the final decision subjects made. 
After subjects placed their bets for either brand or accuracy, each one was given the 
choice to either keep their bet, conditional on the uncertain event, or trade their bet for an 
equivalent objective bet. Prior to making their choices subjects were given examples, for 
betting row 19% and 77%. A subject who chose row 19% could either keep the bet or 
replace the uncertainty with the spin of a bingo cage. If a number between 0 and 19 was 
drawn the subject won the $9.50 prize. He would receive $40.50 for drawing a number 
between 20 and 100. For a bet on row 77%, if a number between 0 and 77 was drawn, he 
would receive $38.50. Numbers between 78 and 100 paid $11.50. 
Assuming subjects have multiple prior probabilistic beliefs for each event; those 
who are averse to the uncertainty associated with their bet would prefer to ―swap‖ for the 
equivalent objective bet. Uncertainty seeking subject would strictly prefer to keep their 
bet from the belief elicitation task. For subjects who expressed indifference, a 6-sided die 
was used to determine if they kept their uncertain bet or swapped the equivalent objective 
lottery. 
For the accuracy frame, indifference suggests reduction and preferences are given 
by Model 2, equations (27) and (28) with  Ju x x  or Model 1, equation (25) and (26) 
with  u x x . Preferences for the certain (uncertain) bet imply  Iu   (or  u  ) is 
concave (convex) and the subject are uncertainty aversion (loving). Indifference in the 
brand frame of the ELP suggests that reduction applies for the uncertain brand process 
and UP preferences are of the form given by Model 3, equations (29) and (30) with 
 Iu x x  or Model 1, equation (25) and (26) with  u x x . 
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4.1.2.2 Controlling for Risk Attitudes 
Risk attitudes were controlled using subject responses to a series of random 
lottery pair choices consistent with the classic Hey and Orme (1994) experiments. All 
bets were in the gain domain and in the range of $0 to $50. An example screen shot of the 
computer interface used to elicit preferences is in Appendix D. 
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4.2 Econometric Model 
4.2.1 Controlling Risk Attitudes 
Risk attitudes were controlled assuming the expo-power utility function 
 
   11 exp rv x x      , (6) 
where 0   and 1r   are parameters to be estimated, and x  is income from observed 
lottery choices, $0, $15, $35, and $50. With many of the same subjects who participated 
in the Ellsberg experiment reported in Chapter 3, I expected to find evidence of 
decreasing relative risk aversion. Equation (6) was estimated using maximum likelihood 
techniques, assuming EUT. 
As in Chapter 3, the link function was assumed to be the logistic distribution. The 
probability that the subject chooses lottery 1 was modeled with the index function 
 
  
     
1 0
1 0 2 0
exp eu ,
exp eu , exp eu ,
r
EU
r r
 
   
 

. (7) 
where     0eu , ,i ir EU r    with 0  the contextual norm, and 0  the Fechner error 
parameter. Maximizing the log-likelihood, equation (8) in chapter 3, I found evidence 
that subjects exhibited decreasing relative risk aversion as predicted, with ˆ 0.7336r   and 
ˆ 0.7256   . 
4.2.2 Identifying Subjective Beliefs and Uncertainty Attitudes 
Beliefs and attitudes towards uncertainty were identified from choices made in the 
MPL bets paying in the simulated commodity, LSR bets for the ―quality‖ of the 
experimental commodity, and the ELP task where subjects are able to swap uncertainty 
for objectivity. 
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From the MPL task, subjects made choices between pairs of uncertain lotteries. 
To simplify the discussion, I will only use the UP preference function defined in Model 
1, equations (25) and (26). The utility of option I is evaluated by 
             
  w B Cg ,gB,C 1 Pr B B 1 Pr C Ci I i j j ik k ik kkj JUP u v v              
        w g g1 Pr B B Pr C Cj v v          , 
and option II by 
             
  w A Dg ,gA,D 1 Pr A A 1 Pr D Di I i j j ik k ik kkj JUP u v v              
         w g g1 Pr A A Pr D Dj v v          . 
Second-order utilities were assumed characterized by constant relative uncertainty 
aversion,    1 1u x x    . The latent index was modeled using the logistic function 
 
  
     
II w A D 1
I w B C 1 II w A D 1
exp up , , , ; ,
exp up , , , ; , exp up , , , ; ,
r
UP
r r
  
     
 

π π π
π π π π π π
, (31) 
with log-likelihood 
       1
1
ln , , ; , , , ln + 1 ln 1
T
t t
t
L y r y UP y UP  

   π X , 0  , 1r  , (32) 
where 1(0)ty   indicates the t
th
 choice of lottery II(I), and X  is data pertaining to the 
choice tasks and/or subject characteristics. To supplement identification of 1 , the 
Fechner error for MPL choices, deviations in the switching point for the ―branded‖ 
commodity treatment are only explained by errors, 1 . 
Beliefs wπ , Aπ , Bπ , Cπ , and Dπ  were identified using a linear scoring rule, 
where subjects place bets that either the can they won was Coke or Pepsi, or both cans in 
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their chosen option were correctly grade (―branded‖) by the motivated volunteer.22 All 25 
subjects in the ungraded sessions and 5 subjects in the first graded session made bets for 
the brand of the experimental commodity they won. 
For each belief, bets with the LSR were placed using identical experimental 
procedures. To save space and avoid overly repetitive discussion, description of the LSR 
component(s) of the FIML model will focus on bets contingent on the brand of 
commodity A. In such an instance, subjects behave as if maximizing 
    
 
A A
0 Coke,Pepsi
A A | report
I
i ig g
i g
UP u v   
 
 
   
 
  . (33) 
For a given report  , the multinomial logistic link functions is written as 
 
  
  
A A 1
A A 1
exp UP , , ; ,
exp UP , , ; ,
r
W
r


  
  


 

π ρ
π ρ
, (34) 
where    A A A A 1UP , , ; , , , ; ,r UP r     π ρ π ρ  is the contextual error specification 
for the UP values, analogous to equation (7). The log-likelihood function is 
       A A
1
ln , , ; , , , ln + 1 ln 1
T
t t
t
L y r y W y W 

   π ρ X , 0  , 1r  , (35) 
where 1ty   for the report 
  and 0ty   for all other  . (The likelihood functions 
for those subjects betting on the brands of the other commodities are identical, except 
subscripts ―A‖ in equations (33), (34), and (35) are replaced by either B, C, or D.) 
In the final task, the ELP task, the subject in possession of commodity A and 
having placed a bet   was afforded the opportunity to swap his uncertain bet, in 
                                                 
22
 The motivated volunteer was given an incentive of $10 extra if he correctly identified the brand for each 
soda can in options I and II. The volunteer for each ―graded‖ session was randomly chosen from a pool of 
multiple volunteers. 
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exchange for a bet defined by the objective probability  L ACokeP 100 1 101       and 
 R ACokeP 100 1 101       that he receive payment from the left (L) or right (R) hand 
columns of Table 14, where  A  π  is the implicit raw subjective belief given report  . 
Subjects evaluated their objective 
    L R RP PLEU v z v z  , (36) 
of making the swap, with their ambiguous  
 
   
 
A A
0 Coke,Pepsi
A A |
I
i ig g
i g
UP u v

  

 
 
   
 
  , (33) 
of keeping their LSR bet. 
With these the preferences, ELP choices were assumed logistically distributed, 
with probability of replacing the uncertain bet given by 
 
  
     
L R 1
L R 1 A A 1
exp eu P ,P ; ,
exp eu P ,P ; , exp up , , ; ,
r
W
r r
 
    
 
 π ρ
, (37) 
where  eu  and  up   are the contextual normalizations of equation (36) and (33). The 
log-likelihood is 
      A A 1 L R
1
ln , , , ; ,P ,P , , , ln + 1 ln 1
T
t t
t
L y r y W y W  

   π ρ X , 
 0  , 1r  , (38) 
where 1(0)ty   indicates the t
th
 subject’s choice of replacing (keeping) his uncertain 
LSR bet, and X  is data pertaining to the choice tasks and/or subject characteristics. 
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4.3 Data and Results 
Hypothesis 4, identified in chapter 2, extends the economic concept of uncertainty 
aversion and multiple priors to multiple uncertain processes. For each process, the subject 
may have different sets of prior beliefs and attitudes towards each uncertainty embodied 
in those sets. 
HYPOTHESIS 4: Subjects cognitively differentiate between different uncertain 
processes. 
Hypothesis 4 is tested as follows. Section 4.3.2 estimates risk attitudes alone, 
assuming EUT. Section 4.3.3 estimates three models of uncertain priors. First, both brand 
beliefs for each commodity as well as signal (prediction) accuracy of a volunteer 
―grader‖ is assumed uncertain with multiple beliefs (Model 1), equation (25) and (26). 
Second, subjects are assumed uncertainty neutral
23
 with respect to prediction accuracy 
(Model 2), equations (27) and (28) with  Ju x x . Third, subjects are assumed 
uncertainty neutral with respect to brand and UP preferences with respect to brand beliefs 
(Model 3), equations (29) and (30) with  Iu x x . These preference specifications are 
tested using Clarke’s (2003, 2006) sign test.24 Finally, an estimated ―SEU model‖, where 
subjects were assumed to be uncertainty neutral over both brand and prediction accuracy 
is compared to the better model out of Model 1, 2, or 3. 
                                                 
23
 I purposely avoid describing uncertainty neutral preferences as SEU. In the context of Ellsberg’s (1961) 
two-color problem SEU implies subjects believe balls are only distributed 50-50 (or some other 
distribution), for example. However, in the context of a soda’s brand, the single belief interpretation 
appears to be inappropriate. There are only two possibilities: the commodity is either Coke, not Pepsi, or it 
is Pepsi, not Coke. Sodas are not 50% Coke and 50% Pepsi. The subject logically weights these two 
possibilities. But this interpretation is clearly not the same as SEU preferences in an ―Ellsberg‖ context. 
24
 Vuong’s (1989) non-nested test was inappropriate. The Shapiro-Wilk test rejected the null that the 
likelihood ratios for each model comparison were normally distributed. 
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4.3.2 Estimating Risk Attitudes Alone 
Before estimating the expo-power utility function (equation (6)), average relative 
risk aversion of the subject-pool was estimated using the CRRA utility function, 
     1 1rv x x r  , over the domain  of RLP prizes used to calibrate risk attitudes ($0, 
$15, $35, and $50). On average, subjects were moderately risk averse over the prize 
domain, ˆ 0.4587r   (Table 15). 
Table 15. Coefficient Estimates for Risk Attitudes from CRRA Utility 
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error p-value 
Lower 
95% CI 
Upper 
95% CI 
r RRA at zero income 0.4587 0.0791 <0.0001 0.3037 0.6136 
µ0 RLP Fechner error 0.0881 0.0098 <0.0001 0.069 0.1073 
       
Pseudo log-likelihood = -2479.5339      
Observations =3667      
 
Table 16 reports coefficient estimates assuming an expo-power utility 
specification. The expo-power specifications allows relative risk aversion to either 
increase, decrease, or remain constant over the domain of prizes ($0, $15, $35, and $50). 
The degree of relative risk aversion is 
   1RRA 1 rr r x    , (15) 
which is increasing when 0  , decrease for 0  , and remain constant if 0  . From 
Table 16, ˆ  is highly significant and CRRA is rejected. Choices exhibit risk aversion for 
low stakes gambles ( ˆ 0.7336r  ), which decreases as lottery prizes increase to $50 (
ˆ 0.7256   ). 
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Table 16. Coefficient Estimates for Risk Attitudes from Expo-Power Utility 
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error p-value 
Lower 
95% CI 
Upper 
95% CI 
r RRA at zero income 0.7336 0.0317 <0.0001 0.6714 0.7957 
α Positive income RRA normalization  -0.7256 0.0783 <0.0001 -0.8790 -0.5722 
µ0 RLP Fechner error 0.0712 0.0067 <0.0001 0.0581 0.0843 
       
Pseudo log-likelihood = -2455.1592      
Observations =3667      
 
4.3.3 The Uncertain Priors Model 
For the unbranded and graded treatments, where each commodity was not known 
with certainty, 15 subjects won commodity A and 5 placed LSR bets on the commodity’s 
brand. The average report was 0.616, with a median of 0.58 and each bet was: 0, 0.5 0.58 
and 1. The left hand column of Figure 4 graphically depicts these bets for each anchoring 
treatment, high and low. The kernel density of each bet is shown in the last row. The 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test failed to reject the null hypotheses of no anchoring biases for 
LSR bets placed on the correct brand of commodities A (p-value = 0.20, n = 5). 
Anchoring bias is also rejected for commodities B, C, and D. 
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Figure 4. Raw Elicited Brand Beliefs 
Thirteen out of 23 subjects winning commodity B placed LSR bets on the 
commodities brand. The average report was 0.495, with median 0.62 and 2 bets that B 
was Pepsi for sure and 2 bets that B was Coke for sure. Bets for commodity C’s brand 
were similar. Eight out of 12 subjects who won commodity C in the MPL task placed 
bets on its brand. The mean report was 0.486, with median 0.71. Reports from the 4 
subjects betting on the brand of commodity D were similar to those of commodity A. 
There was a low number of subjects placing bets (4 out of 7 possible). Three of the 4 
subjects placed bets consistent with risk and uncertainty neutral preferences. Two 
subjects were certain commodity D was Pepsi and one was certain it was Coke. The last 
subject bet 0.4, consistent with a belief it was more likely commodity D was Pepsi than 
Coke. 
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The remaining 27 subjects participating in the ungraded and graded treatment 
placed LSR bets on the accuracy of their chosen option in the MPL task. Subjects who 
chose option I placed their bets that commodities B and C were correctly identified by the 
financially motivated volunteer.
25
 
The majority of subjects betting each option were more than 50% sure the 
volunteers’ predictions were correct. The median reports were 0.81 for option I and 0.905 
for option II. The 25
th
 percentile for each set of reports was greater than or equal to 0.5. 
Figure 5 shows these reports graphically. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test 
failed to reject the null hypotheses of no anchoring biases for LSR bets placed on the 
accuracy of brand signal for each MPL option I (p-value = 0.898, n = 15) and II (p-value 
= 0.990, n = 12). 
 
                                                 
25
 The volunteers in each graded session made the same prediction. Commodities A and B were predicted 
to be Coke, B and C were predicted to be Pepsi. 
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Figure 5. Raw Elicited Signal (Prediction) Accuracy Beliefs 
Coefficient estimates for the UP model with brand and prediction uncertainty are 
shown in Table 17. The identifying assumption that subjects’ preferences are SDRA with 
respect to individual commodity brand beliefs and prediction accuracy of the volunteer 
was made. Specifically, A B C D 2I I I I    . Economically, the SDRA assumption is 
based on the argument that subjects believe either the commodity is all Coke or all Pepsi 
and weight these priors by their subjective probability that each outcome will occur. 
This interpretation is distinctly different from that of the UP model as it was 
applied to the Ellsberg problem in chapter 3. In chapter 3, it was reasonably assumed that 
subjects believed the priors were equal to the possible distributions of colored balls in the 
unknown bingo cage. Prior weights then represented the subjective belief that the 
experimenter filled the cage with a particular distribution of bingo-balls. Here, there is no 
such set of possibilities. Each commodity is either one brand or the other. The same 
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argument applies for the assumption of SDRA with respect to the volunteer’s prediction 
accuracy. Table 17 reports the coefficient estimates for Model 1, the UP model given by 
equations (25) and (26). Subjects were very confident that commodity A was coke, 
A
ˆ 0.7223  . Subjects were also more confident that commodity C was Coke  
( Cˆ 0.6421  ), than they were for commodities B ( Bˆ 0.3390  ) and D ( Dˆ 0.2255  ) 
which was insignificant at conventional levels. A contradiction to the raw LSR reports in 
Figure 5, Model 1 estimates that subjects were very confident the volunteer’s prediction 
was incorrect, Wˆ 0.6513   with p-value = 0.003. 
Table 17. Model 1: Brands & Prediction Accuracy 
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error p-value 
Lower 
95% CI 
Upper 
95% CI 
r RRA at zero income 0.716 0.0209 <0.0001 0.675 0.757 
α Positive income RRA normalization  -0.6413 0.0205 <0.0001 -0.6815 -0.6011 
µ0 RLP Fechner error 0.0718 0.0072 <0.0001 0.0578 0.0858 
ρW Prior weight: brand prediction 0.6513 0.2214 0.0030 0.2174 1.0852 
ρA Prior weight: soda A Coke 0.7223 0.2110 0.0010 0.3088 1.1358 
ρB Prior weight: soda B Coke 0.3390 0.1977 0.0860 -0.0485 0.7264 
ρC Prior weight: soda C Coke 0.6421 0.2210 0.0040 0.2089 1.0752 
ρD Prior weight: soda D Coke 0.2255 0.1993 0.2580 -0.1650 0.6161 
ϕ CRUA coefficient -0.1560 0.1399 0.2650 -0.4302 0.1181 
µ1 Fechner error 0.3514 0.0944 <0.0001 0.1665 0.5364 
       
Pseudo log-likelihood = -3608.5548      
Observations = 5313      
 
Statistical control for anchoring biases in the MPL decisions are added to the 
model in Table 18. At the beginning of this section, the Kolmogrov-Smirnov test failed to 
reject the null of no anchoring biases in LSR bets. Coefficient estimates for ˆ Anchorρ  are 
jointly zero at the 0.9733 level ( 25 0.86  ). The model reported in Table 17 is the better 
model, assuming UP preferences with both brand and prediction uncertainty. 
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Table 18. Model 1: Brands & Prediction Accuracy with Treatment Effects 
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error p-value 
Lower 
95% CI 
Upper 
95% CI 
r RRA at zero income 0.7172 0.0232 <0.0001 0.6717 0.7626 
α Positive income RRA normalization  -0.6461 0.0864 <0.0001 -0.8154 -0.4767 
µ0 RLP Fechner error 0.0717 0.0071 <0.0001 0.0579 0.0856 
ρW Prior weight: brand prediction      
Constant  0.5835 0.2504 0.0200 0.0928 1.0741 
Anchor MPL anchoring treatment 0.2055 0.4238 0.6280 -0.6251 1.036 
ρA Prior weight: soda A is Coke      
Constant  0.7059 0.2215 0.0010 0.2718 1.1401 
Anchor MPL anchoring treatment 0.0838 3.3025 0.9800 -6.3890 6.5565 
ρB Prior weight: soda B is Coke      
Constant  0.3509 0.2240 0.1170 -0.0882 0.7899 
Anchor MPL anchoring treatment -0.1827 0.3455 0.5970 -0.8599 0.4946 
ρC Prior weight: soda C is Coke      
Constant  0.6434 0.2396 0.0070 0.1737 1.1131 
Anchor MPL anchoring treatment 0.0196 3.3823 0.9950 -6.6096 6.6488 
ρD Prior weight: soda D is Coke      
Constant  0.2033 0.2593 0.4330 -0.3049 0.7116 
Anchor MPL anchoring treatment -0.1780 0.2854 0.5330 -0.7374 0.3814 
ϕ CRUA coefficient -0.1646 0.1643 0.3160 -0.4866 0.1573 
µ1 Fechner error 0.3570 0.1041 0.0010 0.1531 0.5609 
       
Pseudo log-likelihood = -3607.3399      
Observations = 5313      
 
4.3.3.1 Uncertain Distinctions 
Two alternative UP-consistent preference models assume either: 
1. Model 2, subjects are uncertainty neutral in the prediction accuracy and 
uncertainty seeking/averse in the brand domain (equations (27) and (28) with 
 Ju x x ), or 
2. Model 3, subjects are uncertainty seeking/averse in the prediction accuracy 
domain and uncertainty neutral in the brand domain (equations equations (29) 
and (30) with  Iu x x ). 
Table 19 and Table 20 show the likelihood estimates for Model 2. Anchoring 
biases are tested in Table 20. The chi-square test fails to reject the null of no bias and all 
treatment variables are jointly zero at the 0.1122 level, with 25 8.92  .  
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Table 19. Model 2: Uncertainty Neutral in Prediction Domain 
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error p-value 
Lower 
95% CI 
Upper 
95% CI 
r RRA at zero income 0.7240 0.3686 0.0490 0.0016 1.4464 
α Positive income RRA normalization  -0.6842 2.1441 0.7500 -4.8866 3.5182 
µ0 RLP Fechner error 0.0716 0.0079 <0.0001 0.0561 0.0871 
ρW Prior weight: brand prediction 0.1876 0.3198 0.5580 -0.4393 0.8144 
ρA Prior weight: soda A Coke 0.7964 0.2545 0.0020 0.2976 1.2952 
ρB Prior weight: soda B Coke 0.3357 0.2567 0.1910 -0.1675 0.8388 
ρC Prior weight: soda C Coke 0.6623 0.2899 0.0220 0.0941 1.2304 
ρD Prior weight: soda D Coke 0.1353 0.3254 0.6780 -0.5024 0.7730 
ϕ CRUA coefficient -0.1155 0.2739 0.6730 -0.6523 0.4213 
µ1 Fechner error 0.3927 0.1911 0.0400 0.0181 0.7674 
       
Pseudo log-likelihood = -3599.637      
Observations = 5313      
 
Table 20. Model 2: Uncertainty Neutral in Prediction Domain with Treatment Effects 
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error p-value 
Lower 
95% CI 
Upper 
95% CI 
r RRA at zero income 0.7229 0.0574 <0.0001 0.6105 0.8354 
α Positive income RRA normalization  -0.6772 0.2504 0.0070 -1.1680 -0.1863 
µ0 RLP Fechner error 0.0716 0.0071 <0.0001 0.0578 0.0854 
ρW Prior weight: brand prediction      
Constant  0.1633 0.3067 0.5940 -0.4379 0.7645 
Anchor MPL anchoring treatment 0.0546 0.3271 0.8670 -0.5865 0.6957 
ρA Prior weight: soda A is Coke      
Constant  0.8012 0.3074 0.0090 0.1988 1.4037 
Anchor MPL anchoring treatment -0.6249 0.6043 0.3010 -1.8094 0.5596 
ρB Prior weight: soda B is Coke      
Constant  0.3726 0.2453 0.1290 -0.1082 0.8535 
Anchor MPL anchoring treatment 0.6133 0.2385 0.0100 0.1458 1.0807 
ρC Prior weight: soda C is Coke      
Constant  0.6513 0.3286 0.0470 0.0072 1.2953 
Anchor MPL anchoring treatment -0.6124 0.5006 0.2210 -1.5934 0.3687 
ρD Prior weight: soda D is Coke      
Constant  0.0488 0.4433 0.9120 -0.8200 0.9176 
Anchor MPL anchoring treatment 0.7733 0.5155 0.1340 -0.2371 1.7837 
ϕ CRUA coefficient -0.1292 0.2907 0.6570 -0.6989 0.4404 
µ1 Fechner error 0.3908 0.1089 <0.0001 0.1773 0.6042 
       
Pseudo log-likelihood = -3598.7185      
Observations = 5313      
 
Estimates reported in Table 19 suggests that subjects were highly confident that 
the volunteer prediction was correct, Wˆ 0.1876   with p-value = 0.558. This is 
consistent with the raw reports in Figure 5. Subjects remain confident that commodities A 
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and C are Coke ( Aˆ 0.7964   and Cˆ 0.6623  ) the coefficient Bˆ 0.3357   is now 
insignificant at the 0.19 level. The coefficient Dˆ 0.1353   remains insignificant. The 
estimated coefficient of relative uncertainty ˆ 0.1155    in the brand domain is 
insignificant. 
Figure 6 shows the distribution of likelihood ratios comparing Models 1 and 2. 
The Shapiro-Wilk test clearly rejects the null that the ratios are normally distributed. The 
Clarke (2003, 2006) sign test is appropriate to discriminate between these two models. 
The Clarke test rejects equality of the models in favor of Model 2 at the 0.0622 level. 
There is evidence that the assumption subjects are uncertainty neutral with respect to 
prediction accuracy explains the data better than Model 1, where subjects are assumed 
uncertainty seeking / averse for both brand and prediction accuracy. 
 
Figure 6. Distribution Likelihood Ratios: Model 1 vs. Model 2 
 
Table 21 reports the likelihood estimates from Model 3, where subjects are 
assumed uncertainty neutral in the commodity brand domain only. Subjects place more 
weight on the volunteer prediction was incorrect than correct. The estimated coefficient 
of relative uncertainty ˆ 0.0404    in the prediction domain is insignificant. Point 
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estimates of beliefs that each commodity A, B, C and D is coke are consistent with earlier 
observations, Aˆ 0.81   and Cˆ 0.6728  , while Bˆ  and Dˆ  are insignificant. Consistent 
with raw reports in Figure 5, ˆ 0.1798W   is insignificant at the 0.479 level. Coefficient 
estimates reported in Table 22 fail to reject the null of no anchoring biases in the MPL 
task at the 0.78 level ( 2
5 2.47  ). 
Table 21. Model 3: Uncertainty Neutral in Brand Domain 
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error p-value 
Lower 
95% CI 
Upper 
95% CI 
r RRA at zero income 0.7266 0.0324 <0.0001 0.6631 0.7900 
α Positive income RRA normalization  -0.7014 0.0765 <0.0001 -0.8513 -0.5515 
µ0 RLP Fechner error 0.0716 0.0071 <0.0001 0.0578 0.0855 
ρW Prior weight: brand prediction 0.1798 0.2540 0.4790 -0.3181 0.6777 
ρA Prior weight: soda A Coke 0.8100 0.2991 0.0070 0.2236 1.3963 
ρB Prior weight: soda B Coke 0.3042 0.2748 0.2680 -0.2344 0.8428 
ρC Prior weight: soda C Coke 0.6728 0.3402 0.0480 0.0061 1.3396 
ρD Prior weight: soda D Coke 0.0913 0.2825 0.7470 -0.4624 0.6450 
ϕ CRUA coefficient -0.0404 0.1252 0.7470 -0.2857 0.2049 
µ1 Fechner error 0.3949 0.1065 <0.0001 0.1861 0.6037 
       
Pseudo log-likelihood = -3599.8614      
Observations = 5313      
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Table 22. Model 3: Uncertainty Neutral in Brand Domain with Treatment Effects 
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error p-value 
Lower 
95% CI 
Upper 
95% CI 
r RRA at zero income 0.7273 0.0326 <0.0001 0.6634 0.7912 
α Positive income RRA normalization  -0.7063 0.0795 <0.0001 -0.862 -0.5505 
µ0 RLP Fechner error 0.0716 0.0071 <0.0001 0.0578 0.0855 
ρW Prior weight: brand prediction      
Constant  0.1440 0.3034 0.6350 -0.4506 0.7387 
Anchor MPL anchoring treatment 0.0519 0.3456 0.8810 -0.6254 0.7292 
ρA Prior weight: soda A is Coke      
Constant  0.8211 0.3012 0.0060 0.2306 1.4115 
Anchor MPL anchoring treatment 0.1524 0.3072 0.6200 -0.4497 0.7545 
ρB Prior weight: soda B is Coke      
Constant  0.3541 0.2361 0.1340 -0.1086 0.8168 
Anchor MPL anchoring treatment -0.1529 0.3559 0.6670 -0.8504 0.5446 
ρC Prior weight: soda C is Coke      
Constant  0.6657 0.3446 0.0530 -0.0097 1.3411 
Anchor MPL anchoring treatment 0.1538 0.4635 0.7400 -0.7547 1.0623 
ρD Prior weight: soda D is Coke      
Constant  0.0003 0.0120 0.9830 -0.0232 0.0237 
Anchor MPL anchoring treatment 0.0338 0.0413 0.4130 -0.0471 0.1147 
ϕ CRUA coefficient -0.0151 0.1387 0.9130 -0.2870 0.2568 
µ1 Fechner error 0.3974 0.1069 <0.0001 0.1880 0.6069 
       
Pseudo log-likelihood = -3599.0641      
Observations = 5313      
 
The Shapiro-Wilk test rejects normality of the likelihood ratios between Models 1 
and 3 (Figure 7). Clarke’s (2003, 2006) test rejects equality of the individual log 
likelihoods in favor of equations Model 3 at the 0.0988 level. There is a moderate amount 
of evidence that subjects are uncertainty neutral in the commodity brand domain with 
 Iu x x . 
The Shapiro-Wilk test rejects the null hypothesis of normality of the likelihood 
ratios between Model 2 and Model 3. The distribution of likelihood ratios is shown in 
Figure 8. The Clarke (2003, 2006) test clearly favors Model 3 as the better model to 
explain subjects’ choices when compared to Model 1. More than 63% of non-zero 
likelihood differences (1049 out of 1629) favor subjects being uncertainty neutral with 
respect to brand accuracy. 
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Figure 7. Distribution Likelihood Ratios: Model 1 vs. Model 3 
It has been demonstrated that Model 2 (Table 19) and Model 3 (Table 21) both 
outperform Model 1 (Table 17). As expected, the Shapiro-Wilk test (see Figure 8) rejects 
normality of the likelihood differences for these two models and the Clarke (2003, 2006) 
test is appropriate to discriminate between Model 2 and 3. The Clarke test favored Model 
3 over Models 2 and 1 (p-value < 0.0001). 
 
Figure 8. Distribution Likelihood Ratios: Model 2 vs. Model 3 
Assuming subjects were uncertainty neutral in both the brand and prediction 
accuracy domains, point estimates reported in Table 23 describe subjects as believing the 
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volunteer’s prediction was correct, Wˆ 0.166   is insignificant. Subjects also believed 
commodities A and C were Coke with Aˆ 0.8094   and Cˆ 0.6722  , respectively. 
Subjects were very confident commodities B and D were Pepsi, Bˆ  and Dˆ  are both 
insignificant. The point estimates reported in Table 24 fail to reject the null of no 
anchoring biases at the 0.6055 level, 2
5 3.62  . 
Table 23. ―SEU‖ Model: Uncertainty Neutral in Brand and Prediction Domains 
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error p-value 
Lower 
95% CI 
Upper 
95% CI 
r RRA at zero income 0.7276 0.0329 <0.0001 0.6630 0.7921 
α Positive income RRA normalization  -0.7087 0.0794 <0.0001 -0.8642 -0.5531 
µ0 RLP Fechner error 0.0716 0.0071 <0.0001 0.0578 0.0855 
ρW Prior weight: brand prediction 0.1660 0.2213 0.4530 -0.2677 0.5997 
ρA Prior weight: soda A Coke 0.8094 0.3000 0.0070 0.2213 1.3974 
ρB Prior weight: soda B Coke 0.3064 0.2704 0.2570 -0.2234 0.8363 
ρC Prior weight: soda C Coke 0.6722 0.3376 0.0460 0.0106 1.3339 
ρD Prior weight: soda D Coke 0.0926 0.2768 0.7380 -0.4500 0.6352 
µ1 Fechner error 0.3981 0.1005 <0.0001 0.2012 0.5951 
       
Pseudo log-likelihood = -3599.9313      
Observations = 5313      
 
With ˆ  from Model 3 insignificant (p-value = 0.673) and no evidence of 
treatment effects for the ―SEU‖ model which assumes subjects are uncertainty neutral 
over both brand and prediction domains, the likelihood ratio test applied to observations 
from the WTA, LSR, and ELP decision tasks failed to reject the equivalence of Model 2 
and the ―SEU‖ mode reported in Table 23 ( 2
1 0.5486  ). 
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Table 24. ―SEU‖ Model: Uncertainty Neutral Preferences with Treatment Effects 
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error p-value 
Lower 
95% CI 
Upper 
95% CI 
r RRA at zero income 0.7277 0.0328 <0.0001 0.6634 0.7920 
α Positive income RRA normalization  -0.7091 0.0787 <0.0001 -0.8633 -0.5549 
µ0 RLP Fechner error 0.0716 0.0071 <0.0001 0.0578 0.0855 
ρW Prior weight: brand prediction      
Constant  0.1375 0.2552 0.5900 -0.3626 0.6377 
Anchor MPL anchoring treatment 0.0549 0.3349 0.8700 -0.6015 0.7112 
ρA Prior weight: soda A is Coke      
Constant  0.8210 0.3006 0.0060 0.2318 1.4101 
Anchor MPL anchoring treatment 0.1652 0.2997 0.5820 -0.4222 0.7525 
ρB Prior weight: soda B is Coke      
Constant  0.3561 0.2300 0.1220 -0.0947 0.8069 
Anchor MPL anchoring treatment -0.1589 0.3499 0.6500 -0.8447 0.5269 
ρC Prior weight: soda C is Coke      
Constant  0.6656 0.3431 0.052 -0.0069 1.3381 
Anchor MPL anchoring treatment 0.1671 0.4543 0.713 -0.7233 1.0575 
ρD Prior weight: soda D is Coke      
Constant  0.0001 0.0032 0.9830 -0.0062 0.0064 
Anchor MPL anchoring treatment 0.0306 0.0377 0.4160 -0.0432 0.1045 
µ1 Fechner error 0.3986 0.1027 <0.0001 0.1973 0.5999 
       
Pseudo log-likelihood = -3599.0736      
Observations = 5313      
 
4.4 Experiment Summary 
This chapter set out to develop an experimental design to test the hypothesis that 
individuals differentiate between different uncertainties. 
HYPOTHESIS 4: Subjects cognitively differentiate between different uncertain 
processes. 
To test hypothesis 4, three different specifications of the uncertain priors model 
were estimated using structural likelihood methods. The first, Model 1 (equation (25) and 
(26)), assumed attitudes towards uncertainty were singular and subjects did not 
differentiate between uncertain processes. Model 2 (equations (27) and (28)) assumed 
subjects had neutral attitudes towards prediction accuracy uncertainty and non-neutral 
attitudes towards brand uncertainty. Model 3 (equations (29) and (30)) assumed non-
neutral attitudes towards prediction accuracy and neutral attitudes towards brand 
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uncertainty. Application of Clarke’s (2003, 2006) sign test for non-nested models 
rejected equality of Models 2 and 3, in favor of Model 2. The Clarke test also rejects 
equality of Models 1 and 2, in favor of model 2 at the 6.22% level. 
Empirical analysis can neither reject nor fail to reject hypothesis 4. Results from 
the Clarke tests yield evidence in favor of hypothesis 4. There is evidence that one 
process models, Model 2 (Table 19) and Model 3 (Table 21), explains behavior better 
than assuming subjects are have attitudes towards uncertainty over both processes. 
Estimated beliefs from Model 2, Model 3, and the ―SEU‖ model are consistent with each 
other as well as raw elicited beliefs. Subjects believed the volunteer’s prediction was 
correct. But if he was wrong, subjects believed commodities B and D more likely to be 
Coke while commodities A and C were more likely to be Pepsi. There is also strong 
evidence that subjects are uncertainty neutral in both the prediction accuracy and brand 
domains. 
The empirical results are ambiguous. 
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CHAPTER 5: PRIVACY, IDENTIFICATION, AND UNCERTAINTY 
Chapter 3 demonstrated that uncertainty aversion in Ellsberg’s (1961) two-color 
problem only survives a laboratory setting at the 11.7% level. In chapter 4, the Clarke 
(2003, 2006) test for non-nested model selection favored constraining subjects to have 
neutral attitudes towards prediction accuracy. The Clarke test supports hypothesis 4. 
However, the empirical evidence rejected non-neutral attitudes towards quality 
uncertainty. As a result, the evidence presented in favor of hypothesis 4 is mixed. 
The experimental design presented in the sequel retests hypothesis 4 in the 
context of privacy uncertainties, confidentiality and consequences. The experiment is 
designed to test hypothesis 5 and 6. 
HYPOTHESIS 5: Subjects’ willingness-to-accept confidentiality loss is lower when 
making indirect sales of information to a party that does not have a 
direct mechanism to harm the subject. 
HYPOTHESIS 6: Subjects cognitively differentiates between uncertain 
confidentiality breach and consequences. 
Testing hypothesis 5 and 6 requires that only behavior in the laboratory 
characterizes privacy loss as well as its consequences. To do that, privacy must be salient 
to the design. There must be a link between subject A’s chosen strategy and subject B’s 
valuation of the knowledge of A’s strategy. Confounds represented by uncontrolled 
strategies and interpersonal comparisons outside of the lab must be controlled. 
Table 25 lists several well-known games and a lesser known game and tasks that 
generate private information, which human subjects may value. These include: 
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 Social Dilemma Games, where the payoff to each individual is higher from defecting 
behavior than those from cooperative behaviors, and all individuals are worse off 
when cooperation is not unanimous, 
 Bargaining Games, where common knowledge of otherwise private information is 
known to change the solution concept (Roth and Malouf 1979), 
 Joy-of-Destruction, a new game designed to measure ―nastiness‖ towards others, and 
 Lottery Choice Tasks. 
Excluding the Joy-of-Destruction game, introduced by Abbink and Sadrieh (2008) 
and simple lottery choice tasks, anonymity loss may alter the way subjects play these 
games (Gächter and Fehr 1999). Anonymity loss may engender other-regarding 
preferences such as social approval, possibilities for reciprocal actions outside the lab, 
exhibitionism, or plain old nastiness.  
Multiple mechanisms and institutions generate different pieces of information for 
each subject. Histories of play (actions) are the most salient types of information 
generated in the games listed in Table 25. Knowing Player A’s payoff indirectly informs 
Player B of Player A’s history of play, and vice versa. The qualifying criterion for a 
candidate experimental design is that actions by Player A map into the payoffs and 
strategies of Player B, such that Player B’s payoffs are partly determined by Player A’s 
chosen strategy. Player A’s effect on Player B’s payoff, coupled with an appropriate 
mechanism for reciprocal action would lead Player A to value keeping his history private 
from Player B. 
Consider the joy-of-destruction game. Each player (A or B) can either earn their 
endowment, or be assigned one at random. Abbink and Sadrieh (2008) used an earnings 
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based mechanism to avoid house money effects
26
 in their experimental analysis of 
anonymity and players’ willingness to impose financial damage on others. The analysis 
of Abbink and Sadrieh (2008) focuses on changes to Player A’s (the dictator) actions, not 
his belief regarding possible repercussions, such as the possibility of reciprocal actions 
from Player B (the victim) knowing Player A’s identity. Confounds represented by 
uncontrolled opportunities for reciprocity that may exist outside the lab makes this 
particular design inappropriate, since beliefs would not be identifiable and utilities would 
not be controlled. 
Furthermore, Rutström and Williams (2000) concluded that irrespective of the 
way in which endowments were earned subject behavior may be best described as self-
interested. Poorer subjects prefer distributions that increase own payoffs, while richer 
subjects prefer distributions that leave their payoffs intact. These results suggest that 
Player A ―knowing‖ Player B’s potential payoff would not alter Player A’s chosen 
strategy in the joy-of-destruction in any meaningful way. Player A would rather be nasty, 
destroying Player B’s wealth to maximize the likelihood that he earns at least as much as 
Player B. In the experimental design of Abbink and Sadrieh (2008), Player B’s beliefs for 
the occurrence of a bad outcome will be unchanged by a loss of privacy over wealth. 
Player B would have little incentive to be willing to pay to maintain privacy.  
Burnham (1997) reported on a series of dictator games where, in one treatment, 
Player A would receive Player B’s photo prior to deciding whether or not to split a $10 
endowment between himself and Player B. Burnham (1997) found that receiving player 
                                                 
26
 Thaler and Johnson (1990, p. 643-644) define the house money effect as when ―… under some 
circumstances a prior gain can increase subjects’ willingness to accept gambles.‖ Contemporary 
experimental economics uses the term house money effect to describe behavioral differences between those 
subjects who earn money in the lab as consequences to choices made and those subjects who are ―given‖ 
money by the experimenter. 
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B’s photo does not change the likelihood that Player A chooses to keep the entire $10. 
However, conditional on Player A already giving Player B a portion of the $10, losing 
anonymity increases Player A’s giving. These results suggest that the classic dictator 
game is also an inappropriate design to elicit values of privacy. Both the dictator game 
and joy-of-destruction game lack mechanisms that would induce dictators to behave in a 
more self-interested way following the recipients’ loss of confidentiality. 
In a series of related experiments, Fehr and Fischbacher (2004), Goette, Huffman, 
and Meire (2006), Bernhard, Fehr, and Fischbacher (2006), and Chen and Xin Li (2009) 
measure the effects of induced group identities and real group identities. Using prisoner’s 
dilemma and dictator games, each analysis measured punishment levels associated with 
deviations from social norms. Within-group and between-group designs were employed 
in each experiment. In-group members were robustly found to punish deviation more 
severely than out-group members, and this finding was statistically significant.  
Supporting the saliency of laboratory induced (group) identities to explain the 
privacy behavior, Fehr and Fischbacher (2004, Fig. 1 and 2) show that subjects form 
expectations of punishment that increase with violations of social norms. Their results 
suggest that a dictator game, coupled with the formation of identities and opportunities 
for reciprocal punishment, may allow subjects to form values of identifying information 
that are endogenous to the experiment. 
The joy-of-destruction and dictator games using real subject identities have 
therefore been eliminated as potential institutions that allow subjective values of privacy 
to emerge as a result of salient consequences from strategies chosen in the laboratory. 
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Integrating (repeated) prisoner’s dilemma games with punishment opportunities would 
allow for experimental control of previously identified confounds.  
Public goods and common pool resource games with punishment accomplish this 
task. Consider the simple linear public goods game, where each players’ payoff is the 
sum of the social composition function and the part of their endowment not contributed to 
the public good. Although full cooperation is the social optimum, as long as the marginal 
return from own contributions to the public good is less than the marginal private return, 
Players A, B, and any other subject will completely free-ride. Although the free-rider 
hypothesis
27
 tends to fail one-shot tests, under repeated play behavior tends toward 
complete free-riding by each player (Camerer 2002, p. 46; Fehr and Gächter 2000). 
Behavior converges towards full cooperation within a relatively short period of time after 
the introduction of punishment opportunities, (Fehr and Gächter 2000; Ostrom, Walker, 
and Gardner 2001).
28
 
Observations that punishment opportunities increase contributions to the public 
good are explainable by a simple subjective expected utility model. Player A evaluates 
the probability that other players punish him for each possible contribution level. He then 
chooses the contribution level that maximizes his subjective expected utility. This 
contribution level would minimize his expected punishment. As punishments are 
realized, Player A updates his beliefs, and contributions continue to increase towards full 
cooperation. 
                                                 
27
 The free-rider hypothesis tells us that nonexcludability imparts, on each individual, an incentive to 
contribute less than his marginal value to the cost of providing a public good. 
28
 Ostrom, Walker and Gardner (2001) found that sanctions need not be financial. ―Cheap talks‖ 
communication is sufficient to substantially reduce over use of the resource. 
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Players presented with a non-anonymous public goods game with punishment 
should have a willingness to pay for anonymity that is no more than the amount of money 
that dissipates all gains from anonymous play. Subjects form beliefs about the likelihood 
and severity of punishment without anonymity, and then compare these beliefs to their 
expected utility from anonymous play. This is essentially the same evaluation process 
that individuals make when evaluating privacy decision similar to the privacy paradox. 
From the games discussed above and decision tasks presented in Table 25, public 
goods games, common pool resource games, and other appropriately designed repeated 
interaction social dilemma problems appear as natural institutions that may be used to 
generate individualized histories of play that allow subjects to endogenously value 
keeping their histories of play private. 
In section 5.1, the public goods game is incorporated into an experimental design 
to elicit subjective beliefs and attitudes towards privacy uncertainties, confidentiality and 
consequences. The econometric model used to analyze the data is presented in section 
5.2. The data analysis results are discussed in section 5.3 and summarized in section 5.4. 
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Table 25. Candidate Games/Tasks with Private Information 
Games/Tasks 
Information Generating 
Process 
Stake Holder of Privacy and 
Payoffs Saliency of Keeping Privacy 
Public Goods 
Non-rivalrous and non-excludable 
goods and services. 
1) Contributions 
a) Amount of free-
riding behavior. 
2) Endowment 
a) Earned / Random 
1) Contributors 
a) lose money 
2) Free-riders 
gain money 
1) Free-riders reduce payoffs to 
contributors 
2) Controlled punishment opportunities 
inside of the lab. 
Common Pool Resource 
Rivalrous and (usually) non-
excludable goods, such as grazing 
lands in the tragedy of the commons. 
1) Consumption 
a) Amount of resource 
use. 
2) Endowment 
a) Earned / Random 
1) Over-users 
a) Increase payoffs 
2) Everyone else 
a) Relatively lower payoffs 
1) Over-users reduce payoffs to all 
others. 
2) Controlled punishment opportunities 
inside the lab. 
Dictator Games 
One person divides a pie between 
himself and another.  
1) Endowment 
a) Earned / Random 
2) Allocation 
1) Dictator 
a) Unilaterally allocates 
payoffs 
2) Receiver 
a) No laboratory Identity 
1) Uncontrolled punishment 
opportunities outside of the lab. 
2) Controlled punishment opportunities 
inside of the lab. 
Ultimatum Games 
One person makes an offer to 
another. The second person may reject 
the offer, leaving both with zero. 
1) Endowment 
a) Earned / Random 
2) Proposal 
3) Acceptance / Rejection 
1) Proposer 
a) Offers a payoff 
2) Receiver 
a) Accepts or rejects payoff. 
1) Controlled punishment opportunities 
inside of the lab. 
2) Uncontrolled punishment 
opportunities outside of the lab. 
Prisoner’s Dilemma 
Each player must choose whether to 
obtain security, to the detriment of the 
common good. 
1) Defection(s) 
a) One-shot play 
b) Iterated play 
1) Cooperators 
a) Loose money 
2) Defectors 
a) Gain money 
1) Controlled punishment opportunities 
inside of the lab. 
2) Uncontrolled punishment 
opportunities outside of the lab. 
Joy-of-Destruction 
Players can mutually destroy each 
others’ wealth. 
1) Endowment 
a) Earned / Random 
1) Victim loses money. 
2) Nasty player gains no money 
1) Privacy (hidden-action) would tend 
to reduce social distance, increasing 
players’ nastiness to one another. 
Lottery Choice tasks 
Lotteries are randomly presented to 
subjects, who then state preference for 
the same lotteries. 
1) Randomly determined 
lottery pairs 
2) Randomly determined 
prizes 
1) No laboratory identities 1) Prize differences are random 
2) Uncontrolled punishment 
opportunities outside of the lab. 
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5.1 Experimental Design 
Experimental instruments used to elicit privacy values must accomplish two 
things. First, privacy values should emerge endogenously as a result of real choices made 
by subjects. Second, values should be elicited with incentive compatible mechanisms. A 
four stage design is sufficient to satisfy these two criteria. In the first stage, subjects play 
a public goods game. The second stage introduces the prospect of punishment 
opportunities and uses a BDM mechanism in a bargaining situation where subjects have 
the opportunity to sell information pertaining to their choices in the public good stage of 
the experiment. The third stage elicits subjects’ beliefs and presents subjects with an ELP 
choice task to identify UP preferences and attitudes towards uncertainty. Finally, Stage 4 
resolves punishment. 
Table 26. Experimental Design 
Session 
Public Goods WTA/BDM Interval LSR 
Anchoring 
(Skew) 
Sellers, 
Senders, 
punishers Endowment 
Private 
Return 
Public 
Return Low High 
1 20 3 1 $0.00 $20.99 
High 5, 3, 6 
Low 5, 2, 4 
2 30 3 1 $0.00 $20.99 
High 4, 1, 3 
Low 2, 2, 3 
3 30 3 2 $0.00 $20.99 
High 4, 3, 6 
Low 6, 2, 4 
4 20 3 2 $0.00 $20.99 
High 4, 1, 4 
Low 4, 3, 4 
5 30 3 1 $000 $20.99 
High 3, 2, 1 
Low 3, 1, 5 
 
5.1.1 Stage 1: The Public Goods Game 
In the first stage of the experiment, subjects played a public goods game designed 
using the Veconlab
29
 website and software. The game used a 2×2 design where per 
period endowments were 20 or 30 tokens and the social return was either 1 or 2 cents per 
                                                 
29
 http://veconlab.econ.virginia.edu 
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token. Private return was a fixed 3 cents per token for each experimental session. Subject 
endowments and the social return were held fixed for each of the ten rounds played. Ten 
rounds were played in each session to allow subjects to learn that complete free-riding is 
in their selfish best interest (Isaac, Walker, and Thomas 1984; Isaac, McCue, and Plott 
1985). 
At the conclusion of the public goods game, subjects knew only their earnings for 
that task and the total contributions of the remainder of the group. At this point in the 
experiment, no subject possessed any information regarding the payoffs of any other 
subject. The punishment phase was played at the end of each session, after the value 
elicitation and belief elicitation tasks were completed. 
5.1.2 Stage 2: Eliciting Privacy Values 
In the value elicitation stage, subjects were randomly assigned to one of three 
roles: seller, sender, or punisher. Panels A and B of Figure 9 illustrate the bargaining and 
punishment groups used to simulate the canonical privacy problem. Subject pairings used 
were direct-sale groups (including a seller and punisher) and indirect-sale groups 
(including a seller, sender, and punisher). 
Panel A depicts the direct-sale groups where sellers trade directly with punishers. 
To facilitate the transaction, subjects sold their record sheets to the experimenters, who in 
turn gave the records to the punisher. For the indirect-sale treatment (panel B), the 
experimenters gave the sold records to senders who then decided to either keep it 
confidential or pass it to the punisher. The instructions describing these roles to subjects 
were accompanied with a cartoon used to help privately convey their roles to subjects. 
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Referring to Figure 10 panel B (indirect-sale), sellers decided whether or not to 
sell their records. If the seller’s records were sold to the experimenter, they were given to 
the sender with certainty. Records that did not sell stayed secret, with certainty. Senders 
then decided whether or not to pass the record sheet to a punisher, whom in turn decided 
whether or not to deduct 50% of the seller’s earnings from the public goods game. 
Utilizing the public goods game in this way reverses the ―good guy‖ and ―bad 
guy‖ roles from the loyalty card example. The difference was that in the later, the person 
responsible for conferring the bad event on the seller wants to defraud the seller in an 
attempt to better themselves. While in the former, the person conferring the bad event on 
the seller wants to punish the seller for perceived free-riding behavior. The kernel of 
reported privacy behavior remains unchanged. Sellers have private information, which if 
released may incentivize the receiver of that information to harm the subject of that 
information. 
Sale of information was facilitated by a (reverse) BDM mechanism. Subjects 
assigned to the role of seller were instructed to state a price between $0.00 and $20.99 at 
which they would be willing to sell their record sheet. Their price was then compared to 
the experimenter’s randomly determined bid price. If the seller’s asking price was less 
than or equal to the experimenter’s bid, the transaction took place. The seller received the 
randomly determined bid, and the seller’s record sheet was given to his counterpart, a 
punisher or sender. If the asking price was greater than the random bid, then no 
transaction took place. The seller’s personal information remained private. Consider the 
following example, illustrating the truth telling properties of the transaction mechanism. 
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Assume Player A is assigned to the role of seller, and let WTA  be his actual 
willingness-to-accept a privacy loss. With random bid b , his payoff will be 0b WTA   
if WTA b  and 0 otherwise. Reporting truthfully is a dominant strategy. If Player A 
reports rWTA WTA b  , then he is equally well off with either a true or false report. If 
he reports rWTA b WTA  , then he loses 0b WTA   and would have been better off 
by reporting truthfully. Over-reporting is dominated by reporting honestly. Similarly, if 
Player A reports rWTA WTA b  , then he receives 0 with either a true or false report. 
However, by reporting rWTA b WTA  , Player A loses 0b WTA   and would have 
been better off by reporting truthfully. Under-reporting is dominated by truthful 
reporting. 
5.1.2.1 Maintaining Real-World Privacy 
To maintain real-world privacy for the experimental subject, record sheets were 
purchased from all subjects. If a sale did not take place, the earnings information was 
replaced with ―no sale,‖ indicating that the records were not sold. All subjects had no 
way to know the experimental roles of other subjects. Subjects in the roles of sender and 
punisher were given an explicit guarantee of confidentiality. Their optimal response to 
the BDM was a price of $0.
30
 
 
                                                 
30
 Mean WTA for all senders and punishers was $7.99 with median 7.64, maximum 20.99, and standard 
deviation 4.98. 
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(A) Direct-Sale Group 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(B) Indirect-Sale Group 
 
Direction of Information Sale:                               
Direction of Confidentiality Loss:                         
Direction of Punishment:                                       
 
Figure 9. Subject Pairs for (A) Direct-Sale and (B) Indirect-Sale Groups 
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   (A) Punisher in Direct-Sale Group    (B) Sender in Indirect-Sale Group 
 
Figure 10 Instructional Cartoons Depicting Subject Roles and Tasks 
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5.1.3 Stage 3: Belief Elicitation 
Sellers’ beliefs for confidentiality loss and consequences were elicited using a 
LSR. Sellers were assigned to only one of these two treatment frames. The LSR was 
administered using paper and pencil. Each seller placed bets on the uncertain events by 
circling the appropriate row number on their decision sheets. Copies of the decision 
sheets and instructions can be found in Appendix F. The first six rows of a decision sheet 
used for the confidentiality frame are shown here. To detect anchoring biases, two 
versions of the scoring rule varied the distribution of payoffs to determine if subjects 
anchor their choices in the center of the decision sheet. In the absence of anchoring 
biases, reports would be distributed equally across both treatments. 
Table 27: Example Betting Sheet for Linear Scoring rule 
Row 
Payment if your 
record sheet is passed 
to the Punisher 
Payment if your 
record sheet is not 
passed to the Punisher 
0% $0.00 
 
$50.00   
4% $2.00 
 
$48.00   
8% $4.00 
 
$46.00   
12% $6.00 
 
$44.00   
15% $7.50 
 
$42.50   
19% $9.50 
 
$40.50   
 
Sellers placed their bets by circling the row number corresponding to the bet they 
preferred. For the decision sheet here selecting row 19% would pay $9.50 if the sender 
passed the seller’s record sheet to the punisher and $40.50 otherwise. These prize 
amounts correspond directly to a report of  % report in the LSR given by 
   |passed 50 50 1S      and    |not passed 50 50S    . 
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5.1.3.1 Maintaining Real-World Privacy 
To maintain the real-world privacy of each subject and avoid role identification 
during the belief elicitation task, senders and punishers place LSR bets that they would 
receive the record sheet from seller counterpart. Senders place bets that the seller they 
were paired with would sell his record sheet. Punishers bet on one of two events. 
Punishers in the direct-sale groups bet that the seller they were paired with would sell his 
records. Punishers in the indirect-sale bet that the seller sold his records and the sender 
decided to breach the seller’s confidentiality. 
5.1.3.2 Equivalent Lottery Pairs: Controlling Uncertainty 
The ELP choice was the final decision sellers made. After placing their LSR bets, 
sellers were given the choice to either keep their uncertain bet on confidentiality or 
consequences, or to trade their bet for an objective bet. Prior to choosing sellers were 
given examples for bets at row 19% and 77%. A seller who chose row 19% could either 
keep the bet or replace the uncertainty with the spin of a bingo cage. If a number between 
0 and 19 was drawn the subject won the $9.50 prize. He would receive $40.50 for 
drawing a number between 20 and 100. For a bet on row 77%, if a number between 0 and 
77 was drawn, he would receive $38.50. Numbers between 78 and 100 paid $11.50. 
Sellers who are averse to the uncertainty associated with their bet would prefer to 
―swap‖ for the objective bet. Uncertainty seeking sellers would prefer to keep their bet 
from the belief elicitation task. For sellers who expressed indifference, whether they kept 
their uncertain bet or swapped the equivalent objective lottery was randomly determined. 
For bets place on consequences, indifference suggests preferences are given by 
equation (4) with  2u x x , Model 2, or equation (3) with  u x x , Model 1. 
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Preferences for the certain (uncertain) bet imply  2u   (or  u  ) is concave (convex) and 
sellers are uncertainty aversion (loving). Indifference between keeping and swapping bets 
on confidentiality suggests that reduction applies for the uncertain consequences and UP 
preferences are of the form given by equation (5) with  1u x x , Model 2, or equation 
(3) with  u x x , Model 1. 
5.1.4 Stage 4: Resolution of Punishment 
Confidentiality and punishment were resolved in two steps. First, record sheets 
for sellers in indirect-sale groups who sold their information were given to those subjects 
assigned to the role of sender. If a seller in an indirect-sale group did not sell his records, 
the sender received an indication of ―no sale‖ in place of the seller’s earnings from the 
public goods game. To maintain real-world anonymity for the senders, sellers and 
punishers were given blank slips of paper. Every subject in the lab received a slip of 
paper. Subjects could not determine who had been assigned the role of sender. Senders 
were instructed to make their decisions and all record sheets and blank slips were 
collected. 
Step two resolved the consequences of privacy loss. Records sheets were given to 
the punishers in accordance with the senders’ decision for the indirect-sale groups and the 
outcome of the BDM mechanism for sellers in the direct-sale groups. Real-world 
anonymity was maintained by giving blank slips of paper to sellers and senders. Every 
subject in the lab received a slip of paper, minimizing the chances that subjects could 
determine who was assigned to what roles. Finally, punishers were instructed to make 
their decision. Punishment was determined by a binary yes/no (punish/don’t punish) 
choice. Punishment resulted in a fixed 50% loss of earning from the public goods game. 
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Punishment was proportional to earnings to guarantee non-negative earnings and avoid 
the possibility of bankruptcy. It is important maintain positive earnings to eliminate the 
need for house money because its effects have been shown to confound identification of 
―risky‖ behavior (Thaler and Johnson 1990). 
All earnings from the value and belief elicitation tasks were retained by sellers, 
regardless of the resolution of punishment. This was made clear to subjects prior to the 
elicitation of their beliefs in Stage 3. 
5.2 Econometric Model 
5.2.1 Testing the Privacy Paradox 
Sellers in the WTA task reported their minimum willingness-to-accept 
compensation in exchange for (i) giving their earnings information from the public goods 
game directly to another subject (a punisher) whom had the option to reduce the seller’s 
earnings by 50% or (ii) giving their contributions information to a third party (sender) 
whom may, or may not, pass that information to a punisher. To test hypothesis 5, a hurdle 
model was estimated to control for the upper payment limit of $20.99 used in the BDM 
mechanism. 
Intuition for the hurdle model is as follows. Upon instruction for the WTA task 
and assignment to either a direct-sale or indirect-sale group, a seller interrogated himself, 
determining his minimum WTA loss of privacy. Once the seller mentally calculated his 
minimum value, he determined if that value is above or below the $20.99 maximum 
experimenter WTP. If the seller’s WTA was greater than $20.99, he marked some 
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arbitrary value greater than $20.99.
31
 If the seller’s WTA was less than or equal to 
$20.99, the ―hurdle‖ is crossed and he expressed that value.  
Under this framework, likelihood model is given as follows. The probability of 
stating a WTA less than or equal to $20.99 is given by 
  
, $20.99
Pr WTA
1 , $20.99
y
y
y



  
 
 (39) 
Conditional on having a WTA within the bounds of the BDM mechanism, the seller’s 
WTA is given by 
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otherwise$21,
f 
 

β X
, (40) 
where X are explanatory variables: earnings in the voluntary contributions game and a 
dummy variable indicating group membership. Given equations (39) and (40), the 
unconditional log-likelihood for the seller’s WTA privacy loss is 
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ln 1 , WTA $20.99
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 
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, (41) 
where     is the normal density function. Hypothesis 5 predicts the   coefficient for 
group membership is positive and ―large.‖ 
5.2.2 Controlling Risk Attitudes 
Given the domain of potential experimental payoffs ($0 to $50), risk attitudes 
were controlled using an expo-power utility function 
 
   11 exp rv x x      , (6) 
                                                 
31
 One subject in the direct sale treatment asked $30 in exchange for his personal information, guaranteeing 
his information remained private. 
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where 0   and 1r   are parameters to be estimated, and x  is income from observed 
lottery choices. The probability that the subject chooses lottery 1 was modeled with the 
logistic distribution 
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where  eu ,i r  are the contextually normalized EUs, and 0  the Fechner error 
parameter. 
5.2.3 Identification of Subjective Beliefs and Uncertainty Attitudes 
Subjective beliefs and attitudes towards uncertainty were identified from subjects’ 
decisions to participate in the belief elicitation task, LSR bets for the events of having 
confidentiality breached and having earnings reduced (conditional on privacy), and the 
ELP task where subjects were able to swap their (uncertainty) subjective bets for 
objective bets with identical payoffs. 
Sellers in the direct-sale treatment reported minimum selling price, 
rWTA , to 
equate their UP preferences given that a sale of information has taken place 
    
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2
n
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with final voluntary contributions earnings given that no sale takes place  
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    | n | crW WTA W z z , (44) 
with second-order crra utilities characterized by constant relative uncertainty aversion, 
   1 1u x x    . Similarly, sellers in the indirect-sale treatment report rWTA  such that  
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satisfies 
    | crW WTA W z z . (46) 
Beliefs and priors  1,ρ π  and  2,θ π  were isolated by the sellers’ LSR bets for 
either a confidentiality breach or having their earnings reduced by a punisher. Sellers in 
the indirect-sale treatment bet on confidentiality. Sellers in the direct-sale treatment bet 
on earnings deduction.  
Four sellers decided not to participate in the LSR betting task.
32
 Participation 
decisions were made by comparing the UP preference of not participating in the LSR task 
to the optimal bet, conditional on deciding to participate. Defining BDM as earnings from 
the BDM mechanism, sellers’ UP preferences for not participating are given by 
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for direct-sale groups and 
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for indirect-sale groups. 
Conditional on participating in the belief elicitation task, sellers in direct-sale 
groups placed LSR bets (reports),  , to maximize 
                                                 
32
 One of the sellers opting out of the LSR bet was in an indirect-sale group. The other three sellers were in 
direct-sale groups. 
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where q  are the LSR payments given report  . Sellers in the indirect-sale groups 
placed bets to maximize 
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The decision to participate in the LSR and optimal report, conditional on 
participation, were modeled as a simultaneous decision,    ,1 ,1   λ  using the link 
function 
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for bets made by sellers in the direct-sale, and 
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, (52) 
for bets made by sellers in the indirect-sale.  W   is defined as the contextual norm of 
sellers UP preferences,  W  . Implicit in equation (52) is the assumption that sellers in 
the indirect sale have the same priors and beliefs  1,ρ π  as those sellers in the direct sale. 
The log likelihood function for equations (51) and(52) is 
       
1
ln ; , , , ln + 1 ln 1
T
t t
t
L y r y W y W

    X , 0  , 1r  , (53) 
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where 1ty   for the report 
  and 0ty   for all other 
33
. 
The ELP task controlled attitudes towards uncertainty and varied probabilities. 
Sellers opting to participate in the LSR bet were allowed the option of swapping their 
bets on the uncertain events in exchange for bets defined by  
LP 1 101
     and RP 100 101
    .
34
  
The objective bets were assumed evaluated as 
    L R RP PLEU v z v z  , (54) 
and ELP choices were assumed logistically distributed, with the probability  
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of a seller replacing the uncertain bet on confidentiality and 
 
  
     
L R 1
2
L R 1 1
exp eu P ,P ; ,
exp eu P ,P ; , exp W , , ; ,
r
W
r r

 
    
 
 θ π
, (56) 
 for consequences. The contextual normalizations of equation (54) is given by  eu   and 
1  is a Fechner error parameter. The log-likelihood is 
       A 1 L R
1
ln , , ; ,P ,P , , , ln + 1 ln 1
T
t t
t
L y r y W y W  

   π X , 0  , 1r  ,  
where 1(0)ty   indicates the t
th
 subject’s choice of replacing(keeping) his uncertain LSR 
bet, and X  is data pertaining to the choice task and/or subject characteristics. 
                                                 
33
 To remove portfolio and wealth effects subject participation in the LSR betting task was voluntary. Four 
sellers, one in the indirect sale and three in the direct sale treatments, opted not to participate in the LSR 
betting task. Thus, the set of reports Λ includes the nonparticipation option of keeping their status quo UP 
following the WTA task. 
34
 Sellers opting not to participate in the LSR betting task were not afforded the opportunity to swap their 
status quo UP preference for the EU bet equation (54). By not participated in the LSR task, probabilities PL 
and PR were undefined. 
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5.3 Data and Results 
Data gathered by the experimental design was used to test hypotheses 5 and 6. 
HYPOTHESIS 5: Subjects’ willingness-to-accept confidentiality loss is lower when 
making indirect sales of information to a party that does not have a 
direct mechanism to harm the subject. 
HYPOTHESIS 6: Subjects cognitively differentiate between uncertain confidentiality 
breach and consequences. 
Section 5.3.1 reports the estimated hurdle model given by equation (41) to test 
hypothesis 5, the ―privacy paradox.‖ The null is no difference in asking prices for sellers 
in the direct-sale (DS) and indirect-sale (IS) groups. 
H50: DS IS 0
r rWTA WTA   
H5A: DS IS 0
r rWTA WTA   
A positive difference, H5A, supports hypothesis 5. Hypothesis 6 was tested as follows. 
Section 5.3.2 reports estimated risk attitudes alone, assuming EUT. Section 5.3.3 offers a 
partial test for hypothesis 6. Three models were estimated. First Model 2, equation (4), 
assumed subjects were uncertainty neutral in the consequences domain only. Second, 
Model 3, equation (5), assumed subjects were uncertainty neutral in the confidentiality 
domain only. Finally, sellers were assumed uncertainty neutral in both the confidentiality 
and consequences domains and an ―SEU‖ model35, assuming sellers were uncertainty 
neutral over both confidentiality and consequences, was estimated. The Clarke (2003, 
                                                 
35
 I purposely avoid describing uncertainty neutral preferences as SEU. In the context of Ellsberg’s (1961) 
two-color problem SEU implies subjects believe balls are only distributed 50-50 (or some other 
distribution), for example. However, in the context of a privacy loss, the single belief interpretation appears 
to be inappropriate. There are only two possibilities: confidentiality is either breached or not breached. 
Seller’s arguably do not believe their confidentiality is only partially lost, as the Ellsberg example would 
imply. 
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2006) test was used to choose among Models 2, 3, or ―SEU‖ as the specification that 
explains sellers’ privacy preferences. 
5.3.1 Testing the Privacy “Paradox” 
Average contributions by round for each of the four public goods treatments are 
shown in Figure 11. In each session, the private return from not investing in the public 
good was held fixed at 3 cents/tokens. The marginal per capita return (MPCR) from 
investment was set to 2 cents/tokens for half the sessions and 1 cent/token for the other 
half. Token endowments were set to 20 or 30 tokens. Comparing the right and left 
columns of Figure 11, previous empirical observations (Isaac and Walker 1988) were 
replicated. A higher MPCR results in greater efficiency providing the public goods. 
 
Figure 11. Public Goods Game Contributions 
The distributions of raw WTA values for sellers in the direct-sale and indirect-sale 
groups are shown in Figure 12. The minimum asking price in direct-sale groups was $5, 
whereas the minimum asking price in indirect-sale groups was $0.01. Mean asking prices 
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in the direct-sale treatment were $3.02 higher than asking prices from seller in indirect-
sale groups. 
 
Figure 12. Distribution of WTA Values by Sale Type 
The scatter diagram in Figure 13 plots sellers’ stated WTA amounts against their 
earnings from the voluntary contributions game. Bid prices for sellers in the direct sale 
treatment are shown as blue dots and bids made by sellers in the indirect sale treatment 
are shown as a red ×. Trend lines for each group are also indicated. Mean asking prices 
for sellers in direct-sale groups are higher than sellers in indirect-sale groups for all 
earnings levels from the public goods game. 
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Raw Elicited Dollar Values
Direct-Sale Indirect-Sale
Kernel Density Estimates
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Figure 13. Scatter Plot WTA v. Wealth, by Sale Treatment 
Controlling for the $20.99 upper threshold of the BDM mechanism, coefficient 
estimates from the hurdle model reported in Table 28 provide evidence supporting the 
―privacy paradox.‖ Controlling for wealth earned in the public goods game, the mean 
asking price in the indirect-sale groups was $3.98. Asking prices from sellers in the 
direct-sale groups were significantly higher ($2.00) at the 0.117 level. 
After controlling for previously identified experimental confounds, hypothetical 
bias, other regarding preferences, and deceitful practices, data gathered by the 
experimental design offer support for previously observed privacy behavior at levels 
greater than 10%. When selling personal earnings information directly to someone who 
may harm them, sellers’ minimum willingness-to-accept compensation was higher than 
situations when the buyer did not have a direct mechanism to do harm but could give the 
information to someone who may do harm. 
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Table 28. Coefficient Estimates for Hurdle Model Testing the ―Privacy Paradox‖ 
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error p-value 
Lower 
95% CI 
Upper 
95% CI 
Participation Equation      
φ Probability WTA ≤ $20.99      
Constant  7.4101 158.8722 0.9630 -303.9738 318.7939 
PGearn Voluntary Contribution Earnings -0.1317 0.1281 0.3040 -0.3827 0.1193 
Direct Direct Sale = 1 Indirect Sale = 0 -3.8115 158.8556 0.9810 -315.1627 307.5397 
WTA Bid Equation      
Constant  3.9827 2.0286 0.0500 0.0067 7.9588 
PGearn Voluntary Contribution Earnings 0.3543 0.1495 0.0180 0.0614 0.6473 
Direct Direct Sale = 1 Indirect Sale = 0 1.9973 1.2755 0.1170 -0.5027 4.4973 
σ Standard Error of Regression 3.9813 0.4508 <0.0001 3.0978 4.8648 
       
Pseudo log-likelihood = -112.5437      
Observations = 40      
 
5.3.2 Risk Attitudes Alone 
Average relative risk aversion for the subject pool was estimated with the CRRA 
utility function,      1 1rv x x r  . On average, for the domain of RLP prizes ($0 to 
$50), all
36
 subjects were risk averse with ˆ 0.6899r   (Table 29). 
Table 29. Coefficient Estimates for Risk Attitudes from CRRA Utility 
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error p-value 
Lower 
95% CI 
Upper 
95% CI 
r CRRA Coefficient 0.6899 0.0725 <0.0001 0.5478 0.8321 
µ0 RLP Fechner error 0.1210 0.0201 <0.0001 0.0815 0.1604 
       
Pseudo log-likelihood = -2803.8896      
Observations =4164      
 
Parameter estimates assuming an expo-power utility function reject constant 
relative risk aversion in favor decreasing relative risk aversion as the prize rises (Table 
30). Subjects exhibited risk aversion for low stakes gambles ( ˆ 0.8271r  ) which is 
decreasing as lottery prizes increase to $50 ( ˆ 0.997   ). Relative risk aversion, 
                                                 
36
 Risk attitudes were estimated / controlled using RLP choices for all subjects: sellers, senders, and 
punishers. 
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  1RRA 1 rr r x    . For the $15 prize, RRA = 0.552. At $50, RRA decreases to 
0.488. 
Table 30. Coefficient Estimates for Risk Attitudes from Expo-Power Utility 
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error p-value 
Lower 
95% CI 
Upper 
95% CI 
r RRA at zero income 0.8271 0.0306 <0.0001 0.7672 0.8870 
α Positive income RRA normalization  -0.9970 0.1032 <0.0001 -1.1992 -0.7947 
µ0 RLP Fechner error 0.0974 0.0124 <0.0001 0.0731 0.1216 
       
Pseudo log-likelihood = -2796.9236      
Observations =4164      
 
5.3.3 The Uncertain Priors Model: Uncertain Distinctions 
Figure 14 shows the distributions of raw LSR reports elicited from sellers. Four 
sellers decided not to participate in the LSR betting task, one from a direct-sale group and 
three from indirect-sale groups. The left two columns of Figure 14 show raw punishment 
beliefs for seller in the direct-sale groups. Raw confidentiality beliefs for sellers in 
indirect-sale groups are shown in the right-hand column. The ten sellers in the indirect-
sale groups who did not sell their records were guaranteed privacy and their LSR bets on 
confidentiality were uninformative and dropped from the remainder of the analysis. Out 
of the remaining ten sellers in indirect-sale groups who sold their records, only one 
decided not to participate in the LSR betting task. 
Out of twenty sellers in direct-sale groups, ten sold their records and ten did not. 
The mean report for the seven sellers betting on punishment given non-confidential 
records was 0.671, with median 0.62 and standard deviation 0.30. The Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test rejects anchoring biases at the 0.057 level. For the ten sellers betting on 
punishment given confidentiality anchoring bias was rejected at the 0.695 level and the 
mean report was 0.359, with median 0.455 and standard deviation 0.303. For the nine 
 106 
sellers in the indirect-sale groups betting on confidentiality, the mean raw report was 
0.393, with median 0.39 and standard deviation 0.24. Anchoring biases are rejected at the 
0.556 level. 
 
Figure 14. Raw LSR Beliefs 
Raw beliefs summarized in Figure 14 suggest that sellers believed confidentiality 
loss had a low chance of occurring.  However, if confidentiality was lost the likelihood of 
a being punished was substantially larger than when confidentiality was upheld. 
Controlling for risk and uncertainty attitudes, maximum likelihood estimates confirm 
these observations. 
Likelihood estimates when subjects were assumed uncertainty neutral in the 
consequences domain (Model 2) are shown in Table 31. Controls for anchoring bias in 
punishment beliefs given non-confidentiality are shown in Table 32. The variable Anchor 
takes on values of 1 if the sellers’ LSR bets were in the skew high treatment when the 
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―safe‖ bet was at row 39 of the decision sheet, and 0 otherwise. Anchoring bias is 
rejected at conventional levels, 
b|n
ˆ 0.0202Anchor    with p-value = 0.974. Assuming 
sellers were uncertainty neutral in the consequences domain; estimates reported in Table 
31 explain seller beliefs and preferences. 
Under Model 2, sellers weight the event of confidentiality loss by nˆ 0.2951   
with p-value = 0.031. When records are not confidential, 
b|n
ˆ 0.8834   (p-value < 
0.0001) and sellers believed there was approximately an 88% chance their earnings from 
the public goods game would be reduced by the punisher. Sellers place insignificant 
weight b|cˆ 0.1635   (p-value = 0.202) on being punished when their records were 
confidential. 
Table 31. Model 2: Uncertainty Neutral in Consequences Domain 
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error p-value 
Lower 
95% CI 
Upper 
95% CI 
r RRA at zero income 0.8267 0.0178 <0.0001 0.7919 0.8615 
α Positive income RRA normalization  -0.9964 0.0898 <0.0001 -1.1723 -0.8204 
µ0 RLP Fechner error 0.0971 0.0123 <0.0001 0.0731 0.1212 
ρn Prior weight: confidentiality 0.2951 0.1369 0.0310 0.0267 0.5636 
ρb|n 
Prior weight: consequence | non-
confidential 
0.8839 0.2008 <0.0001 0.4903 1.2776 
ρb|c 
Prior weight: consequence | 
confidential 
0.1635 0.1283 0.2030 -0.0880 0.4149 
ϕ CRUA coefficient -0.4745 0.4278 0.2670 -1.3131 0.3640 
µ1 Fechner error 0.1363 0.0703 0.0520 -0.0014 0.2740 
       
Pseudo log-likelihood = -2926.5533      
Observations = 4217      
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Table 32. Model 2: Uncertainty Neutral in Consequences Domain with Treatment Effects 
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error p-value 
Lower 
95% CI 
Upper 
95% CI 
r RRA at zero income 0.8266 0.0202 <0.0001 0.7871 0.8661 
α Positive income RRA normalization  -0.9951 0.0460 <0.0001 -1.0852 -0.9050 
µ0 RLP Fechner error 0.0971 0.0127 <0.0001 0.0722 0.1220 
ρn Prior weight: confidentiality 0.2955 0.1795 0.1000 -0.0562 0.6472 
ρb|n 
Prior weight: consequence | non-
confidential 
     
Constant  0.8973 0.3224 0.0050 0.2654 1.5293 
Anchor LSR anchoring treatment -0.0202 0.6323 0.9740 -1.2594 1.2190 
ρb|c 
Prior weight: consequence | 
confidential 
0.1643 0.1316 0.2210 -0.0935 0.4222 
ϕ CRUA coefficient -0.4715 0.4677 0.3130 -1.3882 0.4451 
µ1 Fechner error 0.1356 0.1039 0.1920 -0.0679 0.3392 
       
Pseudo log-likelihood = -2926.5524      
Observations = 4217      
 
Table 33 shows the likelihood estimates from Model 3 where sellers are assumed 
to be uncertainty neutral in the confidentiality domain. Table 34 estimates Model 3 with a 
treatment variable to control for anchoring bias in seller beliefs that they will be punished 
when their information is not held in confidentiality. Controlling for risk and uncertainty 
attitudes, the p-value for b|nˆ 0.0371Anchor    is large (0.918) and the null of no bias is not 
rejected. 
Estimated prior weights shown in Table 33 suggest that sellers trusted that their 
confidentiality would be kept by senders in the indirect-sale groups, nˆ 0.186   with p-
value = 0.188. This result contrasts with that of Model 2 (Table 31) which estimated that 
subjects were somewhat distrusting of the senders. Sellers did not place significant 
weight on the event that confidentiality would be breached and their records would be 
given to a punisher.  
In the event that records were not confidential and punishers knew the earning 
from the public goods game, sellers weight b|nˆ 0.756   (p-value < 0.001) on the being 
punished and having their public goods earning reduced by 50%. Sellers place 
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insignificant weight 
b|c
ˆ 0.2852   (p-value = 0.185) on being punished when their 
records were confidential. The p-value (0.514) for the coefficient or relative uncertainty 
ˆ 0.1746    suggests sellers were uncertainty neutral in the confidentiality domain. 
Table 33. Model 3: Uncertainty Neutral in Confidentiality Domain 
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error p-value 
Lower 
95% CI 
Upper 
95% CI 
r RRA at zero income 0.8249 0.0218 <0.0001 0.7821 0.8677 
α Positive income RRA normalization  -0.9882 0.0204 <0.0001 -1.0283 -0.9481 
µ0 RLP Fechner error 0.0963 0.0119 <0.0001 0.0729 0.1197 
ρn Prior weight: confidentiality 0.1860 0.1413 0.1880 -0.0909 0.4628 
ρb|n 
Prior weight: consequence | non-
confidential 
0.7560 0.2070 <0.0001 0.3503 1.1617 
ρb|c 
Prior weight: consequence | 
confidential 
0.2852 0.2155 0.1860 -0.1371 0.7075 
ϕ CRUA coefficient -0.1746 0.2678 0.5140 -0.6994 0.3503 
µ1 Fechner error 0.1559 0.0790 0.0490 0.0001 0.3107 
       
Pseudo log-likelihood = -2926.4906      
Observations = 4217      
 
Table 34. Model 3: Uncertainty Neutral in Confidentiality Domain with Treatment 
Effects 
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error p-value 
Lower 
95% CI 
Upper 
95% CI 
r RRA at zero income 0.8246 0.0147 <0.0001 0.7958 0.8534 
α Positive income RRA normalization  -0.9859 0.0870 <0.0001 -1.1564 -0.8153 
µ0 RLP Fechner error 0.0962 0.0122 <0.0001 0.0724 0.1201 
ρn Prior weight: confidentiality 0.1886 0.1567 0.2290 -0.1184 0.4957 
ρb|n 
Prior weight: consequence | non-
confidential 
     
Constant  0.7837 0.2487 0.0020 0.2964 1.2711 
Anchor LSR anchoring treatment -0.0371 0.3612 0.9180 -0.7451 0.6709 
ρb|c 
Prior weight: consequence | 
confidential 
0.2849 0.2279 0.2110 -0.1618 0.7317 
ϕ CRUA coefficient -0.1719 0.2883 0.5510 -0.7370 0.3931 
µ1 Fechner error 0.1539 0.0977 0.1150 -0.0375 0.3454 
       
Pseudo log-likelihood = -2926.4837      
Observations = 4217      
 
Figure 15 graphically compares the distribution of likelihood ratios from Models 
2 and 3 to the normal distribution. The Shapiro-Wilk statistic, W = 0.922 n = 53, rejects 
normality of the distribution and Clarke’s (2003, 2006) sign test is appropriate to 
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discriminate between models. Model 3 yields higher likelihood values for 31 out of 52 
non-zero differences. With a p-value = 0.1058, Model 3 is ―better than‖ Model 2. 
 
Figure 15. Distribution Likelihood Ratios: Model 2 vs. Model 3 
Constraining sellers to be uncertainty neutral in both confidentiality and 
consequences domains, point estimates in Table 35 describe a belief structure comparable 
to Models 3. Table 36 rejects anchoring bias at conventional levels, b|nˆ 0.0397Anchor    
with p-value = 0.941. 
Table 35. ―SEU‖ Model: Uncertainty Neutral in Confidentiality and Consequences 
Domains 
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error p-value 
Lower 
95% CI 
Upper 
95% CI 
r RRA at zero income 0.8256 0.0167 <0.0001 0.7930 0.8583 
α Positive income RRA normalization  -0.9868 0.0617 <0.0001 -1.1078 -0.8659 
µ0 RLP Fechner error 0.0969 0.0121 <0.0001 0.0731 0.1207 
ρn Prior weight: confidentiality 0.1657 0.1419 0.2430 -0.1125 0.4438 
ρb|n 
Prior weight: consequence | non-
confidential 
0.8720 0.1994 <0.0001 0.4812 1.2629 
ρb|c 
Prior weight: consequence | 
confidential 
0.1739 0.1257 0.1670 -0.0726 0.4204 
µ1 Fechner error 0.2034 0.0621 0.0010 0.0816 0.3252 
       
Pseudo log-likelihood = -2926.685      
Observations = 4217      
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Table 36. ―SEU‖ Model: Uncertainty Neutral in Confidentiality and Consequences 
Domains with Treatment Effects 
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error p-value 
Lower 
95% CI 
Upper 
95% CI 
r RRA at zero income 0.8258 0.0176 <0.0001 0.7914 0.8602 
α Positive income RRA normalization  -0.9899 0.0550 <0.0001 -1.0976 -0.8821 
µ0 RLP Fechner error 0.0969 0.0123 <0.0001 0.0728 0.1209 
ρn Prior weight: confidentiality 0.1689 0.1511 0.2640 -0.1272 0.4651 
ρb|n 
Prior weight: consequence | non-
confidential 
     
Constant  0.8992 0.2945 0.0020 0.3220 1.4765 
Anchor LSR anchoring treatment -0.0396 0.5411 0.9420 -1.1002 1.0209 
ρb|c 
Prior weight: consequence | 
confidential 
0.1754 0.1260 0.1640 -0.0716 0.4224 
µ1 Fechner error 0.2002 0.0789 0.0110 0.0455 0.3549 
       
Pseudo log-likelihood = -2926.6808      
Observations = 4217      
 
The ―SEU‖ model (Table 35) is nested in Models 3 (Table 33) by the constraint
0  . The likelihood ratio test applied to observations from the LSR and ELP decisions 
failed to reject the equivalence of Model 3 and the ―SEU‖ model ( 2
1 0.5224  ). 
5.4 Experiment Summary 
Chapter 5 set out to test two hypotheses. 
HYPOTHESIS 5: Subjects’ willingness-to-accept confidentiality loss is lower when 
making indirect sales of information to a party that does not have a 
direct mechanism to harm the subject. 
HYPOTHESIS 6: Subjects cognitively differentiate between uncertain confidentiality 
breach and consequences. 
Estimates from the hurdle model (Table 28) in Section 5.3.1 demonstrated that the 
―privacy paradox‖ survives strict experimental controls for hypothetical bias, deceitful 
practices, and other regarding preferences at levels greater than 10%. The average WTA 
privacy loss was estimated to be $1.99 higher when trading directly with someone who 
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may do harm. The analysis failed to reject hypothesis 5 at the 0.117 level. Willingness-to-
accept confidentiality loss was lower when making indirect sales of information to a 
party that did not have a direct mechanism to do harm. 
To test hypothesis 6, two different specifications of the uncertain priors models 
were estimated. The first, Model 2 (equation (4)), assumed attitudes towards uncertainty 
were neutral towards consequences and potentially non-neutral to confidentiality. Model 
3 (equation (5)), assumed subjects were uncertainty neutral in the confidentiality domain 
and potentially non-neutral in the consequences domain. Conclusions from the Clarke 
(2003, 2006) test are evidence in favor of Model 3 and hypothesis 6. However, the 
likelihood ratio test failed to reject equivalence of Model 3 (Table 33) and ―SEU‖ 
preferences (Table 35). It should also be recognized that estimated beliefs assuming 
Model 3 and the ―SEU‖ model were behaviorally consistent, where as Model 2 assigned 
significant positive weight on non-confidentiality. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
There is no ―privacy paradox.‖ The dichotomy in the canonical ―loyalty card‖ 
framework (Acquisti and Grossklags 2005a) is attributable to asymmetric subjective 
beliefs (Syverson 2003; and Rifon, LaRose, and Lewis 2007) and subjects’ do not exhibit 
significant amounts of uncertainty aversion (Acquisti and Grossklags 2004 and 2005a) 
over either confidentiality or consequences. These conclusions are based on the results of 
three separate studies. 
Chapter 3 presented an experiment in individual decision making under 
uncertainty, experimentally testing Ellsberg’s canonical two-color choice problem. The 
data did not support Ellsberg’s hypothesis of uncertainty aversion. Subjects believed bets 
on the color ball drawn from Ellsberg’s ambiguous urn were equally likely to pay and 
estimated attitudes towards uncertainty were insignificant. Savage’s subjective expected 
utility model explains subjects’ choices. The results contrast with previous findings 
(Camerer and Webber 1992; Halevy 2007; and others). These differences deserve further 
investigation. It was also demonstrated that use of an objective compound lottery to 
induce uncertainty did not affect subjects’ choices. Smith’s hypothesis is supported, 
however, in an entirely different way than expected. 
Chapter 4 extended the concept of uncertainty to commodities where quality and 
accuracy of a quality report are potentially ambiguous. The uncertain priors model was 
naturally extended to allow for potentially different attitudes towards these two sources of 
uncertainty, quality and accuracy. As they relate to privacy, quality and accuracy of a 
quality report are metaphors for online security and consumer trust in e-commerce. The 
results of parametric structural tests demonstrated that it is possible to discriminate 
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between econometric models allowing subjects to have different preferences towards 
different uncertain processes. Allowing subjects to be uncertainty averse in the quality 
domain and not the report domain outperformed the alternative which only allows for 
uncertainty aversion in the accuracy domain only. Estimated beliefs placed significantly 
more weight on report accuracy, supporting trust as an experimental confound in 
Spiekerman, Grossklags, and Berendt (2002), Berendt, Günther, and Spiekerman (2005). 
Subjects weighted 
Finally, chapter 5 identifies subjects’ privacy beliefs which support the hypothesis 
of Syverson (2003) and Rifon, LaRose, and Lewis (2007), only. The difference between 
WTA privacy loss in direct-sale and indirect-sale groups was positive and significant at 
levels greater than 10%. The roles of asymmetric beliefs and attitudes towards 
uncertainty were identified using parametric structural likelihood methods. Subjects were 
uncertainty neutral and believed ―bad‖ events were more likely to occur when their 
private information was not confidential. The uncertainty aversion hypothesis of Acquisti 
and Grossklags (2004) and (2005a) was not supported. Asymmetric beliefs explained 
subject’s privacy behavior (Syverson 2003). 
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APPENDIX A: IRB HUMAN RESEARCH APPROVAL 
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APPENDIX B: THREE-COLOR ELLSBERG PROBLEM 
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Consider Ellsberg’s (1961, p. 653) three-color problem. There is one urn 
containing 90 balls. Thirty balls are known to be red. The remaining 60 are black and 
yellow, in unknown proportion. One ball will be drawn from the urn at random and 
decision-makers are to consider the four bets shown in Table 37. 
Table 37. Ellsberg’s Three One Urn, Three-Color Problem 
 Red Black Yellow 
I $100 $0 $0 
II $0 $100 $0 
III $100 $0 $100 
IV $0 $100 $100 
 
Choosing I is a bet on red, II is a bet on black, III is a bet on red or yellow, and IV 
is a bet on black or yellow. Ellsberg hypothesizes that a frequent response pattern is 
I II  and IV III . These preferences violate the Sure-thing Principle. The two sets of 
bets I vs. II and III vs. IV differ only by the payoff if yellow occurs, which is constant in 
each pair of bets. 
The preference of I to II implies decision-makers believe there are less than 30 
black balls in the urn, which in turn implies the event ―red or yellow‖ has more than two-
thirds chance of occurring. Thus the contradiction occurs when decision-makers prefer 
the two-thirds chance of winning $100 (bet IV) to a greater than two-thirds chance (bet 
III). The uncertainty aversion hypothesis explains these preferences by claiming that 
decision-makers ―don’t like‖ the possibility that there are really more than 30 black balls 
in the urn. These preferences can be explained using the uncertain priors model 
    
1 1 1
I J K
i ijk jk
i j k
W u v z 
  
 
  
 
 z , (2) 
with K = 1 and j = {red, black, yellow}. 
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Assume the decision-maker has two priors that he weights equally,  0.5,0.5ρ . 
Under prior 1, he believes there are 40 black balls in the urn and his subjective 
probabilities are  1 4 21 3 9 9, ,σ . Under prior 2, he believes there are 20 black balls in the 
urn and  1 2 42 3 9 9, ,σ . If his first-order preferences are defined by  v x x , for some 
argument x, the evaluation of  
1
J
ij jk
j
v z

  for bet I is 
I: 1 4 2
3 9 9
10 0 0 3.3333   , 
under prior 1 and 
I: 1 2 4
3 9 9
10 0 0 3.3333   , 
under prior 2. With second-order utility defined by   0.9u x x , the decision-maker’s UP 
preferences for bet I are 
  0.9 0.9I 0.5 3.3333 0.5 3.3333 2.955W          . 
Similar calculations for bets II, III, and IV yield 
  0.9 0.9II 0.5 4.4444 0.5 2.2222 2.9401W          , 
  0.9 0.9III 0.5 5.5555 0.5 7.7777 5.5077W          , 
  0.9 0.9IV 0.5 6.6666 0.5 6.6666 5.5146W          . 
Comparing these preference values, W(I) > W(II) and W(IV) > W(III) which 
explains Ellsberg’s hypothesized pattern of preferences. If there was no aversion to 
uncertainty such that  u x x  apart from arbitrary normalizations, then W(I) = W(II) and 
W(III) = W(IV). This result is not what Ellsberg predicted and suggests the preferences 
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I II  and IV III  may result from a systematic resolution of indifference where 
decision-makers focus on bets I and IV. 
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APPENDIX C: SOURCE-DEPENDENT RISK ATTITUDES 
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Nau (2006, Model II, Theorem 2, p. 143) presents an axiomatic proof of the 
source-dependant risk aversion (SDRA) model capable of explaining the behavior in 
Ellsberg’s example. The SDRA model may formally be represented as a special case of 
the UP model, and is interpreted as assuming that the decision-maker only considers 
uncertain processes where the ambiguous urns contains either all red or all black balls 
(Nau 2007). 
From equation (1), if the decision-maker forms priors equal in number to the set 
of possible uncertain events, let I J  and rewrite 
U
ij  as 
U
i . Then, by making the 
further assumption that each prior i  is degenerate, so that  1,0Ui  , the UP model 
becomes 
    
1 1
I K
C
i k ik
i k
W u v z 
 
 
  
 
 z , (A1) 
which is the SDRA model, where by definition  r,bi   and  R,Bk  . 
In equation (2), the decision-maker can be viewed as if he evaluates  v   first, 
then he evaluates  u   at the expectation of  v  , taken over  R,Bk  . Finally, 
preferences for the lotteries in Table 1 are determined by the evaluation of the 
expectation of  u  , taken over  r,bi  . In this case, the decision-maker simply behaves 
as if the uncertain urn contains either all red balls or all black balls. 
For both lotteries 2L  and 3L  his expectation of utility over certain event k  is 
1 1
2 2
5 10 0    . Table 38 shows the decision-maker’s expectation of  v   for each 
lottery, under these assumptions. 
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Table 38: Expected EU Assuming SDRA Model 
U  
events 1L  2L  3L  4L  
rU  
1 1
2 2
5 10 0     1 1
2 2
0 0 0     1 1
2 2
10 10 10     1 1
2 2
5 10 0     
bU  
1 1
2 2
5 10 0     1 1
2 2
10 10 10     1 1
2 2
0 0 0     1 1
2 2
5 10 0     
 
From these calculations, it is easy to see how the SDRA model can also explain 
the pattern of preferences assumed in Ellsberg’s example. The decision-maker will have 
final utility for  2L  equal to that of 3L , and utility from 1L  will equal 4L . However, if the 
decision-maker believes that ―r‖ is less likely than ―b‖ and  u   is sufficiently concave, 
then it is easy to see how he could have the preference relations described above. 
Lotteries 1L  and 4L  hedge the uncertainty surrounding which color ball will be drawn 
from urn 2. 
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APPENDIX D: EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR CHAPTER 3 
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D.1 Experimenter Instructions 
Experimenter Instructions 
Welcome. This is an experiment in individual decision making. You can earn cash 
based on the choices you make today. Money you earn today will be paid to you in cash 
at the end of the experiment. You will be paid $5 for participating in the experiment. The 
experiment will last no more than 2 hours. Please make sure that you can stay until the 
end. In addition to the participation fee, your earnings will depend partly on chance and 
partly on the choices you make today. The instructions are simple and you will benefit 
from following them carefully. 
There are three stages today: 
1. We will ask you a series of questions about yourself, such as some basic 
information about your age. The computer will prompt you for these questions, 
and you should just work through them at your own pace when we log you in. 
2. We will then pause and provide instructions on some choices you are to make 
over different amounts of money that have different chances of occurring. These 
choices will directly affect your earnings.  
3. We will then pause again, and provide some instructions on the final task, which 
involves you making some more choices over different amounts of money that 
have different chances of occurring. These choices will also directly affect your 
earnings. 
The instructions for the second and third stage will provide more information on 
the type of choices you are being asked to make. 
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The experimenters will then collate all of your earnings and pay you for the 
money you have earned. 
Your choices are private, and will only be associated with an ID that we will enter 
when we log you in to the computer. So your name, address and SSN will not be linked 
to any choices you make. We will pay you privately, one at a time, to keep your earnings 
private. 
Are there any questions? If not, go ahead and answer the questions until the 
computer pauses and asks for a password. When everyone is finished this stage we will 
announce the password and we can go on to the second stage. There is no hurry, so take 
your time. 
[Wait for everyone to finish demographics] 
There is an instruction book in front of each of you. Please open it and follow 
along as I read the instructions out loud. 
[Do Ellsberg task, read instructions out load] 
Before I spin Cage #1 and Cage #2, each of you have the chance to make another 
choice, with much higher potential payoffs. Our research assistants are passing around 
the decision sheets for this task. If you choose to participate in this task, we will not pay 
you for the decision that you just made. You have the choice which decision we will pay 
you for: the one you just completed, or the new one we are offering you now. 
As you can see from the decision book just handed out, earnings from this next 
choice may be very large, but they may also be small. If you decide not to participate in 
this task, please use the pen on your desk to cross out the title of your new book: 
DECISION TASK. This is your decision to make. If you decide to participate, please 
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circle the title of the decision book and cross out the title of your old book: INDIVIDUAL 
DECISION MAKING. We will pay you today for all money earned in this task if you 
choose to participate. Are there any questions? 
[Do belief elicitation task, read instructions out load] 
Now that each of you has made your decisions for each of these tasks and we 
know which decision you will be paid for, I will uncover Cage #2. As you can see, Cage 
#2 is filled with orange and white balls. I would like to ask for one final volunteer to 
come up and verify that there are exactly 50 balls in Cage #2. 
 
I will now spin each cage. You will be paid according to the choices you have 
made and the color ball chosen from each cage. 
Now that everyone has completed the second stage of today’s experiment, 
research assistants are passing around instruction books for the third and final stage. 
[Do random lottery pairs task, read instructions out load.] 
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D.2 Stage 1: Demographics Questionnaire 
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 130 
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D.3. Stage 2: Ellsberg / Smith Instructions 
D.3.1 Ellsberg Task 
We are interested in your choices, which might be different from the choices 
someone else would make. The only right answer is what you really would choose. That 
is why the choices are for real money. 
In the front of the room there are two bingo cages, labeled Cage #1 and Cage #2. 
There are 25 orange balls and 25 white balls in front of Cage #1. Cage #2 is covered and 
contains 50 balls. Each ball is either orange or white. You will not be told how many 
balls are orange or white. Before we start, I would like to ask one person to come up and 
inspect Cage #1. The volunteer will verify that there are 25 orange balls and 25 white 
balls and then place each ball in Cage #1. If you would like to volunteer please raise your 
hand. 
 
On the last page of this booklet there is a record sheet with four paired choices for 
you to make between ―Option A‖ and ―Option B.‖ These four decisions are reprinted 
here. 
 
In each row you will be asked to circle one of the three decisions. Only one of the 
four decisions you make will end up affecting your earnings, but you will not know in 
Row Option A Option B
Win $10 if orange ball is drawn from Cage #1 Win $0 if orange ball is drawn from Cage #1
Win $0 if white ball is drawn from Cage #1 Win $10 if white ball is drawn from Cage #1
Win $10 if orange ball is drawn from Cage #2 Win $0 if orange ball is drawn from Cage #2
Win $0 if white ball is drawn from Cage #2 Win $10 if white ball is drawn from Cage #2
Win $10 if orange ball is drawn from Cage #1 Win $10 if orange ball is drawn from Cage #2
Win $0 if white ball is drawn from Cage #1 Win $0 if white ball is drawn from Cage #2
Win $0 if orange ball is drawn from Cage #1 Win $0 if orange ball is drawn from Cage #2
Win $10 if white ball is drawn from Cage #1 Win $10 if white ball is drawn from Cage #2
4 A B
Don’t 
Care
3 A B
Don’t 
Care
2 A B
Don’t 
Care
Decision
1 A B
Don’t 
Care
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advance which decision will be used. Your earnings from this decision will depend on 
your choice and the outcome of a spin of each of the bingo cages in the front the room. 
Please look at row 1, at the top of the table. Option A will pay $10 if the ball 
drawn from Cage #1 is orange, and Option B will pay $10 if the ball drawn from Cage #1 
is white. The other decisions are similar. For the last row, Option A will pay $10 if the 
ball drawn from Cage #1 is white, and Option B will pay $10 if the ball drawn from Cage 
#2 is white.  
In the column labeled ―Decision‖ there are three choices for each row. For each 
row, circle the letter of the option that you prefer. If you do not care whether you receive 
Option A or Option B, circle ―Don’t Care.‖ 
After making each of your four decisions, please raise your hand and wait for 
assistance. A research assistant will bring you a 6-sided die that you will roll to determine 
which row from the record sheet you will be paid from. If you roll a 1, 2, 3, or 4 then you 
will be paid according to that row. If a 5 or 6 are rolled, you will roll the die again until 
you roll a 1, 2, 3, or 4. If you choose Don’t Care in the decision that we play out, we will 
pick one for you using a 10-sided die, where the numbers 1-5 correspond to Option A and 
the numbers 6-10 correspond to Option B. 
After we know which decision is binding, we will uncover Cage #2 then spin both 
bingo cages to see if you receive the higher amount or the lower amount for the choice 
that you made. If you choose Option A you would be paid the appropriate amount in 
Option A. If you choose Option B you would be paid the appropriate amount in Option 
B. 
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Before you circle your decisions, lets uncover the cages under this blue sheet and 
use them to do an example together. For each of the four decisions, we will flip a coin to 
determine if we choose option A or option B. We will use the white board to keep track 
of our four decisions. 
For row 1, option A will pay $10 if the ball drawn from Cage #1 is orange. Option 
B will pay $10 if the ball drawn from Cage #1 is white. 
For row 2, option A will pay $10 if the ball drawn from Cage #2 is orange. Option 
B will pay $10 if the ball drawn from Cage #2 is white. 
For row 3, option A will pay $10 if the ball drawn from Cage #1 is orange. Option 
B will pay $10 if the ball drawn from Cage #2 is orange. 
For row 4, option A will pay $10 if the ball drawn from Cage #1 is white. Option 
B will pay $10 if the ball drawn from Cage #2 is white. 
Now that we have made each of our four choices, we will roll a 6-sided die to 
determine which row is played for this example. 
Now that we know which row will be used to determine how we are paid, we will 
pick one ball from Cage #1 and Cage #2 to determine what our earnings would be. 
Are there any questions? 
You may now mark your decisions for each row of the decision sheet. When you 
are satisfied with the decisions that you have made, please raise your hand and wait for a 
research assistant to bring the dice to determine which row you will be paid from. 
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D.3.1.1 Smith Treatment 
We are interested in your choices, which might be different from the choices 
someone else would make. The only right answer is what you really would choose. That 
is why the choices are for real money. 
In the front of the room there are three bingo cages, labeled Cage #1, Cage #2, 
and Cage #3. There are 25 orange balls and 25 white balls in front of Cage #1. Cage #2 is 
empty, and will be filled with 50 balls. Each ball will be either orange or white. You will 
not be told how many balls are going to be orange and how many are going to be white. 
The composition of balls filling Cage #2 will be determined by drawing 1 out of 51 
numbered balls from Cage #3. Each ball will have a number between 0 and 50 written on 
it. Before we start I would like to ask one person to come up and inspect Cage #1. The 
volunteer will verify that there are 25 orange and 25 white balls. If you would like to 
volunteer please raise your hand. 
 
On the last page of this booklet there is a record sheet with four paired choices for 
you to make between ―Option A‖ and ―Option B.‖ These four decisions are reprinted 
here. 
 
Row Option A Option B
Win $10 if orange ball is drawn from Cage #1 Win $0 if orange ball is drawn from Cage #1
Win $0 if white ball is drawn from Cage #1 Win $10 if white ball is drawn from Cage #1
Win $10 if orange ball is drawn from Cage #2 Win $0 if orange ball is drawn from Cage #2
Win $0 if white ball is drawn from Cage #2 Win $10 if white ball is drawn from Cage #2
Win $10 if orange ball is drawn from Cage #1 Win $10 if orange ball is drawn from Cage #2
Win $0 if white ball is drawn from Cage #1 Win $0 if white ball is drawn from Cage #2
Win $0 if orange ball is drawn from Cage #1 Win $0 if orange ball is drawn from Cage #2
Win $10 if white ball is drawn from Cage #1 Win $10 if white ball is drawn from Cage #2
Decision
1 A B
Don’t 
Care
2 A B
Don’t 
Care
3 A B
Don’t 
Care
4 A B
Don’t 
Care
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In each row you will be asked to circle one of the three decisions. Only one of the 
four decisions you make will end up affecting your earnings, but you will not know in 
advance which decision will be used. Your earnings from this decision will depend on 
your choice and the outcome of a spin of each of the bingo cages in the front the room. 
Please look at row 1, at the top of the table. Option A will pay $10 if the ball 
drawn from Cage #1 is orange, and Option B will pay $10 if the ball drawn from Cage #1 
is white. The other decisions are similar. For the last row, Option A will pay $10 if the 
ball drawn from Cage #1 is white, and Option B will pay $10 if the ball drawn from Cage 
#2 is white.  
In the column labeled ―Decision‖ there are three choices for each row. For each 
row, circle the letter of the option that you prefer. If you do not care whether you receive 
Option A or Option B, circle ―Don’t Care.‖ 
After making each of your four decisions, please raise your hand and wait for 
assistance. A research assistant will bring you a 6-sided die that you will roll to determine 
which row from the record sheet you will be paid from. If a 1, 2, 3, or 4 is rolled, you will 
be paid according to that row. If a 5 or 6 are rolled, you will roll the die again until you 
roll a 1, 2, 3, or 4. If you choose Don’t Care in the decision that we play out, we will pick 
one for you using a 10-sided die, where the numbers 1-5 correspond to Option A and the 
numbers 6-10 correspond to Option B. 
After we know which decision is binding, I will ask one person to come and 
verify that there are 51 balls numbered between 0 and 50 in front of Cage #3. The same 
person will then place each of these balls in Cage #3, and spin and draw one ball. The 
number on that ball will determine the number of orange balls that we will place in Cage 
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#2. The remaining balls, up to 50, will be white. We will then spin Cage #1 and Cage #2 
and draw out one ball from each, to see if you receive the higher amount or the lower 
amount for the choice that you made. If you choose Option A you would be paid the 
appropriate amount in Option A. If you choose Option B you would be paid the 
appropriate amount in Option B. 
Before you circle your decisions, lets uncover the cages under this blue sheet and 
use them to do an example together. For each of the four decisions, we will flip a coin to 
determine if we choose option A or option B. We will use the white board to keep track 
of our four decisions. 
For row 1, option A will pay $10 if the ball drawn from Cage #1 is orange. Option 
B will pay $10 if the ball drawn from Cage #1 is white. 
For row 2, option A will pay $10 if the ball drawn from Cage #2 is orange. Option 
B will pay $10 if the ball drawn from Cage #2 is white. 
For row 3, option A will pay $10 if the ball drawn from Cage #1 is orange. Option 
B will pay $10 if the ball drawn from Cage #2 is orange. 
For row 4, option A will pay $10 if the ball drawn from Cage #1 is white. Option 
B will pay $10 if the ball drawn from Cage #2 is white. 
Now that we have made each of our four choices, we will roll a 6-sided die to 
determine which row is played for this example. 
Now that we know which row will be used to determine how we are paid, we will 
pick one ball from Cage #3 to determine how many orange balls and how many white 
balls there will be in Cage #2. 
We will now fill Cage #2 with the appropriate number of orange and white balls. 
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Now we will pick one ball from Cage #1 and Cage #2 to determine what our 
earnings would be. 
Are there any questions? 
You may now mark your decisions for each row of the decision sheet. When you 
are satisfied with the decisions that you have made, please raise your hand and wait for a 
research assistant to bring the dice to determine which row you will be paid from. 
 
 138 
D.3.5 Ellsberg / Smith Task Decision Sheet 
Record Sheet 
 
Row Option A Option B Decision 
1 
Win $10 if orange ball is drawn from Cage #1 
Win $0 if white ball is drawn from Cage #1 
Win $0 if orange ball is drawn from Cage #1 
Win $10 if white ball is drawn from Cage #1 
A B 
Don’t 
Care 
2 
Win $10 if orange ball is drawn from Cage #2 
Win $0 if white ball is drawn from Cage #2 
Win $0 if orange ball is drawn from Cage #2 
Win $10 if white ball is drawn from Cage #2 
A B 
Don’t 
Care 
3 
Win $10 if orange ball is drawn from Cage #1 
Win $0 if white ball is drawn from Cage #1 
Win $10 if orange ball is drawn from Cage #2 
Win $0 if white ball is drawn from Cage #2 
A B 
Don’t 
Care 
4 
Win $0 if orange ball is drawn from Cage #1 
Win $10 if white ball is drawn from Cage #1 
Win $0 if orange ball is drawn from Cage #2 
Win $10 if white ball is drawn from Cage #2 
A B 
Don’t 
Care 
 
 
To be completed by Staff: 
 
Row Number Selected: __________   Option Selected: __________ 
 
Ball Chosen from Cage #1: __________  Ball Chosen from Cage #2: __________ 
 
Earnings: __________ 
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D.3.3 Belief Elicitation Instructions 
Before I spin each cage you will make one decision which will be used to 
determine how much money you make. Your decision sheet for this task is on the 
following page. Before you make your choice, lets discuss the decision sheet. 
You will be paid based on the choice you circle and the color ball drawn from 
Cage #2. 
Choice 1, at the top of the decision sheet, pays $0 if the ball chosen from Cage #2 
is orange and $50 if the ball chosen from Cage #2 is white. If you are certain that Cage #2 
is filled entirely with white balls then you should select Choice 1. 
Choice 51, at the bottom of the decision sheet, pays $50 if the ball chosen from 
Cage #2 is orange and $0 if ball chosen from Cage #2 is white. If you are certain that 
Cage #2 is filled entirely with orange balls then you should select Choice 51. 
Choices with low numbers pay more if a white ball is drawn from Cage #2, and 
less if an orange ball is drawn from Cage #2. Choices with high numbers pay more if an 
orange ball is drawn from Cage #2, and less if a white ball is drawn from Cage #2. 
Are there any questions? 
Please circle your choice on the decision sheet. 
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Row Choice: __________ 
 
To be completed by Staff: 
 
Ball Drawn from Cage #2: ________ Earnings: _________ 
Choice
1 $0.00 $50.00
2 $0.50 $49.50
3 $1.50 $48.50
4 $2.00 $48.00
5 $2.50 $47.50
6 $3.50 $46.50
7 $4.00 $46.00
8 $4.50 $45.50
9 $5.50 $44.50
10 $6.00 $44.00
11 $6.50 $43.50
12 $7.00 $43.00
13 $8.00 $42.00
14 $8.50 $41.50
15 $9.00 $41.00
16 $10.00 $40.00
17 $10.50 $39.50
18 $11.00 $39.00
19 $12.00 $38.00
20 $12.50 $37.50
21 $13.00 $37.00
22 $14.00 $36.00
23 $14.50 $35.50
24 $15.00 $35.00
25 $16.00 $34.00
26 $16.50 $33.50
27 $17.00 $33.00
28 $18.00 $32.00
29 $18.50 $31.50
30 $19.00 $31.00
31 $19.50 $30.50
32 $20.50 $29.50
33 $21.00 $29.00
34 $21.50 $28.50
35 $22.50 $27.50
36 $23.00 $27.00
37 $23.50 $26.50
38 $24.50 $25.50
39 $25.00 $25.00
40 $27.00 $23.00
41 $29.00 $21.00
42 $31.50 $18.50
43 $33.50 $16.50
44 $35.50 $14.50
45 $37.50 $12.50
46 $39.50 $10.50
47 $41.50 $8.50
48 $44.00 $6.00
49 $46.00 $4.00
50 $48.00 $2.00
51 $50.00 $0.00
Payment if Ball Drawn 
from Cage #2 is Orange
Payment if Ball Drawn 
from Cage #2 is White
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D.4 Stage 4: Lottery Task Instructions 
Your Instructions 
Here, you will be asked to choose between lotteries with varying prizes and 
chances of winning. You will be presented with a series of lotteries where you will make 
choices between pairs of them. There are 45 pairs in the series. For each pair of lotteries, 
you should indicate which of the two lotteries you prefer to play. You will actually get 
the chance to play one of the lotteries you choose, and will be paid according to the 
outcome of that lottery, so you should think carefully about which lotteries you prefer. 
Here is an example of what the computer display of such a pair of lotteries will 
look like. The display on your screen will be bigger and easier to read. 
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The outcome of the lotteries will be determined by the draw of a random number 
between 1 and 100. Each number between (and including) 1 and 100 is equally likely to 
occur. In fact, you will be able to draw the number yourself using two 10-sided dice. 
In the above example the left lottery pays five dollars ($5) if the number on the 
dice that is rolled is between 1 and 40, and pays fifteen dollars ($15) if the number is 
between 41 and 100. The yellow color in the pie chart corresponds to 40% of the area and 
illustrates the chances that the number on the dice rolled will be between 1 and 40 and 
your prize will be $5. The black area in the pie chart corresponds to 60% of the area and 
illustrates the chances that the number on the dice rolled will be between 41 and 100 and 
your prize will be $15. 
We have selected colors for the pie charts such that a darker color indicates a 
higher prize. White will be used when the prize is zero dollars ($0). 
Now look at the pie in the chart on the right. It pays five dollars ($5) if the 
number on the dice rolled is between 1 and 50, ten dollars ($10) if the number is between 
51 and 90, and fifteen dollars ($15) if the number is between 91 and 100. As with the 
lottery on the left, the pie slices represent the fraction of the possible numbers which 
yield each payoff. For example, the size of the $15 pie slice is 10% of the total pie. 
Each pair of lotteries is shown on a separate screen on the computer. On each 
screen, you should indicate which of the lotteries you prefer to play by clicking on one of 
the three boxes beneath the lotteries. You should click the LEFT box if you prefer the 
lottery on the left, the RIGHT box if you prefer the lottery on the right, and the DON’T 
CARE box if you do not prefer one or the other. 
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You should approach each pair of lotteries as if it is the one out of the 45 that you 
will play out. If you chose DON’T CARE in the lottery pair that we play out, you will 
pick one using a 10-sided die, where the numbers 1-5 correspond to the left lottery and 
the numbers 6-10 to the right lottery. 
After you have worked through all of the pairs of lotteries, raise your hand and an 
experimenter will come over. You will then roll two 10-sided die to determine which pair 
of lotteries that will be played out. You roll the die until a number between 1 and 45 
comes up, and that is the lottery pair to be played. If you picked DON’T CARE for that 
pair, you will use the 10-sided die to decide which one you will play. Finally, you will 
roll the two 10-sided dice to determine the outcome of the lottery you chose. 
For instance, suppose you picked the lottery on the left in the above example. If 
the random number you rolled was 37, you would win $5; if it was 93, you would get 
$15. If you picked the lottery on the right and drew the number 37, you would get $5; if it 
was 93, you would get $15. 
Therefore, your payoff is determined by three things: 
• by which lottery pair is chosen to be played out in the series of 45 such pairs 
using the two 10-sided die; 
• by which lottery you selected, the left or the right, for that pair; and 
• by the outcome of that lottery when you roll the two 10-sided die. 
This is not a test of whether you can pick the best lottery in each pair, because 
none of the lotteries are necessarily better than the others. Which lotteries you prefer is a 
matter of personal taste. The people next to you will have different lotteries in front of 
them when you make your choices, and may have different tastes, so their responses 
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should not matter to you. Please work silently, and make your choices by thinking 
carefully about each lottery. 
All payoffs are in cash, and are in addition to the $5 show-up fee that you receive 
just for being here and any earnings from the previous stage. 
We will now come around to your computer and get you started. When you are 
finished, please signal someone to come around to play out your lottery and record your 
earnings. 
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APPENDIX E: EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR CHAPTER 4 
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E.1 Experimenter Instructions 
Experimenter Instructions 
Welcome. This is an experiment in individual decision making. You can earn cash 
based on the choices you make today. Money you earn today will be paid to you in cash 
at the end of the experiment. You will be paid $5 for participating in the experiment. The 
experiment will last no more than 2 hours. Please make sure that you can stay until the 
end. In addition to the participation fee, your earnings will depend partly on chance and 
partly on the choices you make today. The instructions are simple and you will benefit 
from following them carefully. 
There are three stages today: 
4. We will ask you a series of questions about yourself, such as some basic 
information about your age. The computer will prompt you for these questions, 
and you should just work through them at your own pace when we log you in. 
5. We will then pause and provide instructions on some choices you are to make 
over different amounts of money that have different chances of occurring. These 
choices will directly affect your earnings.  
6. We will then pause again, and provide some instructions on the final task, which 
involves you making some more choices over different amounts of money that 
have different chances of occurring. These choices will also directly affect your 
earnings. 
The instructions for the second and third stage will provide more information on 
the type of choices you are being asked to make. 
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The experimenters will then collate all of your earnings and pay you for the 
money you have earned. 
Your choices are private, and will only be associated with an ID that we will enter 
when we log you in to the computer. So your name, address and SSN will not be linked 
to any choices you make. We will pay you privately, one at a time, to keep your earnings 
private. 
Are there any questions? If not, go ahead and answer the questions until the 
computer pauses and asks for a password. When everyone is finished this stage we will 
announce the password and we can go on to the second stage. There is no hurry, so take 
your time. 
[Wait for everyone to finish demographics] 
There is an instruction book in front of each of you. Please open it and follow 
along as I read the instructions out loud. 
[Do individual choice task, read instructions out loud]  
Now that everyone has completed the second stage of today’s experiment, 
research assistants are passing around instruction books for the third and final stage. 
[Do random lottery pair task, read instructions out loud] 
E.2 Stage 1: Demographics Questions 
Demographics questions were identical to those in Appendix D.2. 
E.3 Stage 2: Commodity Betting Instructions 
E.3.1 Commodity Choice Task 
On the last page of this booklet there is a decision sheet with twenty paired 
choices between ―Option I‖ and ―Option II.‖ In each row you will be asked to circle one 
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of the three decisions shown in the right-hand column. Before you start making your 
twenty choices, let me explain how these choices affect you potential earnings. 
Although you will make twenty decisions, only one choice will affect your 
earnings. You will not know in advance which decision you make will end up affecting 
your earnings. After completing the twenty choices you will roll a 20-sided die the result 
corresponds to the row from the decision sheet you will play. Obviously, each decision 
has an equal chance of being used in the end. 
Once the row has been selected we will use a two 10-sided dice to play the option 
I or II corresponding to your decision on the selected row. The final result will be written 
on the decision sheet. 
Please look at row 1, at the top of the table. Option I pays C if the die shows a 
number between 1 and 5, and it pays B if the die shows a number between 6 and 100. 
Option II pays A if the die shows a number between 1 and 5, and it pays D if the die 
shows a number between 6 and 100. The other choices are similar. 
Each of these letters A, B, C, and D labels one of the sodas on the table in the 
front of the room. If the soda you win is a Coke, we will pay you $10. If the soda you win 
is Pepsi we will pay you $0. 
In the column labeled ―Decision,‖ there are three choices for each row. For each 
row, circle the Roman numeral of the option that you prefer. If you do not care whether 
you receive Option I or Option II, circle ―Don’t Care.‖ 
After making each of your twenty decisions, please raise your hand and wait for 
assistance. A research assistant will bring you a 20-sided die that you will roll to 
determine which row from the record sheet you will be paid from. For example, if you 
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roll a 1 then your decision for row 1 will be binding. If you choose Don’t Care in the 
decision that we play out, we will pick one for you using a 10-sided die, where the 
numbers 1-5 correspond to Option I and the numbers 6-10 correspond to Option II. 
After we know which decision is binding, you will roll the two 10-sided die to 
determine which soda you will be paid for. Remember, we will pay you $10 if you win a 
Coke. If you win Pepsi, we will pay you $0. 
At the conclusion of this session you can have either a Coke or a Pepsi, which 
ever you prefer. You should not let the fact that you like to drink one soda brand over the 
other influence the 20 choices you make. You can have whichever soda you prefer at the 
end of the session. 
Consider the following examples. 
If you chose Option I for row 1 and you then roll a 3 using the two 10-sided dice, 
you will be paid based on the brand of soda C. In fact, if your roll any number less than 
or equal to 5, you will be paid based on the brand of soda C. On the other hand, if you 
roll a 6 or higher you will be paid based on the brand of soda B. 
Alternatively, if you chose Option II for row 1 and you then roll a 3 using the two 
10-sided dice, you will be paid based on the brand of soda A. In fact, if your roll any 
number less than or equal to 5, you will be paid based on the brand of soda A. On the 
other hand, if you roll a 6 or higher you will be paid based on the brand of soda D. 
If row 20 is the row that we play out, and if you choose Option I, you will be paid 
based on the brand of soda C. On the other hand, if you choose Option II then you will be 
paid based on the brand of soda A. 
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Remember, at the conclusion of this session you can have either a Coke or a 
Pepsi, which ever you prefer. You should not let the fact that you like to drink one soda 
brand over the other influence the 20 choices you make. You can have whichever soda 
you prefer at the end of the session. 
Before you make your choices, you may come to the front of the room to taste 
each soda. 
Are there any questions? 
You may now mark your decisions for each row of the decision sheet. When you 
are satisfied with the decisions that you have made, please raise your hand and wait for a 
research assistant to bring the dice to determine which row you will be paid from. 
E.3.1.1 Ungraded Treatment 
In the ungraded treatment each soda A, B, C, and D was covered with 2 to 3 
layers of blue painters tape. Soda labels were not visible. The instructions were identical 
to those used in the branded treatment, above. 
E.3.1.2 Graded Treatment 
In the graded treatment the following text is inserted before subjects are asked to 
make their choices. 
Before you make your choices, I would like to ask for a volunteer to come taste 
each soda and then make a guess whether each is Coke or Pepsi. This volunteer will write 
his guesses on the index cards in front of each can. If this volunteer correctly guesses the 
brand of each soda he will be paid $10 in addition to his/her earning from his/her 
decisions.  
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If you would like to volunteer please raise your hand. If there is more than one 
volunteer we will pick one randomly. 
 
Before you make your choices, you may come to the front of the room to taste 
each soda. 
 
  152 
E.3.2 Commodity Choice Task Decision Sheet 
Row Option I Option II Decision 
1 5/100 of C and 95/100 of B 95/100 of D and 5/100 of A I II Don’t Care 
2 8/100 of C and 92/100 of B 92/100 of D and 8/100 of A I II Don’t Care 
3 11/100 of C and 89/100 of B 89/100 of D and 11/100 of A I II Don’t Care 
4 15/100 of C and 85/100 of B 85/100 of D and 15/100 of A I II Don’t Care 
5 18/100 of C and 82/100 of B 82/100 of D and 18/100 of A I II Don’t Care 
6 21/100 of C and 79/100 of B 79/100 of D and 21/100 of A I II Don’t Care 
7 24/100 of C and 76/100 of B 76/100 of D and 24/100 of A I II Don’t Care 
8 28/100 of C and 72/100 of B 72/100 of D and 28/100 of A I II Don’t Care 
9 31/100 of C and 69/100 of B 69/100 of D and 31/100 of A I II Don’t Care 
10 34/100 of C and 66/100 of B 66/100 of D and 34/100 of A I II Don’t Care 
11 37/100 of C and 63/100 of B 63/100 of D and 37/100 of A I II Don’t Care 
12 40/100 of C and 60/100 of B 60/100 of D and 40/100 of A I II Don’t Care 
13 44/100 of C and 56/100 of B 56/100 of D and 44/100 of A I II Don’t Care 
14 47/100 of C and 53/100 of B 53/100 of D and 47/100 of A I II Don’t Care 
15 50/100 of C and 50/100 of B 50/100 of D and 50/100 of A I II Don’t Care 
16 60/100 of C and 40/100 of B 40/100 of D and 60/100 of A I II Don’t Care 
17 70/100 of C and 30/100 of B 30/100 of D and 70/100 of A I II Don’t Care 
18 80/100 of C and 20/100 of B 20/100 of D and 80/100 of A I II Don’t Care 
19 90/100 of C and 10/100 of B 10/100 of D and 90/100 of A I II Don’t Care 
20 100/100 of C and 0/100 of B 0/100 of D and 100/100 of A I II Don’t Care 
 
To be completed by Staff: 
 
Row Number Selected: __________  Option Selected: __________ 
Roll of 100-Sided Die: __________  Prize Won: __________  Dollar Value of prize: _________ 
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E.3.3 Belief Elicitation Instructions 
E.3.3.1 Brand Elicitation 
Please read these instructions quietly to yourself. If you have any questions please 
raise your hand and a research assistant will come by and answer your questions 
privately. 
In this task you will place a bet that the soda you won is either Coke or Pepsi. At 
the conclusion of this session, we will uncover each can to reveal the brands. 
Your decision sheet for this task is on the following page. Before you make your 
choice, lets discuss the decision sheet.  
You will be paid based on the choice you circle and the brand of the soda you 
won in the previous task. The true brand will be determined when we uncover each can at 
the conclusion of this stage of today’s session. Before you make your report, lets discuss 
the decision sheet. 
If you believe with 100% certainty that the correct brand for the soda you won is 
Coke then you should select row 100%. Row 100% pays $50 if the correct brand for the 
soda you won is Coke and $0 if the correct brand for the soda you won is Pepsi. 
Similarly, if you are sure that the correct brand for the soda you won is Pepsi 
then you should select row 0%. Selecting row 0% means that you believe there is a 0% 
chance certainty that the correct brand for the soda you won is Coke. Row 0% pays $0 
if that the correct brand for the soda you won is Coke and $50 if that the correct brand 
for the soda you won is Pepsi. 
Are there any questions? 
Please circle your belief on the decision sheet.  
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DECISION SHEET 
 
 
Row Choice: __________ 
 
To be completed by Staff: 
 
Correct Brand Coke (yes/no)?: ________  Earnings: _________ 
Row
0% $0.00 $50.00
1% $0.50 $49.50
3% $1.50 $48.50
4% $2.00 $48.00
5% $2.50 $47.50
7% $3.50 $46.50
8% $4.00 $46.00
9% $4.50 $45.50
11% $5.50 $44.50
12% $6.00 $44.00
14% $7.00 $43.00
15% $7.50 $42.50
16% $8.00 $42.00
18% $9.00 $41.00
19% $9.50 $40.50
20% $10.00 $40.00
22% $11.00 $39.00
23% $11.50 $38.50
24% $12.00 $38.00
26% $13.00 $37.00
27% $13.50 $36.50
28% $14.00 $36.00
30% $15.00 $35.00
31% $15.50 $34.50
32% $16.00 $34.00
34% $17.00 $33.00
35% $17.50 $32.50
36% $18.00 $32.00
38% $19.00 $31.00
39% $19.50 $30.50
41% $20.50 $29.50
42% $21.00 $29.00
43% $21.50 $28.50
45% $22.50 $27.50
46% $23.00 $27.00
47% $23.50 $26.50
49% $24.50 $25.50
50% $25.00 $25.00
54% $27.00 $23.00
58% $29.00 $21.00
62% $31.00 $19.00
65% $32.50 $17.50
69% $34.50 $15.50
73% $36.50 $13.50
77% $38.50 $11.50
81% $40.50 $9.50
85% $42.50 $7.50
88% $44.00 $6.00
92% $46.00 $4.00
96% $48.00 $2.00
100% $50.00 $0.00
Payment if the correct 
brand for the soda you 
won is Coke
Payment if the correct 
brand for the soda you 
won is Pepsi
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E.3.3.2 Prediction Accuracy Elicitation 
Please read these instructions quietly to yourself. If you have any questions please 
raise your hand and a research assistant will come by and answer your questions 
privately. 
In this task you will place a bet that the brands of both sodas in your chosen 
option were predicted correctly by our volunteer. At the conclusion of this session, we 
will uncover each can to reveal the brands. 
Your decision sheet for this task is on the following page. Before you make your 
choice, lets discuss the decision sheet.  
You will be paid based on the choice you circle and the accuracy of the brand 
prediction marked on each index card for the sodas in you chosen option from the 
previous task. The true brand will be determined when we uncover each can at the 
conclusion of this stage of today’s session. Before you make your report, lets discuss the 
decision sheet. 
If you believe with 100% certainty that the brands for both sodas in your chosen 
option were predicted correctly then you should select row 100%. Row 100% pays $50 if 
both sodas in your chosen option were predicted correctly and $0 if the brand for at least 
one of the sodas in your chosen option was predicted incorrectly. 
Similarly, if you are sure that the brand for at least one of the sodas in your 
chosen option is not correct then you should select row 0%. Selecting row 0% means that 
you believe there is a 0% chance certainty that the brands for both sodas in your chosen 
option were predicted correctly. Row 0% pays $0 if the brands for both sodas in your 
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chosen option were predicted correctly and $50 if the brand for at least one of the sodas 
in your chosen option is not correct. 
Are there any questions? 
Please circle your belief on the decision sheet. 
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DECISION SHEET 
 
 
Row Choice: __________ 
 
To be completed by Staff: 
 
Correct Brand Predicted (yes/no)?: ________  Earnings: _________ 
Row
0% $0.00 $50.00
1% $0.50 $49.50
3% $1.50 $48.50
4% $2.00 $48.00
5% $2.50 $47.50
7% $3.50 $46.50
8% $4.00 $46.00
9% $4.50 $45.50
11% $5.50 $44.50
12% $6.00 $44.00
14% $7.00 $43.00
15% $7.50 $42.50
16% $8.00 $42.00
18% $9.00 $41.00
19% $9.50 $40.50
20% $10.00 $40.00
22% $11.00 $39.00
23% $11.50 $38.50
24% $12.00 $38.00
26% $13.00 $37.00
27% $13.50 $36.50
28% $14.00 $36.00
30% $15.00 $35.00
31% $15.50 $34.50
32% $16.00 $34.00
34% $17.00 $33.00
35% $17.50 $32.50
36% $18.00 $32.00
38% $19.00 $31.00
39% $19.50 $30.50
41% $20.50 $29.50
42% $21.00 $29.00
43% $21.50 $28.50
45% $22.50 $27.50
46% $23.00 $27.00
47% $23.50 $26.50
49% $24.50 $25.50
50% $25.00 $25.00
54% $27.00 $23.00
58% $29.00 $21.00
62% $31.00 $19.00
65% $32.50 $17.50
69% $34.50 $15.50
73% $36.50 $13.50
77% $38.50 $11.50
81% $40.50 $9.50
85% $42.50 $7.50
88% $44.00 $6.00
92% $46.00 $4.00
96% $48.00 $2.00
100% $50.00 $0.00
Payment if both soda 
brands in  your chosen 
option are predicted 
correctly
Payment if at least one 
soda brands in  your chosen 
option are predicted 
incorrectly
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E.4 Stage 3: Lottery Task Instructions 
Lottery task instructions were identical to those used in Appendix D.4. 
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APPENDIX F: EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR CHAPTER 5 
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F.1 Experimenter instructions 
Experimenter Instructions 
Welcome. This is an experiment in individual decision making. You can earn cash 
based on the choices you make today. Money you earn today will be paid to you in cash 
at the end of the experiment. You will be paid $5 for participating in the experiment. The 
experiment will last no more than 2 and ½ hours. Please make sure that you can stay 
until the end. In addition to the participation fee, your earnings will depend partly on 
chance and partly on the choices you make today. The instructions are simple and you 
will benefit from following them carefully. 
There are three stages today: 
7. We will ask you a series of questions about yourself, such as some basic 
information about your age. The computer will prompt you for these questions, 
and you should just work through them at your own pace when we log you in. 
8. We will then pause and provide instructions on some choices you are to make 
over different amounts of money that have different chances of occurring. These 
choices will directly affect your earnings.  
9. We will then pause again, and provide some instructions on the final task, which 
involves you making some more choices over different amounts of money that 
have different chances of occurring. These choices will also directly affect your 
earnings. 
The instructions for the second and third stage will provide more information on 
the type of choices you are being asked to make. 
 161 
The experimenters will then collate all of your earnings and pay you for the 
money you have earned. 
Your choices are private, and will only be associated with an ID that we will enter 
when we log you in to the computer. So your name, address and SSN will not be linked 
to any choices you make. We will pay you privately, one at a time, to keep your earnings 
private. 
Are there any questions? If not, go ahead and answer the questions until the 
computer pauses and asks for a password. When everyone is finished this stage we will 
announce the password and we can go on to the second stage. There is no hurry, so take 
your time. 
[WAIT FOR EVERYONE TO FINISH DEMOGRAPHICS] 
There is an instruction book in front of each of you. Please open it and follow 
along as I read the instructions out loud. 
[Do public goods game, read instructions out loud] 
Now that everyone has finished this game, I would like to introduce the next 
decision task. Our research assistants are handing out the decision books for this task. 
[Do WTA task, read instructions out loud.] 
Thank you. Now that everyone has finished this task, research assistants will 
come by to play everyone’s decisions. 
Before we record your earnings from the sale of your record sheet and play out 
the punishment phase of this session, each of you has the chance to make another choice, 
with much higher potential payoffs. Research assistants are passing around the decisions 
book for the choice that Sellers will now be allowed to make if they want to. If you 
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choose to participate in this task, we will not pay you for the decisions that you have 
made so far. 
Earnings from this next choice may be very large, they may also be small. If you 
decide not to participate in this task, please use the red pen on your desk to cross out the 
title of your new book: DECISION TASK. This is your decision to make. If you decide to 
participate, please circle the title of the new decision book and cross out the title of your 
old book: INDIVIDUAL DECISION MAKING. Remember, while some of the payoffs are 
large, there is no catch. We will pay you today for all money earned in this task. You 
have the choice which decision we will pay you for. 
Before we proceed, if anyone has any questions please raise your hand and we 
will answer your questions privately. 
[Do belief elicitation task, read instructions out loud] 
By now everyone should be finished making your selections. If you have not 
finished please raise your hand. 
Before you play your bet, each of you has a decision to make. You can replace the 
bet you just made with the spin of a bingo cage. Let me explain how this works. 
If you decide to replace the bet you just made with the spin of a bingo cage, write 
REPLACE at the bottom of your decision sheet for the task we just completed. If you 
don’t care, write DON’T CARE. If you write DON’T CARE, you will pick one using a 
10-sided die, where the numbers 1-5 correspond to the keeping your bet and the numbers 
6-10 to replacing your bet. If your bet is replaced, a research assistant will bring you a 
small bingo cage filled with balls numbered between 0 and 100. Before you make this 
decision, lets do an example to show you how this works. 
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For row 19%: If this bet is replaced and you draw a bingo ball numbered between 
0 and 19 we will pay $9.50. On the other hand, if you draw a bingo ball number between 
20 and 100 we pay $40.50.  
Lets do one more example. 
For row 77%: If this bet is replaced and you draw a bingo ball numbered between 
0 and 77 we will pay $38.50. On the other hand, if you draw a bingo ball numbered 
between 78 and 100 we pay $11.50. 
Are there any questions? 
[ANSWER QUESTIONS] 
Remember, if you decide to replace the bet you just made with the spin of a bingo 
cage, write REPLACE at the bottom of your decision sheet for the task we just 
completed. If you don’t care, write DON’T CARE. If you write DON’T CARE, you will 
pick one using a 10-sided die, where the numbers 1-5 correspond to the keeping your bet 
and the numbers 6-10 to replacing your bet. This decision is final. Make you decision 
now. 
[WAIT FOR DECISIONS TO BE MADE] 
Has everyone made their decision? 
Please put your pens down and wait for a research assistant to come verify that 
your decision has been made. If you chose REPLACE or DON’T CARE, you will play 
that decision now. 
[SPIN CAGE FOR THOSE SUBJECTS WHO REPLACE] 
[FOLD WTA DECISION BOOKS SO SENDER & PUNISHER DECISIONS SHEETS 
ARE SHOWING.] 
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[FOLD WTA BOOKS OF SELLERS TO KEEP THEIR IDENTITIES SECRET] 
[Task 4 – Punishment] 
If you are a Sender and the seller you are paired with sold their record sheet we 
will now pass it to you. 
[PASS RECORD SHEETS AND BLANKS] 
If your role is Sender, we would like you to make your decision to either keep the 
sellers information confidential or pass it to the punisher now. Please circle either A or B 
on the decision sheet in front of you. If you are not a Sender or you did not receive a 
seller’s record sheet you have no decision to make. 
[WAIT FOR DECISIONS TO BE MADE] 
We will now collect all record sheets and give them to the punishers according to 
the decisions made by the sellers and senders they are paired with. 
[COLLECT DECISION SHEETS FROM SENDERS] 
[WRITE SENDER DECISION ON THE BOTTOM OF THE SELLER’S RECORD 
SHEET] 
[COLLECT BLANKS FROM ALL SELLERS AND PUNISHERS] 
[PASS RECORD SHEETS AND BLANKS TO PUNISHERS] 
[PASS BLANKS TO SELLERS AND SENDERS] 
If you have been assigned the role of Punisher, we would like you to make your 
decision now. 
[WAIT FOR DECISIONS TO BE MADE] 
[COLLECT RECORD SHEETS AND BLANKS] 
[IF SELLER IS PUNISHED, WRITE PUNISHED ON THEIR RECORD SHEET] 
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Research assistant will now come by and calculate your final earnings for this 
stage. 
[COLLECT RECORD SHEETS FROM PUNISHERS. IF THEY PUNISH WRITE 
PUNISHED ON THEM.] 
[COLLECT BLANKS FOR SELLERS, SENDERS, AND SOME PUNISHERS] 
[GIVE SELLERS THEIR ORIGINAL RECORD SHEET FROM FIRST GAME] 
[GIVE BLANKS TO SENDERS AND PUNISHERS] 
This stage is now over. 
F.2 Stage 1: Demographics Questions 
Demographics questions were identical to those in Appendix D.2. 
F.3 Stage 2: Privacy task Instructions 
F.3.1 Public Goods Instructions 
The task that will be described to you next will be repeated 10 times. Each 
repetition will be referred to as a round. In each round you will be matched with four 
other people in this room. 
You begin each round with 20 ―tokens.‖ Your task is to decide how to use your 
tokens. You have to decide how many of the 20 tokens you want to invest and how many 
of the 20 tokens to keep for yourself. The people you are matched with will decide how 
many of their tokens to keep, and how many to invest. The consequences of your 
decision are explained in detail below. 
At the beginning of each round a screen similar to this will appear: 
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The round number and your ID number appear at the top middle of the screen. 
The round number is also indicated in the left hand column titled ―Round.‖ Your decision 
must be made before the next round can begin. 
You have to decide how many tokens you want to invest by choosing a number 
between 0 and 20 in the drop-down box labeled ―Number Invested,‖ located in the 
middle of your screen. This field can be found by clicking ―please choose‖ next to 
―Tokens to Invest.‖ As soon as you have decided how many tokens to invest, you have 
also decided how many tokens you keep for yourself, since this is 20 tokens minus your 
investment. After entering your investment, you must press ―Submit.‖ Once you have 
done this, you will be asked to confirm your decision for that round. Once you confirm 
your investment, your decision can no longer be revised. 
After you and everyone else have made your decisions the following earnings 
screen will show you the total amount of tokens invested. This screen also shows you 
how much money you have earned during the round. 
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Your earnings consist of two parts: 
1) The tokens which you have kept for yourself 
2) The earnings from investment. This is calculated as follows: 
Your earnings from investment = 1 cents x the sum of the investments from everyone this 
round. 
 
The earnings from investment that go to each of you are calculated in the same 
way, which means that each person receives the same earnings from investment. Suppose 
the sum of the contributions is 20 tokens. In this case each of you receives earnings from 
investment of 1 cent x 20 = 20 cents. On the other hand, if the total investment is 3 
tokens, then each member of the group receives earnings of 1 cent x 3 = 3 cents from 
investment. 
Your earnings for each round are therefore: 
 
3 cents x (20 - your investment) + 1 cents x (sum of all investments) 
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Each token that you keep for yourself adds 3 cents to your earnings. If you 
invested 1 additional token, then your earnings from investment would rise by 1 cents x 
1=1 cents. The earnings of the other people would also rise by 1 cents, so that the 
combined earnings for all of you from investment would rise by 5 cents. Your investment 
therefore also increases the earnings of the other people. On the other hand you also get 
earnings for each token invested by the others. For each token invested by the others you 
also earn 3 cents x 1=3 cents. 
Of course, every additional token you contribute to the project is 1 less token that 
goes towards ―Earnings from private tokens kept.‖ 
To summarize: For each token you invest, your earnings are reduced 3 cents by 
the token you invest and increased by the investment earnings of 1 cents. In addition, 
your earnings are increased by 1 cents for each token contributed by the others. After you 
review the earnings screen, please press the button at the bottom to begin the next round. 
Before we start the actual experiment you will have a chance to practice this task 
for two rounds. 
F.3.1.1 Public Goods Treatments 
The public goods game task used a 2 2  design, setting endowments to {20 
tokens, 30 tokens} and public return from investment {2 tokens, 1 token}. 
F.3.2 BDM / WTA Privacy Loss Instructions 
In this task each of you has been assigned one of three roles: Seller, Sender, or 
Punisher. Your role is indicated at the top of the next page of this booklet. Please do not 
read ahead. 
Let me explain these roles here. 
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Sellers have the chance to sell us a copy of their record sheet from the game that 
was just played. If the Seller sells us their record sheet we will then give the record 
sheet to either a Sender or a Punisher. Sellers will know in advance the role of the 
person who we would give the record sheet to. However, Sellers will not know their true 
identity. And they will not know the Sellers true identity. 
If a Seller’s record sheet is sold and then given to a Sender, that Sender will 
decide whether to keep the records confidential or to share the records with a Punisher. 
This decision is entirely up to the Sender. Remember that the Sender will not know the 
true identity of the Seller or the Punisher. And the Punisher and Seller will not know the 
true identity of the Sender. 
At the end of this stage, each person assigned to the role of Punisher will have a 
choice to make. Punishers will choose to: 
(a) deduct 50% of the Seller’s earning from the first game 
(b) deduct no earnings. 
Punishers may deduct earnings from a Seller even if the seller did not sell their 
record sheet. This decision is entirely up to the Punisher. 
Remember, each Sender will decide to keep a record sheet confidential or to share 
the record sheet with a Punisher. Each Punisher will decide whether or not to deduct 
earnings from the Seller. 
The next page of this booklet indicates your role: Seller, Sender, or Punisher. 
Please read the instructions, on the following page quietly to yourself. If you have 
any questions please raise your hand and a research assistant will come by and answer 
your questions privately. 
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In this experiment, you are a Seller. The cartoon below shows your role, circled 
in red, along with the roles of the people you are paired with. 
YOU
Don’t 
Sell 
Records
Sell
Records
Us the
Experimenter
Your records   
are secret
We 
give
to 
Sender
Sender
Give to punisher
Keep secret
Punisher
You lose 
half of 
money
You lose 
no 
money
 
If you sell your record sheet to us, we will give it to the Sender you are paired 
with. The Sender will decide whether to keep your records confidential or to share the 
records with a Punisher. The punisher will choose to: 
(a) deduct 50% of the Seller’s earning from the first game 
(b) deduct no earnings. 
Before we proceed, if you have any questions please raise your hand and we will 
answer your questions privately. 
 
Now that everyone has had a chance to understand their role and ask questions, 
we will explain how Sellers can sell a copy of their record sheet from the first task. 
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Before we explain how Sellers sell us their record sheet, Senders and Punishers 
can also sell us their record sheet. But, we will keep Senders’ and Punishers’ record 
sheets confidential. 
To summarize, we would like to buy everyone’s record sheet. If your role is 
Seller, we will give your record sheet to either a Sender or Punisher, as indicated on the 
previous page of your instructions. If your role is Sender or Punisher we will keep your 
record sheet confidential.  
If you have any questions please raise your hand and a research assistant will 
come by and answer your questions privately. 
We will now explain how you can sell your record sheet. 
On the last page of this decision book you have an decision sheet. It reads as 
follows: 
―I will sell record sheet for $______.‖ 
In order to provide you with an incentive to think about the value of your record 
sheet, and tell us that value, we will do the following. We will randomly choose a price 
between $0.00 and $20.99 to pay for a record sheet. We will not pay more than $20.99. 
Before you write your offer in the blank space provided, let me explain how the sale will 
work. 
After you write your price in the blank provided on the last page of this booklet, a 
research assistant will bring you one 20-sided die and two 10-sided dice. You will roll 
each of these dice to determine how much money we are willing to pay for the record 
sheet. Numbers on the 20-sided die will represent dollars. The numbers rolled with the 
two 10-sided dice will represent cents. Consider the following examples. 
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Example 1: ―John Doe‖ is willing to sell his record sheet for $7.78, so he would 
write 7.78 on the last page of his booklet. If he then rolls a 5 on the 20-sided die and a 65 
with the two 10-sided dice, then we are only willing to pay $5.65 for ―John Doe’s‖ record 
sheet. Because we are not willing to pay the price that ―John Doe‖ has asked, no sale 
takes place and ―John Doe‖ keeps his record sheet private. 
Example 2: ―Jane Doe‖ is willing to sell her record sheet for $4.33, so she would 
write 4.33 on the last page of her booklet. If she then rolls a 4 on the 20-sided die and a 
73 with the two 10-sided dice, then we are willing to pay $4.73 for ―Jane Doe’s‖ record 
sheet. Because we are willing to pay more than the price that ―Jane Doe‖ has asked, a 
sale takes place and in exchange for a copy of her record sheet ―Jane Doe‖ will receive 
$4.73. 
Your best interest is served by simply telling us the value of the record sheet to 
you. If the price you write down is too high or too low, then you are passing up 
opportunities that you would prefer. 
• For example, suppose Jane would be willing to sell her record sheet for 
$12 but instead she marked $15. If the amount of money drawn at random 
is anything between the $12 and $15 (for example $13.50), she would 
keep her record sheet and lose the $13.50 that she would have been willing 
to make the trade for. 
• Suppose John would be willing to sell his record sheet for $15 but he 
marked $12. If the amount of money drawn at random is between the $15 
and $12 (for example $13.50) then he would be forced to sell the record 
sheet even though at that price he prefers to keep the record sheet secret. 
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You may now mark your decision on the decision sheet. 
DECISION SHEET 
YOU
Don’t 
Sell 
Records
Sell
Records
Us the
Experimenter
Your records   
are secret
We 
give
to 
Sender
Sender
Give to punisher
Keep secret
Punisher
You lose 
half of 
money
You lose 
no 
money
 
Remember, the cartoon above shows your role, circled in red, along with the roles 
of the people you are paired with. Please write the amount of money you are willing to 
sell your record sheet for in the blank space provided on the next line. 
I will sell record sheet for $__________ 
 
 
20-
sided Roll 
1
st
 
10-sided Die 
Roll 
2
nd
 
10-sided Die 
Roll 
   
 
Did sale take place? Yes  No 
If yes, amount paid $___________  
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F.3.2.1 Private Instructions and Decision Sheet for Sender in Indirect-Sale 
In this experiment, you are a Sender. The cartoon below shows your role, circled 
in red, along with the roles of the people you are paired with. 
Seller
Don’t 
Sell 
Records
Sell
Records
Us the
Experimenter
Seller’s records   
are secret
We 
give
to   
you
You
Give to punisher
Keep secret
Punisher
Seller loses 
half of 
money
Seller 
loses no 
money
 
At the end of this session you may or may not receive the record sheet of a Seller. 
If you receive a seller’s record sheet, it will include the Seller’s earnings in the game that 
was just played. 
You have a decision to make at the end of the session. You will need to decide to 
either keep information confidential or pass the information to a punisher, who may or 
may not reduce the Seller’s earning from the game that was just played by 50%. This 
decision is entirely up to you. 
Before we proceed, if you have any questions please raise your hand and we will 
answer your questions privately. 
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DECISION SHEET 
Seller
Don’t 
Sell 
Records
Sell
Records
Us the
Experimenter
Seller’s records   
are secret
We 
give
to   
you
You
Give to punisher
Keep secret
Punisher
Seller loses 
half of 
money
Seller 
loses no 
money
 
Remember, the cartoon above shows your role, circled in red, along with the roles 
of the people you are paired with. 
Please write the amount of money you are willing to sell your record sheet for in 
the blank space provided on the next line. 
I will sell record sheet for $__________ 
At the end of this stage you will have a decision to make. For this decision, you 
will need to circle either A or B for your choice. Do not make this choice yet. We will tell 
you when to make your decision. 
 Keep the Seller’s record sheet confidential:  A 
 Pass the Seller’s record sheet to the Punisher: B 
 
 
20-
sided Roll 
1
st
 
10-sided Die 
Roll 
2
nd
 
10-sided Die 
Roll 
   
 
Did sale take place? Yes  No 
If yes, amount paid $___________  
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F.3.2.2 Private Instructions and Decision Sheet for Punisher in Indirect-Sale 
In this experiment, you are a Punisher. The cartoon below shows your role, 
circled in red, along with the roles of the people you are paired with. 
Seller
Don’t 
Sell 
Records
Sell
Records
Us the
Experimenter
Seller’s records   
are secret
We 
give
to   
you
Sender
Give to punisher
Keep secret
You
Seller lose 
half of 
money
Seller 
loses no 
money
 
 
You may or may not receive the record sheet of a Seller. If you receive a seller’s 
record sheet, it will include the Seller’s earnings in the game that was just played. 
You have a decision to make at the end of the stage. You will need to decide to 
either 
(a) deduct 50% of the Seller’s earning from the first game 
(b) deduct no earnings. 
This decision is entirely up to you. 
Before we proceed, if you have any questions please raise your hand and we will 
answer your questions privately. 
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DECISION SHEET 
Seller
Don’t 
Sell 
Records
Sell
Records
Us the
Experimenter
Seller’s records   
are secret
We 
give
to   
you
Sender
Give to punisher
Keep secret
You
Seller lose 
half of 
money
Seller 
loses no 
money
 
Remember, the cartoon above shows your role, circled in red, along with the roles 
of the people you are paired with. 
Please write the amount of money you are willing to sell your record sheet for in 
the blank space provided on the next line. 
I will sell record sheet for $__________ 
At the end of this stage you will have a decision to make. For this decision, you 
will need to circle either A or B for your choice. Do not make this choice yet. We will tell 
you when to make your decision. 
Deduct none of the Seller’s earnings from the first game: A 
Deduct 50% of the Seller’s earning from the first game: B 
 
 
20-
sided Roll 
1
st
 
10-sided Die 
Roll 
2
nd
 
10-sided Die 
Roll 
   
 
Did sale take place? Yes  No 
If yes, amount paid $___________  
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F.3.2.3 Private Instructions and Decision Sheet for Seller in Direct-Sale 
In this experiment, you are a Seller. The cartoon below shows your role, circled 
in red, along with the role of the person you are paired with. 
You
Don’t 
Sell 
Records
Sell
Records
Us the
Experimenter
Your records   
are secret
We     
give
to   
punisher
Punisher
Punish you
Don’t punish you
You lose 
half of 
money
You lose 
no 
money
 
If you sell your record sheet to us, we will give it to the Punisher you are 
paired with. The punisher will choose to: 
(c) deduct 50% of the Seller’s earning from the first game 
(d) deduct no earnings. 
Before we proceed, if you have any questions please raise your hand and we will 
answer your questions privately. 
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DECISION SHEET 
You
Don’t 
Sell 
Records
Sell
Records
Us the
Experimenter
Your records   
are secret
We     
give
to   
punisher
Punisher
Punish you
Don’t punish you
You lose 
half of 
money
You lose 
no 
money
 
 
Remember, the cartoon above shows your role, circled in red, along with the role 
of the person you are paired with. Please write the amount of money you are willing to 
sell your record sheet for in the blank space provided on the next line. 
I will sell record sheet for $__________ 
 
 
 
20-
sided Roll 
1
st
 
10-sided Die 
Roll 
2
nd
 
10-sided Die 
Roll 
   
 
Did sale take place? Yes  No 
If yes, amount paid $___________  
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F.3.2.4 Private Instructions and Decision Sheet for Punisher in Direct-Sale 
In this experiment, you are a Punisher. The cartoon below shows your role, 
circled in red, along with the role of the person you are paired with. 
Seller
Don’t 
Sell 
Records
Sell
Records
Us the
Experimenter
Seller’s records   
are secret
We 
give
to   
you
You
Punish Seller
Don’t punish seller
Seller loses 
half of 
money
Seller 
loses no 
money
 
You may or may not receive the record sheet of a Seller. If you receive a seller’s 
record sheet, it will include the Seller’s earnings in the game that was just played. 
You have a decision to make at the end of the stage. You will need to decide to 
either 
(c) deduct 50% of the Seller’s earning from the first game 
(d) deduct no earnings. 
This decision is entirely up to you. 
Before we proceed, if you have any questions please raise your hand and we will 
answer your questions privately. 
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DECISION SHEET 
Seller
Don’t 
Sell 
Records
Sell
Records
Us the
Experimenter
Seller’s records   
are secret
We 
give
to   
you
You
Punish Seller
Don’t punish seller
Seller loses 
half of 
money
Seller 
loses no 
money
 
Remember, the cartoon above shows your role, circled in red, along with the role 
of the person you are paired with. 
Please write the amount of money you are willing to sell your record sheet for in 
the blank space provided on the next line. 
I will sell record sheet for $__________ 
At the end of this stage you will have a decision to make. For this decision, you 
will need to circle either A or B for your choice. Do not make this choice yet. We will tell 
you when to make your decision. 
Deduct none of the Seller’s earnings from the first game: A 
Deduct 50% of the Seller’s earning from the first game: B 
 
 
20-
sided Roll 
1
st
 
10-sided Die 
Roll 
2
nd
 
10-sided Die 
Roll 
   
 
Did sale take place? Yes  No 
If yes, amount paid $___________  
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F.3.3 Belief Elicitation Instructions 
F.3.3.1 Elicitation of Punishment Beliefs 
Please read these instructions quietly to yourself. If you have any questions please 
raise your hand and a research assistant will come by and answer your questions 
privately. 
In this task you will place a bet that the Punisher reduces your earnings from the 
first game by 50%. 
Your decision sheet for this task is on the following page. Before you make your 
choice, lets discuss the decision sheet.  
You will be paid based on the choice you circle and if the Punisher reduces your 
earnings from the first game by 50%. 
If you believe with 100% certainty the Punisher will reduce you earnings from the 
first game then you should select row 100%. Row 100% pays $50 if the Punisher reduces 
you earnings from the first game and $0 if the Punisher does not reduce you earnings 
from the first game 
Similarly, if you are sure the Punisher will not reduce you earnings from the first 
game then you should select row 0%. Selecting row 0% means that you believe there is a 
0% chance that the Punisher will reduce you earnings from the first game. Row 0% pays 
$0 if the Punisher reduces you earnings from the first game and $50 if the Punisher does 
not reduce you earnings from the first game 
If you have any questions please raise your hand and a research assistant will 
come by to assist you. 
Please circle your belief on the decision sheet.  
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DECISION SHEET 
 
 
Report: __________ 
 
To be completed by Staff: 
 
Did punisher reduce by 50% (yes/no)?: ________  Earnings: _________ 
Row
0% $0.00 $50.00
1% $0.50 $49.50
3% $1.50 $48.50
4% $2.00 $48.00
5% $2.50 $47.50
7% $3.50 $46.50
8% $4.00 $46.00
9% $4.50 $45.50
11% $5.50 $44.50
12% $6.00 $44.00
14% $7.00 $43.00
15% $7.50 $42.50
16% $8.00 $42.00
18% $9.00 $41.00
19% $9.50 $40.50
20% $10.00 $40.00
22% $11.00 $39.00
23% $11.50 $38.50
24% $12.00 $38.00
26% $13.00 $37.00
27% $13.50 $36.50
28% $14.00 $36.00
30% $15.00 $35.00
31% $15.50 $34.50
32% $16.00 $34.00
34% $17.00 $33.00
35% $17.50 $32.50
36% $18.00 $32.00
38% $19.00 $31.00
39% $19.50 $30.50
41% $20.50 $29.50
42% $21.00 $29.00
43% $21.50 $28.50
45% $22.50 $27.50
46% $23.00 $27.00
47% $23.50 $26.50
49% $24.50 $25.50
50% $25.00 $25.00
54% $27.00 $23.00
58% $29.00 $21.00
62% $31.00 $19.00
65% $32.50 $17.50
69% $34.50 $15.50
73% $36.50 $13.50
77% $38.50 $11.50
81% $40.50 $9.50
85% $42.50 $7.50
88% $44.00 $6.00
92% $46.00 $4.00
96% $48.00 $2.00
100% $50.00 $0.00
Payment if the Punisher 
reduces your earning from 
the first game by 50%
Payment if the Punisher does 
not   reduces your earning 
from the first game by 50%
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F.3.3.2 Elicitation of Confidentiality Beliefs 
Please read these instructions quietly to yourself. If you have any questions please 
raise your hand and a research assistant will come by and answer your questions 
privately. 
In this task you will place a bet that the Sender will pass your record sheet to the 
Punisher. 
Your decision sheet for this task is on the following page. Before you make your 
choice, lets discuss the decision sheet.  
You will be paid based on the choice you circle and if Sender passes your 
information to the Punisher.  
If you believe with 100% certainty that your information will be passed to the 
Punisher then you should select row 100%. Row 100% pays $50 if your information is 
passed to the Punisher and $0 if your information is not passed to the Punisher. 
Similarly, if you are sure that your information is not going to be passed to the 
Punisher then you should select row 0%. Selecting row 0% means that you believe there 
is a 0% chance that your information will be passed to the Punisher. Row 0% pays $0 if 
your information is passed to the Punisher and $50 if your information is not passed to 
the Punisher. 
If you have any questions please raise your hand and a research assistant will 
come by to assist you. 
Please circle your belief on the decision sheet. 
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DECISION SHEET 
 
 
Report: __________ 
 
To be completed by Staff: 
 
Was the record sheet passed (yes/no)?: ________  Earnings: _________ 
Row
0% $0.00 $50.00
1% $0.50 $49.50
3% $1.50 $48.50
4% $2.00 $48.00
5% $2.50 $47.50
7% $3.50 $46.50
8% $4.00 $46.00
9% $4.50 $45.50
11% $5.50 $44.50
12% $6.00 $44.00
14% $7.00 $43.00
15% $7.50 $42.50
16% $8.00 $42.00
18% $9.00 $41.00
19% $9.50 $40.50
20% $10.00 $40.00
22% $11.00 $39.00
23% $11.50 $38.50
24% $12.00 $38.00
26% $13.00 $37.00
27% $13.50 $36.50
28% $14.00 $36.00
30% $15.00 $35.00
31% $15.50 $34.50
32% $16.00 $34.00
34% $17.00 $33.00
35% $17.50 $32.50
36% $18.00 $32.00
38% $19.00 $31.00
39% $19.50 $30.50
41% $20.50 $29.50
42% $21.00 $29.00
43% $21.50 $28.50
45% $22.50 $27.50
46% $23.00 $27.00
47% $23.50 $26.50
49% $24.50 $25.50
50% $25.00 $25.00
54% $27.00 $23.00
58% $29.00 $21.00
62% $31.00 $19.00
65% $32.50 $17.50
69% $34.50 $15.50
73% $36.50 $13.50
77% $38.50 $11.50
81% $40.50 $9.50
85% $42.50 $7.50
88% $44.00 $6.00
92% $46.00 $4.00
96% $48.00 $2.00
100% $50.00 $0.00
Payment if your record sheet 
is passed to the Punisher
Payment if your record sheet 
is not passed  to the Punisher
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F3.3.3 Elicitation of Beliefs from Senders and Punishers 
Please read these instructions quietly to yourself. If you have any questions please 
raise your hand and a research assistant will come by and answer your questions 
privately. 
In this task you will place a bet you receive the seller’s record sheet from the first 
game we played. 
Your decision sheet for this task is on the following page. Before you make your 
choice, lets discuss the decision sheet.  
You will be paid based on the choice you circle and if you receive the seller’s 
record sheet.  
If you believe with 100% certainty that you will receive the seller’s record sheet 
then you should select row 100%. Row 100% pays $50 if you receive the seller’s record 
sheet and $0 if you do not. 
Similarly, if you are sure that you will not receive the seller’s record sheet then 
you should select row 0%. Selecting row 0% means that you believe there is a 0% chance 
that you will receive the seller’s record sheet. Row 0% pays $0 if you receive the seller’s 
record sheet and $50 if you do not receive the seller’s record sheet. 
If you have any questions please raise your hand and a research assistant will 
come by to assist you. 
Please circle your belief on the decision sheet. 
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DECISION SHEET 
 
 
Report: __________ 
 
To be completed by Staff: 
 
Was the record sheet received (yes/no)?: ________  Earnings: _________ 
Row
0% $0.00 $50.00
1% $0.50 $49.50
3% $1.50 $48.50
4% $2.00 $48.00
5% $2.50 $47.50
7% $3.50 $46.50
8% $4.00 $46.00
9% $4.50 $45.50
11% $5.50 $44.50
12% $6.00 $44.00
14% $7.00 $43.00
15% $7.50 $42.50
16% $8.00 $42.00
18% $9.00 $41.00
19% $9.50 $40.50
20% $10.00 $40.00
22% $11.00 $39.00
23% $11.50 $38.50
24% $12.00 $38.00
26% $13.00 $37.00
27% $13.50 $36.50
28% $14.00 $36.00
30% $15.00 $35.00
31% $15.50 $34.50
32% $16.00 $34.00
34% $17.00 $33.00
35% $17.50 $32.50
36% $18.00 $32.00
38% $19.00 $31.00
39% $19.50 $30.50
41% $20.50 $29.50
42% $21.00 $29.00
43% $21.50 $28.50
45% $22.50 $27.50
46% $23.00 $27.00
47% $23.50 $26.50
49% $24.50 $25.50
50% $25.00 $25.00
54% $27.00 $23.00
58% $29.00 $21.00
62% $31.00 $19.00
65% $32.50 $17.50
69% $34.50 $15.50
73% $36.50 $13.50
77% $38.50 $11.50
81% $40.50 $9.50
85% $42.50 $7.50
88% $44.00 $6.00
92% $46.00 $4.00
96% $48.00 $2.00
100% $50.00 $0.00
Payment if you receive the 
seller's record sheet
Payment if you do not  receive 
the seller's record sheet
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F.4 Stage 3: Lottery Task Instructions 
Lottery task instructions were identical to those used in Appendix D.4. 
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